

The American Gender Gap in Political Attitudes:
From Foreign Policy to Welfare Programs, 1987-2012

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Abstract

For this study, I analyze differences in men and women's political attitudes on questions relating to the economy, foreign policy, feminism, social issues, and social welfare in the United States. I find that the size and significance of the gender gap varies across issues. For policy areas that do contain statistically significant gaps in political attitudes among the sexes, I further my research on these questions by utilizing interactions with survey years and determining whether, over time, it is American men or women that are largely responsible for creating the gap on these respective issues.

Background of the Gender Gap

The difference in party identification and political behavior among men and women has been a puzzle discussed by political scientists, journalists, and pundits for decades. Among contemporary elections, the partisan gender gap, or the tendency for female voters to be more aligned than men with the Democratic Party, first appeared in 1982. While an actual "gap" in vote share between men and women can be traced back to the 1968 election between Lyndon B. Johnson and Barry Goldwater, American National Election Studies (ANES) voter data indicate the first contemporary appearance of a statistically significant gap occurred in 1982 and remained significant for most years leading up to the 2000's (Norrander and Wilcox, 2008). Like the partisan gap, the ideological gap – the tendency for women to be more likely than men to express a liberal political ideology – also emerged in the early 1980s, with the size and significance only slightly diverting from that of the partisan gap in following years (Norrander and Wilcox, 2008).

Currently, there are several explanations as to why the ideological gender gap exists. Scholarly research from the 1980's finds that foreign policy and military intervention are key issues driving the gap (Smith 1984; Gilens 1988), particularly during the Reagan administration. Women's approval of President Reagan was largely shaped by their positions on defense spending – more so than social welfare or women's rights (Gilens 1988). The theory behind these results is that women primarily tend to choose the no-force option compared to the force option, which is seen as intrusive, violent, or overwhelming. This difference is traceable to socialization, with men being more inclined to participate in violent activity like extreme sports or direct military combat; while gun ownership among women has risen over the past few decades, men are still more likely than women to own a firearm, which may be related to men's support for military force (Saad, 2011).

Economic conditions in the United States have also been found to play a role in the gap's existence. As the percentage of single, economically vulnerable women increases, the gap is more likely to increase (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2004). Single women who are either never married, divorced, or widowed are typically “clustered near the bottom of the socioeconomic structure” (Carroll 1988). Though these women are economically independent, they are typically not considered “well-off” like their female breadwinner counterparts (who are members of a nuclear family). With low economic status comes a higher propensity to rely on welfare programs, and this results in single, low-income women supporting the Democratic Party, whose platform has historically supported social welfare programs.

Expectedly, second-wave feminism (the women's movement that peaked in the 1960s and 1970s) played a role in the formation of the gap over recent decades. American women have placed a greater emphasis on women's rights, or more specifically, reproductive rights, since the 1970s in comparison to previous years. Though the gap is absent in the 1972 and 1976 presidential elections, the *Roe v. Wade* decision in 1973 expanded abortion rights and may have influenced the women's vote during the 1980 election. Pro-life candidate Reagan, "who was more willing to campaign on the issue of abortion than most of his predecessors," received more support from men than women by a margin of 17 points in 1980 (Silver 2012). This result makes theoretical sense: As abortion became a subject of dispute for political candidates and the courts, the importance placed on this issue wound up dividing voters by gender. During the late 70s, state legislatures also debated ratifying the Equal Rights Amendment, to which Reagan and many members of the Republican leadership stood opposed. Though the 1980s did not mark the beginning of the feminist movement, it did mark a rise in the debate over feminist causes and initiated conflict between women and the Republican Party.

Political scientists have also discussed whether the gender gap is derived from men and women simply having different positions on policies, or if it is derived from a combination of differing positions on policies as well as each gender placing a different weight on how important that issue is to him or her. The "Attitude Hypothesis" posits that differing attitudes explain the gap, while the "Salience Hypothesis" suggests that the gap relies on a complex combination of differing attitudes as well as the varied weights of importance each gender places on particular political issues (Petrocik and Kaufman, 1999).

In Petrocik and Kaufman's study, "The Changing Politics of Men," the Attitude Hypothesis explains the gender gap in both the 1992 and 1996 presidential elections – that is, differences in policy attitudes largely contributed to the gender gap (Petrocik and Kaufman, 1999). Even though the Salience Hypothesis explained the gender gap during the 1996 election, the "increase in salience effects... does not diminish the absolute importance of attitudes to the gender gap" (Petrocik and Kaufman 1999). It is possible men and women place different levels of salience on particular issues in specific elections, but overall differences in attitudes best account for the gender gap across elections in the 1990s.

One major question surrounding gender gap research is whether the demographic of relevance in political science research should be men or women. Conventionally, as women are the minority experiencing more changes in political rights than men over the past century, it is assumed that women are responsible for creating the gap. Men, on the other hand, should be treated as the constant to women's varied political beliefs over time. In actuality, understanding the gender gap involves knowing that it could either be men or women who have changed their views over time.

In contrast to common understandings, Petrocik and Kaufman found that the partisan and ideological gap can largely be attributed to the shifting views of men rather than women. Specifically, differences in party identification and voting behavior can be explained by men's shifting political preference towards the Republican Party. While women's preference for the Democratic Party did not drop below 50% after 1964, "Democratic identification among men... consistently declined after 1964 and has not been above 50% since 1980" (Petrocik and Kaufman, 1999). Men's growing

Republicanism can be explained by policy attitude differences more-so than issue-salience differences.

Utilizing the Pew Research Center's *American Values Survey* data from 1987 – 2012, we can observe that the partisan gap seems to reflect sharper changes in men's affiliation with the Republican Party in comparison to women's (i.e. larger increase in men's Republican identification from 1999 – 2002 of about 10%, while women's increase is about 6%), displayed in Figure 2. Though the partisan gap seems to taper off between 2007 – 2012, 2010's gap was still statistically significant.

Additionally, the ideological gender gap has been larger than the partisan gap over the past decade, with about 9% more men than women describing themselves as conservative as of 2012 (see Figure 1).




Figure 1: Percent identify as conservative. Source: Pew Research Center's *American Values Survey*, 2002-2012.




Figure 2: Percent identify as Republican. Source: Pew Research Center's *American Values Survey*, 1987 – 2012.

Although men's shifting political views explain the gap in men and women's self-identification as liberal or conservative, we still do not know how the gap varies across specific areas of public policy. Since the previous research finds that different policy attitudes, rather than issue salience, have consistently explained the gender gap since the 1980's, I will focus on studying political attitudes in relation to the gender gap, rather than consider salience in my models.

Another important consideration is whether one can conclude that differing political ideologies even have political implications – if differences in attitudes actually impact partisan identification. As explained by Box-Steffensmeier et al. (2004), ideology and partisanship have become more closely linked, with ANES surveys showing a correlation coefficient of 0.62 by 2004. Therefore, an ideological gender gap typically correlates with a partisan gender gap.

Issue-based Sources of the Gender Gap

In Kaufman and Petrocik's study, the Attitude Hypothesis is tested over multiple categories of policy areas, namely social welfare spending, social issues, feminist issues, economic issues, and defense-related issues. Apart from feminist issues and defense-related issues, all other issue areas were statistically significant at the 5% level in predicting the gender gap in party identification.

Chaney et al. (1998) break up policy issues into further categories, such as views towards the national economy, food stamps, government jobs, and abortion, during the 1980-1984 period. Though they find views on the economy, defense spending, personal finances, government jobs, food stamps, abortion, and cooperation with the USSR were all positively significant in explaining the gender gap, the policy areas tested could be separated into even more precise categories (Chaney et al, 1998). It is telling that negative views on the national economy were negative and statistically significant in predicting a party identification gap, for instance, but "negative views on the national economy" is a broad concern within itself. Are there particular sub-categories within the economy that men and women feel differently on, such as the job climate, inflation, or taxes? Do men and women have differing views on certain types of social welfare policy, rather than just food stamps?

The same can be argued concerning Kaufman and Petrocik's study. Though mean percentages are calculated on men and women's favorability towards different subcategories within issue areas (i.e. "Abortion" and "Working Women" within the "Feminist Issues" issue area), logistic regression analysis is only conducted on these broad issues (Kaufman and Petrocik, 1999).

In a similar light, Norrander and Wilcox propose that men may be significantly more likely than women to oppose government expenditures on social welfare, while women would be more likely than men to support “feminism” (Norrander and Wilcox, 2008). Again, we are left with broad categories, and additional research into particular policies may offer different insight into men and women’s ideological commitments.

For this study, I will statistically analyze survey data on certain “untouched” and understudied questions as well as examine men and women’s views on these issues over a wider time frame. Norrander and Wilcox, for instance, study trends on men and women’s political attitudes up until 2004, while Kaufman and Petrocik study both the 1992 and 1996 elections. Major changes in attitudes could have occurred since then, given such major changes in the political climate as the election of Barack Obama as well as both the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street Movements. I seek to include survey years up until at least 2012.

Of course, studying less commonly researched issues does not come without its own data-availability constraints. For this study, I seek to research the gender gap pertaining to issues beyond the previous research, provided that these issues are addressed in available surveys with sizable respondent pools ($n \geq 1000$).

Research Expectations and Hypotheses

Following Kaufman and Petrocik’s and Norrander and Wilcox’s studies, I will focus on the following issue areas foreign policy, the economy, feminism, social issues and social welfare programs.

Foreign Policy

On matters relating to international affairs, I anticipate there will be a significant gap concerning favorability of war, where women will be less likely than men to favor U.S. military intervention. As Moore (2002) notes, men have consistently favored going to war since the 1960's, while women have favored maintaining a focus on issues at home and balancing the costs and benefits of going to war. Because of this common pattern in the polls, I hypothesize that ordinal logistic regression will find that men are significantly more likely to favor military intervention abroad (no matter the reason), while women will be more likely to favor focusing on issues at home:

H1: Men are more likely than women to support American military involvement abroad, whether it is right or wrong.

H2: Women are more likely than men to favor focusing on domestic issues, rather than issues abroad.

Additionally, because women seem less prone to favor military action, I hypothesize they will be less likely than men to favor using war as means to ensure peace. The preference of women obtaining UN approval before going to war signifies that women are more likely to favor alternative methods for peace than using the military (Moore 2002).

H3: Women are less likely than men to favor ensuring peace through military strength.

Economy

Delving deeper into economic issues, rather than analyzing men and women's overall views on the status of the economy, I will focus on their views towards their personal financial situation as well as their opinions about corporations and business power. Studying these issues can present an idea of how men and women view their own

financial situation in comparison to how they view the financial situation of businesses in the economy.

Though women and men may express various views about their personal finances, I hypothesize that women will be less optimistic than men about their financial situation. Women are typically less confident about personal finances than men: A 2014 Prudential Financial study found that, though women understand basic financial products, a moderately low “61% claim a somewhat or very good understanding of workplace retirement plans, 38% understand mutual funds, and only 31% claim to have a good understanding of annuities” (Prudential 2014). Even though understanding of financial products may not be associated with confidence in one’s financial situation, I would expect that individuals who do not know much about these subjects would be less confident about the status of their personal financial situation.

H4: Women are less likely than men to be confident about their personal finances.

If women were less confident than men in their own financial situation, I would also theorize that women are less confident concerning, and more suspicious of, big business than men are. If women are already lacking confidence about their own financial knowledge, I would assume this mentality would also be directed towards business – in other words, not trusting businesses’ capabilities to always do what’s best for the public, or to “play fair.”

H5: Women are less likely than men to trust “big business.”

Feminism

I would expect there to be a statistically significant gap regarding explicitly feminist issues, with women favoring the pro-feminist answers on societal issues relating

to gender. For purposes of this study, I will break down “feminist issues” into two main subcategories: views towards women in the home and views towards women at work.

Assuming that women will side more so with feminist perceptions than men, I will assume that, when it comes to family roles, women will be more progressive than men (i.e. do not subscribe to traditional family roles). Given that women led feminist movements at home and in the workplace, one would expect that women are more likely than men to believe in equal roles for men and women at work.

H6: Women are less likely than men to believe in traditional family roles.

H7: Women are more likely than men to believe in equal roles for men and women at work.

Social Issues

Because previous surveys typically show that women favor liberal views on social issues, I predict women will be significantly more likely to favor gay rights than men.

H8: Women are more likely than men to favor gay rights.

Though gay rights is a seemingly conventional social issue, testing the role of media will also be important in gauging men and women’s views toward whether the government should be involved in censorship. This would be an important issue to evaluate because, though gay rights can give us an idea of how socially conservative or liberal one is when it comes to what should be legally allowed in society, it does not tell us how people view freedom of speech.

When it comes to censorship, women can be expected to support censorship more than men. The theory behind this hypothesis is that women have had a history of being more risk averse. Women’s tendency to be risk averse can be traced to both their

childhood and parenting habits. As Fagot (1978) notes, young girls are more likely to fear risk and stay closer to their parents than boys. Additionally, women have a higher tendency to “check on young children who are out of sight” than do fathers (Fagot, 1978).

Women’s support for censorship of “risky” content – such as pornography – can also be rooted in the feminist belief that pornographic material promotes the exploitation of women and girls. The feminist objection to pornography is based on a belief that “pornography represents the hatred of women, that pornography’s intent is to humiliate, degrade, and dehumanize the female body for the purpose of erotic stimulation and pleasure” (Brownmiller 1980). This perspective may resonate with women, who believe risky content promotes the physical and psychological harm of females.

Given women’s higher likelihood to oppose “risky” behavior than men, I hypothesize women are more likely than their male counterparts to support censorship in publications and other media:

H9: Women are more likely than men to favor speech restrictions in media for risky content.

Welfare

As Fox Piven notes, “women with children are the overwhelming majority among the beneficiaries of the main ‘means tested’ income maintenance programs” (Gelman 1999). As women make up most of the welfare recipient population, I would assume that they are more likely than men to favor welfare programs and believe that government should serve a role in helping the needy, as they are a primary beneficiary of these programs:

H10: Women are more likely than men to believe that the government should financially assist the poor.

Control Variables

To replicate the data analysis of Norrander and Wilcox, I also include control variables for age, income, race, and education. As found throughout political science research, I anticipate that older age is predictive of a more conservative ideology on political issues, while higher income and education also coincide with having more conservative political attitudes. Minorities should be less likely than their white counterparts to hold conservative political attitudes.

Data and Methods

For this analysis, I utilize Pew Research Center's *American Values Survey* data files, with respondent data merged across all survey years into the dataset (1986 – 2012). This data was chosen because of its consistency in asking respondents similar questions over a number of years while also choosing questions relevant to most of the major issue areas outlined above. Though it is not a panel survey, the survey is administered to respondents with demographics closely approximating the U.S. population (Pew 2012). In the research presented here, the unit of analysis for this data is the survey respondent. Though each individual record indicates a different respondent, when there are enough responses, political ideology can also be aggregated and examined at other levels of observation, such as by state, income bracket, or education level.

From the raw dataset, I recoded the “sex” variable into a dichotomous variable, “female,” with a value of 1 signifying female, 0 signifying male, and any other responses

recorded as missing values. Utilizing this “female” variable can test the significance of women’s political attitudes against men’s. The dependent variable, which represents the respondents’ opinion on political issues, is an ordinal variable, where a value of 1 to 4 represents completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree, and completely disagree, respectively.

The relevant control variables were coded as follows:

- “Northeast,” “South,” and “West” – dichotomous variables defining respondents’ region of origin, where “0” signifies the respondent is not from the region, or “1” if he or she is.
- “year” – a continuous variable representing all years between 1987 – 2012 in which the particular survey question was asked.
- “Black,” “Hispanic,” and “Other Non-White” – dichotomous variables representing respondents’ racial background.
- “HS Grad,” “Some College,” or “College Grad” – dichotomous variables representing respondents’ academic background. Because of the limitations of this survey, I am not provided with separate characteristics on whether the respondent attended graduate school. These variables were recoded from the original “educ” variable in the dataset, which also accounted for “no education,” “technical college,” and “grades 1-8.” I merged the “no education” and “grades 1-8” responses in the raw data with the “high school incomplete” response, since this category was going to be used as a baseline measure in this study, where I would mainly study how different levels of education (from high school or higher) impact the response variable. Additionally, “technical college” was merged into the “some college” category.
- “Age” – a continuous interval variable measuring age, from 18 to 99.

- “PartyRep” and “PartyDem” – dichotomous variables measuring the partisan affiliation of the respondent. With “PartyRep,” 1 = Republican and 0 = otherwise (including independents). Similarly, with “PartyDem,” 1 = Democrat and 0 = otherwise (including independents).
- “Income” – an ordinal variable measuring income bracket, where “1” = Low, “2” = Lower middle, “3” = Upper middle, and “4” = Upper.

The respondent pool for the Pew data is relatively evenly divided amongst men and women, though the proportion of women is a bit higher (53% vs. 47%), but these proportions are indicative of the American population, where there are approximately 5 million more women than men in the US (“Prenatal Sex Selection”). This is also represented in Table 1, where the distribution of men and women skews left and the mean for the female variable is more than 0.5, meaning there are more women than men in the survey pool and, expectedly, the other values deviate about 0.5 above or below the mean.

Table 1, which also shows the proportion of men and women defining themselves as either Republican or Democrat, supports the proportions of men and women I would expect to be Republican or Democrat in the United States. The overall gender gap is still alive and well, with women more likely than men to identify as a Democrat by a margin of approximately 13%. This relatively coincides with national poll percentages, where the gender gap within Democratic Party affiliation has been around 9-10% as of 2009 (Newport, 2009).

Table 1		
	Mean	Standard

			Deviation
Female	.5099		.49991
Party	.4492		.49743
	Democrat	Republican	Total
Male	43.5%	51.3%	47%
Female	56.5%	48.7%	53%

Source: Pew Research Center's *American Values Survey*, 1987-2012.

Results

Statistically Significant Gender Gaps

For each question pertaining to the different hypotheses, I ran an ordinal logistic regression analysis of the dependent variable (survey question answer) against the independent variable (female gender dummy) and the control variables. Before conducting the analysis, I ran a multicollinearity test of the independent and control variables to ensure that none of these variables were too highly correlated with one another before running an ordered logit.

As shown in Appendix Figure 5, none of the predictor variables have correlation coefficients of $-.6$ and lower or $.6$ and higher, meaning regression analysis can be conducted without the risk of having highly multicollinear predictor variables in the model. Among the racial categories in the table, “White” was dropped, as the analysis cannot include all racial categories, and the model needs a baseline population to compare Black, Hispanic, and other minority races with. The same can be said about the regional characteristics: the Midwestern United States is excluded to serve as a baseline

for comparison for the other regions, and “Less than High School” was also dropped among the educational characteristics.

Ordinal logistic regression analysis was conducted for all ten hypotheses. Since the dependent variable was ranked strongly agree to strongly disagree, negative coefficients coincide with agreement on each survey question, and vice-versa. The results are as follows:

[Table 2 about here]

Our first three hypotheses, concerned with foreign policy and national defense, are confirmed with the data, since sex was statistically significant in predicting views towards backing your country (whether right or wrong), concentrating on problems at home rather than abroad, and ensuring peace through military strength. Concerning the first hypothesis (“We should fight for our country, whether it is right or wrong”), being female, African American, and high school graduate or higher were all statistically significant at the $p \leq .01$ level in predicting more skeptical support of the United States.

As shown in Table 9, controlling for variables such as party identification, race, and college education, there is approximately a 6-percentage point gap between men and women concerning this hypothesis, with men being more likely to support the United States, whether it is right or wrong. This gender gap, however, still exists when considering party identification: Republican men were 7% more likely to agree with this claim than Republican women (31% vs. 24%), while Democratic men are 5% more likely to agree than Democratic women (24% vs. 19%). The gap amongst Black respondents, however, was slightly smaller: Black men were about 4% more likely to agree with the

statement than Black women (17% vs. 13%). There were similar findings concerning the hypothesis on ensuring peace: Men are more likely than women to agree “The best way to ensure peace is through military strength.” Table 2 shows that being female, African American, a Democrat, or have a high school education or higher were significantly associated with agreement, while, not surprisingly, being Republican and older were significant in agreeing with the statement – all at the .01 level. This gender gap transcends party lines as well, with Republican men being approximately 7% more likely than Republican women and Democratic men being 5% more likely than Democratic women to support ensuring peace through military efforts.

However, when it came to prioritizing domestic issues over foreign ones, women still held more noninterventionist views than men, but only by about 5% (36% vs. 41%). Being female and African American were statistically significant in predicting agreement that “we should pay less attention to problems overseas and concentrate on problems here at home” at the .01 level. This gap largely changed when controlled for political party – there was no statistically significant difference in agreement between Democratic men and Democratic women, but there was between Republican men and Republican women, with Republican men being 8% more likely to disagree that we should pay less attention to problems overseas than Republican women (39% vs. 31%). Therefore, the gap we see among men and women in general may partially be driven by the differences between Democratic men and women when it comes to foreign involvement.

Interestingly, educational attainment and gender had the same correlation with a less interventionist foreign policy (i.e “female” and having a high school degree or higher correlated with disagreement that we should “fight for our country no matter what” or

“ensure peace through military strength”), but the “female” variable and the educational attainment variables held opposite relationships when it came to whether the U.S. should only focus on issues at home. Being female was statistically significant in agreeing that we should primarily focus on issues at home, while the more educated the respondent was, the more likely he or she would disagree the U.S. government should primarily focus on issues at home. One explanation for this discrepancy may be related to the interpretation of the survey question – believing that we should not primarily be concerned with issues at home does not necessarily denote an interventionist foreign policy. Perhaps the respondents with higher education levels believed the U.S. government should still focus on issues abroad (i.e. diplomatic or trade relations), but not intervene when it comes to military involvement.

Women’s tendency to be less militaristic can be supported by the theory that women and men have different views towards military force because of socialization. As Gilens (1988) concluded, men’s higher likelihood of being in situations that involve physical force (like extreme sports or military combat) can create a more favorable view towards ensuring military strength and fighting for one’s country, regardless of whether or not his country is in the wrong. Additionally, research conducted by Togeby (1994) finds that professional training plays a role in one’s views on foreign policy. Individuals, regardless of sex, were more likely to be critical of foreign intervention if they held a position in a “caring” profession (i.e. healthcare, education, social work). Though self-selection may play a role, “so-called women’s values are developed by employment and training within the caring professions and these subsequently cause critical attitudes towards foreign policy” (Togeby 1994). Since more women than men choose career paths

that involve an empathetic mindset (such as a teacher or healthcare provider), they become more inclined to critique efforts that require harmful force.

These theories of socialization and professional training support the differing views men and women have on military intervention, but they also may explain why there is not a large difference between men and women's attitudes on prioritizing domestic issues. Women were only about 3% more likely than men to prioritize domestic issues over foreign ones ("female" was significant at the 5% level), but there may not be a gender gap on this issue because it does not involve the use of force: The hypothesis is not concerned with aggression vs. peace, but it does address respondents' policy-related interests in foreign affairs. These findings could help reject the stereotype that women are primarily interested in "soft" issues (education, healthcare, welfare), as the gender gap concerning interest in foreign policy is smaller and less significant than the gender gap in support for military intervention.

[Table 3 about here]

As hypothesized, there was a gender gap on economic policies, with women more skeptical of "big business" than men and more likely to favor systems that help the needy. Being older, female, or a minority were significant at the .01 level in agreeing that corporations make too much profit. Meanwhile, being Republican and a high school graduate or higher were all related to disagreeing with this claim. This gender gap still exists in spite of partisan differences: Women were about 6% more likely than men to believe corporations make too much profit, while this margin remained relatively

consistent when comparing Republican men with Republican women and Democratic men with Democratic women.

At a highly significant margin, women were more supportive of government welfare programs, agreeing that “the government should help more needy people even if it means going deeper in debt.” In addition to gender, being Hispanic or African American were predictive in supporting welfare programs. Despite statistical significance, the gender gap concerning opinion towards the government’s role in helping the needy was only about 2%, and this margin was stagnant when political party, race, and education were taken into account.

One theory to explain the gap we find in men and women’s perception of corporations and profits is called the “Autonomy Hypothesis.” As Schlesinger and Heldman note, this theory maintains that gender gaps exist because of women’s desire to eliminate “traditional ideologies that maintain male-dominated power structures” (Schlesinger and Heldman, 2001). Because women seek to live in an egalitarian society, they tend to support ideas that promote economic and psychological independence from men. Perceiving corporations as money hungry is in line with this theory, as some women may have experienced discrimination in the workplace or have had to deal with what they believe to be an impenetrable glass ceiling. This therefore makes women more skeptical of the free market and market-based economic policies.

Women’s support for government programs that subsidize the needy can be traced to the “Nurturance Hypothesis.” This hypothesis claims that women’s traditional role of family caregiver influences their political views on social policies. They are more likely than men to favor a “maternalist welfare state,” as they are more sensitive to

marginalized communities and the poor and will therefore favor programs that provide economic security (Skocpol 1992).

[Table 4 about here]

As expected, women were significantly more likely than males to disagree that “men and women are good at different things in the workplace” (at the .05 level) and that “women should return to their traditional roles in society” (at the .01 level). When it came to “returning to traditional roles,” the more educated an individual was or the more an individual aligned with the Democratic Party, the more likely the respondent held modern views on women and their role in society and the workplace. On the other hand, the older the respondent was or the more he or she aligned with the Republican Party, the more the respondent believed women should return to their traditional roles. This gap seems to be rooted in both ideological and gender differences: The gender gap among men and women on this issue, controlling for party, race or education, remained consistent, albeit at a 1-2% margin.

It should be noted there is a different trend when it comes to men and women’s skills in the workplace. Gender plays a statistically significant role, as men were much more likely than women to agree that “men and women are good at different things in the workplace” (37% vs. 34%). However, in contrast to the hypothesis regarding women and tradition roles, political party was not a significant variable in predicting respondents’ views towards men and women’s skills in the workplace. Since the gender gap among Republican men vs. Republican women and Democratic men vs. Democratic women still

stands at about 3-4%, this discrepancy can largely be explained by gender differences. Other variables – such as income and race – were not significant either. The “female” variable, along with being a college graduate, were the most predictive in believing that men and women can perform similar roles and tasks in the workplace.

There is plenty of research explaining why we see this gap on traditional roles for women in society. Cook and Wilcox (1995) and Kaufman (2006) both attribute the gender gap on women’s roles to the growth of the feminist movement. Especially as women become more economically autonomous, they are more likely to believe women should pursue nontraditional roles and rise in their workplaces.

The lack of a partisan explanation when it comes to respondents’ perception of whether women and men are “good at different things” in the workplace and the existence of a partisan explanation when it comes to traditional roles in society may be explained by a “culture war” of sorts. As the ideological diversity of women grows, “a broader ‘culture war’ in which more secular, highly educated working women become more liberal, while more religious, less educated homemakers become more conservative” has emerged (Norrander and Wilcox, 2008; Cook and Wilcox, 1991).

So why does a party gap emerge concerning traditional roles but not on questions of gender differences in the workplace? This may exist because the question about traditional gender roles has often been discussed in a partisan context, whereas it is less common to see a partisan debate about gender differences in job skills.

Interactions

In addition to determining statistical significance of the “female” variable in the analysis, I also determine the overall trend of men and women’s opinions over time.

While there may be a gender gap when it comes to military intervention, for instance, this does not specifically tell us if, over time, women's or men's shifting views are responsible for this gap. Therefore, I ran similar ordinal regressions on the different hypotheses using an interaction variable, "female*year," to account for the changing views of women over time. In addition, because interpretations of interaction variables can be ambiguous (i.e. the interpretation of the "female" variable is conditional upon the value of "female*year"), I also include cross tabulations of predicted probabilities that consider sex and year. I only consider cross tabulations if there was a significant gender gap in the regressions.

[Table 5 about here]

Changes in the gap over time appear to be small, controlling for other variables (income, age, education, party identification, race, region). In many of the hypotheses, "female*year" was statistically significant (net of other characteristics), but after analyzing crosstabulations over different years on these hypotheses, the intensity of the gap does not appear to considerably change. Overall, collective opinion may change, but the difference in men and women's opinions is largely stable.

One exception where there seems to be change in the size of the gap is on social issues related to family and marriage. When it came to whether respondents agreed they had "old" views regarding family and marriage, the size of the gap among those who completely agreed decreased, albeit slightly (from 6% in 1987 to 4% in 2012). This decrease in the gap seems mainly stemmed from women's changing views (a 13%

difference among women who strongly agreed between 1987 to 2012 vs. an 11% difference among men). It should be noted that, although the overall trend indicates a general decrease among respondents who completely agree they have old views on family and marriage, there is an increase in the share of respondents who “mostly agree” they have old views (likely meaning respondents are feeling less confident over time that they have these traditional views).




Figure 3a: “I have old fashioned views on family and marriage.” CA = Completely agree, MA = Mostly agree. Source: Pew Research Center’s *American Values Survey*, 1987-2012.

A similar narrative can be determined through analyzing men and women’s disagreement towards having “old fashioned views on family and marriage.” In general, men and women’s disagreement towards the claim has been rising, with both the “completely disagree” and “mostly disagree” responses trending upwards. Unlike agreement over this issue, the share of respondents both confident and moderately confident with their disagreement has been increasing over time. A larger share of men

than women completely or mostly disagree, with each gap remaining pretty consistent over the 25-year period.

In the original statistical analysis, when controlling for factors such as age, partisanship, year, income, race, education, and location, being female was statistically significant in predicting *disagreement* towards traditional family roles (at the .01 level). However, when using a female*year interaction term, being female was statistically significant in predicting *agreement* towards traditional family roles (at the .01 level). When analyzing responses by each year, the figures seem to show that there is an increasing trend towards having a more liberal view on this issue, though a higher share of women, rather than men, believe in traditional family roles.

Though I did not control for religion, Conover (1988) finds that women are significantly more likely than men to hold “religiously fundamental” values. Women “average .13 higher than men on a religious fundamentalism scale. Thus, religion plays a bigger role in the daily lives of women than it does in the daily lives of men” (Conover, 1988). This could have influential implications on views over the home and family, with religion providing women with more fundamental views on marriage and the family structure. This could largely explain the higher share of women than men having “old-fashioned” views, but the general trend of a decreasing share of respondents strongly holding these views could be attributed to the rise of the feminist movement and an increasing acceptance towards nontraditional family structures.




Figure 3b: "I have old fashioned views on family and marriage." CD = Completely agree, MD = Mostly disagree.

Source: Pew Research Center's *American Values Survey*, 1987-2012.

When respondents were asked whether they believed women should return to their "traditional" roles in society, unsurprisingly, both men and women have become more confident (i.e. more likely to strongly disagree than mostly disagree) that women should return to traditional roles. Though the size of the gap has remained pretty stable, the increase among respondents who strongly disagreed women should return to traditional roles has sharply increased by about 20% (39% in 1987 and 60% in 2012 for women; 35% in 1987 and 55% in 2012 for men). This gap doesn't seem strongly "created" by either men or women, as disagreement for each gender has increased at a relatively similar rate. The higher share of women disagreeing with traditional views on women's roles throughout this twenty-five year period can likely be stemmed from the reasoning in my hypothesis: Because of the rise of feminism (and the fact that forcing women to return to a particular societal role is not in their interest), women would be more likely than men to believe they should not return to traditional roles.




Figure 4: “Women should return to their traditional roles in society.” CD = Completely disagree, MD = Mostly disagree. Source: Pew Research Center’s *American Values Survey*, 1987-2012.

Among the social issues studied (gay rights and First Amendment rights), the gender gap on views towards gay rights was more dynamic: When respondents were asked if they believed “school boards ought to have the right to fire teachers who are known homosexuals,” the gender gap among those who completely agreed narrowed over time. In 1987, there was a 10% gender gap among those who completely agreed with the statement (34% men vs. 24% women), while this gap shrunk to 4% in 2012 (12% men vs. 8% women).

Men seem to be contributing more to the narrowing of this gap, as their complete agreement on the statement dropped 22% (compared to 16% among women) between 1987-2012. In other words, men’s confidence in expressing agreement that school boards

should be able to fire teachers has been decreasing at a stronger rate over the past few decades.

When it comes to disagreement over firing gay teachers, however, there is a widening gap among those who completely disagree (22% in 1987 to 52% in 2012 for women vs. 16% in 1987 to 42% in 2012 for men), with the share of women who completely disagree increasing at a larger rate than the share of men. While the percentage of men and women who *mostly* disagree with the statement has not changed substantially over time, both Figures 5a and 5b below seem to indicate a gravitation away from strongly opposing gay rights (with a substantial decrease in those who strongly agreed with the statement) as well as increased confidence in expressing disagreement towards anti-gay policies (with a large increase in the share of respondents who strongly disagreed with the statement).

There may be a higher share of women than men who strongly disagree with the statement because of the Nurturance Hypothesis (women's "caretaker" mentality causes them to be more sensitive towards marginalized communities) mentioned previously, but the collective trend of men and women both increasing their support for gay rights over time could be attributed to factors that affect both genders (political activism and state or local legislation favoring gay rights).




Figure 5a: "School boards ought to have the right to fire teachers who are known homosexuals." CA = Completely agree. MA = Mostly agree. Source: Pew Research Center's *American Values Survey*, 1987-2012.




Figure 5b: "School boards ought to have the right to fire teachers who are known homosexuals." CD = Completely disagree. MD = Mostly disagree. Source: Pew Research Center's *American Values Survey*, 1987-2012.

Though the gender gap on views towards free speech did not shift much between 1987 to 2007, it is still notable that the gap is much wider among those who completely disagree (rather than mostly disagree) that "nude magazines and X-rated movies provide

harmless entertainment for those who enjoy it.” By 2007, 35% of female respondents completely disagreed with this statement, compared to 23% of men (a 12% gap). This gap was large in comparison to the 2% gap among those who mostly disagreed (28% men vs. 30% women in 2007) or the 6% gap among those who completely agreed (15% men vs. 9% women in 2007) and 8% gap among those who mostly agreed (34% men vs. 26% women in 2007).

Women’s steady confidence in their disagreement with labeling risky content as “harmless” may reflect the nurturance hypothesis or women’s likelihood to view an issue from a maternal perspective (since X-rated content could be viewed as harmful entertainment for children). However, on the other hand, men’s lower likelihood to condemn such material may stem from the socialization theory discussed previously: Men are more likely than women to become socialized in an environment that tolerates violence or adult-themed content.




Figure 6a: “Nude magazines and X-rated movies provide harmless entertainment for those who enjoy it.” CA = Completely agree. MA = Mostly agree. Source: Pew Research Center’s *American Values Survey*, 1987-2007.




Figure 6b: "Nude magazines and X-rated movies provide harmless entertainment for those who enjoy it." CD = Completely disagree. MD = Mostly disagree. Source: Pew Research Center's *American Values Survey*, 1987-2007.

Conclusion

When it comes to attitudes related to foreign policy, the economy, feminism, and social issues, there were statistically significant gender gaps, as predicted. Women were significantly more likely than men to believe in a less interventionist foreign policy that focuses on domestic affairs. Men, meanwhile, were much more likely than women to have steadfast confidence in the United States and believe that peace must be ensured through military force.

On the economy, women were less likely than men to trust "big business" but more likely than men to support government welfare programs that help the needy. Being female was predictive of having a more skeptical view on the free market, as a higher share of women than men did not trust "big businesses" and believed government should play a role and intervene in the market when it fails to support the poor.

As hypothesized, in general, women were more likely than men to favor feminist views on women's roles in the workplace (or that women should not return to their traditional roles, and women are just as capable as men in completing the same tasks). Additionally, though more women than men support gay rights, women were less tolerant than men of X-rated material, suggesting that women may support restrictions on freedom of speech if certain material is seen as risky or harmful.

One of the most notable findings of this study was a general lack in volatility with the gender gap. When controlling for other characteristics (such as party identification, race, age, income, and region), the gap on most policy areas remained constant. If men's views shifted, women's views also typically shifted in tandem. This negates the idea that fluctuations in the ideological gender gap are attributed primarily to gender. Therefore, if one were to find that the width of the gap – not controlling for other characteristics – fluctuates on different political issues over time, this may be a function of politics (i.e. partisanship) rather than gender.

With that said, the existence of a gap from 1987 to the 2000s on all of the political areas tested does contribute to the notion that gender does play some role in generating political differences. While it is largely assumed that partisanship is foundational to political attitudes, gender was also very predictive of attitudes – above and beyond the effects of partisanship.

If I were to expand on this research, I would have tried to include data prior to 1987, when Pew Research Center started its *American Values Survey*. Since most figures showed a generally consistent gap on different issues, it would be noteworthy to find fluctuations or volatile changes in the gap prior to the 1980s. This may be especially

important when considering issues related to feminism, as the *Roe vs. Wade* decision was made in 1973 and could have correlated with an increase in the gender gap regarding views on abortion during this time.

Although the *American Values Survey* did field questions in other important policy areas, such as government surveillance, the tax system, and abortion, these questions were only fielded for two or three years, and thus were not included in the survey. In the future, I may try to include questions related to these topics, provided that the datasets include dependent variables that are consistent with those in Pew's *American Values Survey* (ordinal, from completely agree to completely disagree).

If I were to expand on this research study, I would be interested in studying whether the size of the gender gap increases during times of high stimulus elections (i.e. presidential elections) on certain political issues. Controlling for other characteristics, the gender gap on issues that are highlighted by campaigns may shift during election cycles. Studying this gap may shine light into how campaigning affects men and women's views on particular issues emphasized during different elections.

Appendix

Table 2 – Spearman correlation coefficients

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
(1) Republican	1.000													
(2) Democrat	-.478	1.000												
(3) Income	.047	-.060	1.000											
(4) HS Grad	-.047	-.011	.020	1.000										
(5) Some College	.012	-.010	-.024	-.404	1.000									
(6) College Grad	.075	-.017	-.004	-.481	-.461	1.000								
(7) Age	.026	.030	.052	-.008	-.045	.009	1.000							
(8) Year	.032	.069	-.037	.029	.129	.096	.086	1.000						
(9) Hispanic	-.025	.043	-.030	.020	.021	-.070	.137	.052	1.000					
(10) Black	-.204	.256	.035	.042	.005	-.118	-.039	-.035	-.089	1.000				
(11) Other Min. Race	-.004	-.025	-.012	-.025	-.012	-.029	-.021	.049	-.086	-.012	1.000			
(12) Northeast US	-.051	.011	.012	-.025	-.016	.048	.021	.012	-.033	-.047	.007	1.000		
(13) South US	.065	-.004	.018	.040	-.017	-.042	.013	.018	-.033	.148	.004	-.361	1.000	
(14) West US	-.008	-.011	-.042	.060	.030	.027	.020	-.054	-.042	.193	-.093	.036	-.229	1.000

Table 3 – Ordered logit

	Fight for country, regardless	Focus on domestic issues	Peace thru military strength	Gov should help needy more	Satisfied financially
Female	.309**	-.211**	.339**	-.141**	.089**
	(.022)	(.031)	(.022)	(.023)	(.022)
Age	-.010**	.006**	-.018**	.006**	-.017**
	(.001)	(.0009)	(.0007)	(.001)	(.0006)
Republican	-.517**	.257**	-.660**	.465**	-.375**
	(.028)	(.038)	(.027)	(.028)	(.027)

Democrat	-.007	-.006	.138**	-.476 **	-.046
	(.027)	(.038)	(.026)	(.028)	(.026)
Year	.001	.013**	-.003*	.007**	.010**
	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.001)
Income	-.0001	.001	-.0004	.001*	-.003**
	(.0004)	(.0005)	(.0004)	(.0004)	(.0004)
Hispanic	-.023	-.122	-.014	-.406**	.033
	(.046)	(.065)	(.046)	(.048)	(.046)
Black	.561**	-.586**	.215**	-.810**	.713**
	(.037)	(.055)	(.036)	(.038)	(.036)
HS Grad	.213**	.202**	.121**	.477**	-.243**
	(.037)	(.062)	(.036)	(.038)	(.036)
Some College	.499**	.542**	.379**	.749**	-.306**
	(.038)	(.063)	(.038)	(.040)	(.037)
College Grad	.914**	1.229**	.678**	.817**	-.692**
	(.038)	(.062)	(.038)	(.040)	(.038)
Northeast	.049	-.0006	.00003	-.207**	.081*
	(.032)	(.047)	(.032)	(.034)	(.032)
South	-.201**	-.054	-.413**	-.044	-.022
	(.028)	(.040)	(.028)	(.029)	(.028)
West	.133**	.057	-.017	.086	.042
	(.034)	(.047)	(.033)	(.034)	(.033)
Pseudo R ²	.029	.040	.038	.045	.029

X ²	2142.84	1402.57	2861.65	3128.36	2095.98
N	27506	15340	28808	26503	29685
<p>**p≤ .01; *p≤ .05; Cell entries are regression coefficients (standard errors) Dependent variable in each case is a 4-point scale, ranges from 1 (strongly agree) to 4 (strongly disagree). Ordinal logistic regression estimated via ologit.</p>					

Table 4 – Ordered logit				
	Businesses only want profit	“Old” view on family and marriage	Women should return to traditional roles	Women and men are good at different things
Female	-.364**	-.198**	.192**	.155*
	(.022)	(.025)	(.024)	(.062)
Age	-.007**	-.027**	-.019**	-.009**
	(.0007)	(.001)	(.001)	(.002)
Republican	.498**	-.460**	-.403**	-.240
	(.028)	(.032)	(.030)	(.077)
Democrat	-.313**	.142**	.085**	.173
	(.027)	(.030)	(.030)	(.077)
Year	.004*	.019**	.034**	-.006
	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.067)
Income	.001	.0003	-.001**	-.001
	(.0004)	(.0004)	(.0004)	(.001)
Hispanic	-.357**	.006	-.344**	-.259*
	(.046)	(.050)	(.050)	(.129)
Black	-.210**	.020	-.155**	-.171

	(.037)	(.041)	(.041)	(.101)
HS Grad	.203**	.004	.483**	.044
	(.036)	(.041)	(.038)	(.127)
Some College	.477**	.194**	.889**	.233
	(.038)	(.042)	(.040)	(.128)
College Grad	.986**	.599**	1.352**	.679**
	(.038)	(.042)	(.042)	(.127)
Northeast	-.101**	.171**	-.043	.119
	(.033)	(.037)	(.036)	(.166)
South	-.052	-.218**	-.132**	-.155
	(.029)	(.033)	(.032)	(.080)
West	.002	.097	.085	.011
	(.034)	(.038)	(.037)	(.098)
Pseudo R ²	.040	.047	.056	.017
X ²	2840.12	2558.40	3332.26	147.19
N	28348	24588	24169	3641
<p>**p ≤ .01; *p ≤ .05; Cell entries are regression coefficients (standard errors) Dependent variable in each case is a 4-point scale, ranges from 1 (strongly agree) to 4 (strongly disagree). Ordinal logistic regression estimated via ologit.</p>				

Table 5 – Ordered logit		
	Fire gay teachers	Nude mags are harmless
Female	.452**	.596**
	(.023)	(.028)

Age	-.021**	.018**
	(.001)	(.001)
Republican	-.546**	.286**
	(.028)	(.035)
Democrat	.212**	-.140**
	(.027)	(.033)
Year	.054**	.008**
	(.002)	(.002)
Income	-.0005	.001**
	(.0004)	(.001)
Hispanic	-.089	-.022
	(.046)	(.058)
Black	-.153**	-.319**
	(.037)	(.045)
HS Grad	.416**	-.035
	(.037)	(.045)
Some College	.844**	.071
	(.039)	(.046)
College Grad	1.454**	.048
	(.039)	(.047)
Northeast	.286**	-.237**
	(.033)	(.041)
South	-.422**	.065

	(.029)	(.036)
West	.156**	-.044
	(.034)	(.042)
Pseudo R ²	.080	.029
X ²	5978.87	1332.12
N	27432	17226
<p>**p ≤ .01; *p ≤ .05; Cell entries are regression coefficients (standard errors) Dependent variable in each case is a 4-point scale, ranges from 1 (strongly agree) to 4 (strongly disagree). Ordinal logistic regression estimated via ologit.</p>		

Table 6 – Ordered logit with interaction variable					
	Fight for country, regardless	Focus on domestic issues	Peace thru military strength	Gov should help needy more	Satisfied financially
Female*Year	.004	.012**	-.007*	.002	.011**
	(.003)	(.004)	(.002)	(.003)	(.003)
Female	-6.947	-23.525**	15.163**	-4.425	-20.854**
	(5.592)	(8.901)	(5.776)	(5.975)	(5.805)
Age	-.006**	.007**	-.017**	.006**	-.017**
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Republican	-.499**	.255**	-.659**	.465**	-.376**
	(.027)	(.038)	(.027)	(.028)	(.027)
Democrat	-.062*	-.008	.140**	-.477**	-.049
	(.026)	(.038)	(.026)	(.028)	(.026)
Year	-.001	.007*	.001	.006**	.005*

	(.002)	(.003)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)
Income	.002**	.001	-.0003	.001*	-.003**
	(.0004)	(.001)	(.0004)	(.0004)	(.0004)
Hispanic	-.009	-.122	.014	-.407**	.032
	(.044)	(.064)	(.046)	(.048)	(.045)
Black	.477**	-.585**	.215**	-.810**	.713**
	(.035)	(.055)	(.046)	(.038)	(.036)
HS Grad	.151**	.202**	.120**	.477**	-.244**
	(.036)	(.062)	(.036)	(.038)	(.036)
Some College	.395**	.541**	.379**	.749**	-.308**
	(.037)	(.063)	(.037)	(.040)	(.037)
College Grad	.749**	1.228**	.678**	.817**	-.694**
	(.037)	(.062)	(.038)	(.040)	(.038)
Northeast	.060	-.001	.0002	-.208**	.081*
	(.031)	(.046)	(.032)	(.034)	(.032)
South	-.159**	-.054	-.412**	.044	-.022
	(.028)	(.040)	(.028)	(.029)	(.028)
West	.134**	.057	-.017	.086*	.043
	(.033)	(.047)	(.033)	(.035)	(.033)
Pseudo R ²	.020	.040	.038	.046	.029
X ²	1708.94	1409.44	2868.24	3128.88	2109.00
N	28876	15340	28808	26503	29685
**p≤ .01; *p≤ .05; Cell entries are regression coefficients (standard errors) Dependent variable in each case is a 4-point scale, ranges from 1 (strongly agree) to 4					

(strongly disagree).
Ordinal logistic regression estimated via ologit.

Table 7 – Ordered logit with interaction variable

	Businesses only want profit	“Old” view on family and marriage	Women should return to traditional roles	Women and men are good at different things
Female*Year	-.011**	.009**	-.006*	-.134
	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	(.131)
Female	21.860**	-17.993**	12.836*	269.043
	(5.857)	(6.050)	(6.075)	(262.969)
Age	-.007**	-.027**	-.019**	-.009**
	(.0006)	(.001)	(.001)	(.002)
Republican	.498**	-.461**	-.402**	-.241**
	(.028)	(.032)	(.030)	(.077)
Democrat	-.310**	.139**	.086**	.173*
	(.027)	(.030)	(.030)	(.077)
Year	.009**	.015**	.038**	.066
	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.097)
Income	.001**	.00001	-.001**	-.001
	(.0004)	(.0005)	(.0005)	(.097)
Hispanic	-.355**	.004	-.343**	-.260*
	(.046)	(.050)	(.050)	(.129)
Black	-.209**	.019	-.154**	-.171
	(.037)	(.040)	(.041)	(.101)

HS Grad	.202**	.004	.484**	.045
	(.036)	(.041)	(.038)	(.126)
Some College	.479**	.192**	.891**	.233
	(.038)	(.042)	(.040)	(.128)
College Grad	.988**	.598**	1.354**	.680**
	(.038)	(.042)	(.042)	(.127)
Northeast	-.101**	.171**	-.044	.121**
	(.032)	(.037)	(.036)	(.096)
South	-.052	-.217**	-.133**	-.152
	(.029)	(.033)	(.032)	(.080)
West	.002	.097*	.084*	.015
	(.034)	(.038)	(.037)	(.097)
Pseudo R ²	.040	.047	.056	.017
X ²	2854.53	2567.05	3336.59	148.24
N	28348	24588	24169	3641
<p>**p≤ .01; *p≤ .05; Cell entries are regression coefficients (standard errors) Dependent variable in each case is a 4-point scale, ranges from 1 (strongly agree) to 4 (strongly disagree). Ordinal logistic regression estimated via ologit.</p>				

	Fire gay teachers	Nude mags are harmless
Female*Year	.006*	.013**
	(.003)	(.004)
Female	-11.193	-25.209**

	(5.928)	(8.200)
Age	-.022**	.018**
	(.001)	(.001)
Republican	-.547**	.287**
	(.028)	(.035)
Democrat	.211**	-.141**
	(.027)	(.033)
Year	.051**	.001
	(.002)	(.003)
Income	-.001	.001*
	(.0004)	(.001)
Hispanic	-.090	-.025
	(.046)	(.058)
Black	-.154**	-.320**
	(.037)	(.045)
HS Grad	.416**	-.036
	(.037)	(.045)
Some College	.842**	.068
	(.039)	(.046)
College Grad	1.453**	.046
	(.039)	(.047)
Northeast	.286**	-.236**
	(.033)	(.041)

South	-.422**	.066
	(.029)	(.036)
West	.157**	-.042
	(.034)	(.042)
Pseudo R ²	.080	.029
X ²	5982.73	1342.03
N	27432	17226
<p>**p≤ .01; *p≤ .05; Cell entries are regression coefficients (standard errors) Dependent variable in each case is a 4-point scale, ranges from 1 (strongly agree) to 4 (strongly disagree). Ordinal logistic regression estimated via ologit.</p>		

Table 9: Predicted probabilities following ordered logit (NS = Not significant)

		Men	Women	Rep M.	Rep W.	Dem. M.	Dem W.	Black M.	Black W.	Non-black M.	Non-black W.	College Grad M.	College Grad W.
Fight for country, regardless	Completely agree	.235	.179	.305	.238	.242	.185	.168	.125	.245	.187	.151	.112
	Completely disagree	.133	.172	.099	.131	.129	.167	.182	.229	.127	.165	.199	.247
Focus on domestic issues	Completely agree	.358	.408	.317	.364	.359 (NS)	.409 (NS)	.484	.537	.343	.392	.194	.229
	Completely disagree	.032	.026	.039	.031	.032 (NS)	.026 (NS)	.019	.016	.034	.028	.071	.059
Peace thru military strength	Completely agree	.219	.166	.310	.242	.203	.154	.188	.142	.223	.170	.146	.109
	Completely disagree	.101	.136	.065	.089	.109	.147	.119	.160	.099	.133	.155	.205
Gov should help needy more	Completely agree	.132	.149	.098	.112	.173	.194	.237	.264	.121	.137	.078	.089
	Completely disagree	.125	.111	.167	.148	.095	.083	.066	.058	.137	.121	.206	.183
Satisfied financially	Completely agree	.140	.130	.176	.163	.144 (NS)	.134 (NS)	.080	.074	.151	.140	.213	.199
	Completely disagree	.110	.119	.086	.093	.107 (NS)	.116 (NS)	.188	.202	.102	.110	.069	.075

Businesses only want profit	Completely agree	.199	.264	.148	.200	.234	.306	.231	.301	.200	.259	.108	.149
	Completely disagree	.066	.047	.092	.066	.055	.034	.056	.040	.068	.048	.127	.092

Table 10: Predicted probabilities following ordered logit (NS = Not significant)

		Men	Women	Rep M.	Rep W.	Dem. M.	Dem W.	Black M.	Black W.	Non-black M.	Non-black W.	College Grad M.	College Grad W.
“Old” views on family and marriage	Completely agree	.454	.503	.537	.586	.431	.480	.450 (NS)	.499 (NS)	.455 (NS)	.504 (NS)	.349	.395
	Completely disagree	.053	.044	.039	.032	.058	.048	.054 (NS)	.045 (NS)	.053 (NS)	.044 (NS)	.080	.067
Women should return to their traditional roles	Completely agree	.083	.069	.108	.091	.078	.066	.094	.079	.081	.068	.033	.027
	Completely disagree	.407	.454	.339	.383	.420	.468	.375	.421	.411	.459	.648	.691
Men and women are good at different things	Completely agree	.373	.338	.414 (NS)	.377 (NS)	.347 (NS)	.313 (NS)	.408 (NS)	.372 (NS)	.368 (NS)	.333 (NS)	.274	.245
	Completely disagree	.058	.067	.049 (NS)	.057 (NS)	.064 (NS)	.074 (NS)	.050 (NS)	.058 (NS)	.059 (NS)	.068 (NS)	.088	.101
Fire gay teachers	Completely agree	.249	.174	.329	.238	.224	.155	.275	.194	.245	.171	.103	.068
	Completely disagree	.221	.308	.161	.231	.246	.339	.198	.280	.224	.312	.449	.561

Nude mags are harmless	Completely agree	.165	.098	.138	.081	.178	.107	.207	.126	.159	.095	.160 (NS)	.095 (NS)
	Completely disagree	.211	.327	.248	.374	.196	.307	.168	.269	.218	.336	.217 (NS)	.335 (NS)

Table 11: Predicted probabilities following ordered logit												
			Year									
			1992	1993	1994	1997	1999	2002	2003	2007	2009	2012
Focus on domestic issues	Completely agree	Men	.381	.378	.375	.366	.360	.351	.348	.337	.331	.322
		Women	.432	.429	.426	.416	.410	.401	.398	.385	.379	.370

	Completely disagree	Men	.029	.030	.030	.031	.032	.033	.034	.035	.036	.038
		Women	.024	.024	.024	.025	.026	.027	.027	.029	.030	.031

Table 12: Predicted probabilities following ordered logit

			Year														
			1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1997	1999	2002	2003	2007	2009	2012
Peace thru military strength	Completely agree	Men	.215	.215	.216	.216	.217	.217	.218	.218	.220	.221	.222	.223	.225	.226	.228
		Women	.163	.164	.164	.164	.165	.165	.166	.166	.167	.168	.169	.170	.171	.172	.173
	Completely disagree	Men	.103	.103	.103	.102	.102	.102	.101	.101	.100	.100	.099	.099	.098	.097	.096
		Women	.139	.138	.138	.138	.137	.137	.137	.136	.135	.134	.133	.133	.132	.131	.130

Table 13: Predicted probabilities following ordered logit

			Year														
			1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1997	1999	2002	2003	2007	2009	2012
Satisfied financially	Completely agree	Men	.150	.149	.147	.146	.145	.144	.142	.141	.138	.135	.132	.131	.126	.124	.121
		Women	.139	.138	.137	.135	.134	.133	.132	.131	.127	.125	.122	.121	.117	.115	.112
	Completely disagree	Men	.103	.104	.105	.105	.106	.107	.108	.109	.112	.114	.117	.118	.123	.125	.128
		Women	.111	.112	.113	.114	.115	.116	.117	.118	.121	.123	.127	.128	.132	.135	.138

Table 14: Predicted probabilities following ordered logit

			Year														
			1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1997	1999	2002	2003	2007	2009	2012
Businesses only want profit	Completely agree	Men	.204	.203	.203	.202	.202	.201	.200	.200	.198	.197	.195	.195	.193	.192	.190
		Women	.269	.268	.268	.267	.266	.266	.265	.264	.262	.261	.259	.258	.256	.254	.252
	Completely disagree	Men	.065	.065	.065	.065	.066	.066	.066	.066	.067	.067	.068	.068	.069	.070	.070
		Women	.046	.046	.046	.046	.047	.047	.047	.047	.048	.048	.048	.049	.049	.049	.050

Table 15: Predicted probabilities following ordered logit

			Year												
			1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1994	1997	1999	2002	2003	2007	2009	2012
“Old” views on family and marriage	Completely agree	Men	.492	.487	.483	.478	.473	.459	.445	.435	.422	.417	.399	.389	.376
		Women	.541	.537	.532	.527	.522	.508	.493	.484	.470	.466	.447	.437	.423
	Completely disagree	Men	.046	.047	.048	.049	.049	.052	.055	.057	.060	.061	.066	.068	.072
		Women	.038	.039	.039	.040	.041	.043	.046	.047	.050	.051	.055	.057	.060

Table 16: Predicted probabilities following ordered logit

			Year												
			1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1994	1997	1999	2002	2003	2007	2009	2012
Women should return to their traditional roles	Completely agree	Men	.106	.103	.100	.097	.094	.085	.078	.073	.066	.064	.056	.053	.048
		Women	.089	.087	.083	.081	.079	.072	.065	.061	.055	.053	.047	.044	.040
	Completely disagree	Men	.342	.350	.358	.366	.374	.399	.424	.441	.466	.475	.509	.527	.552
		Women	.387	.395	.403	.412	.420	.446	.471	.488	.514	.523	.557	.574	.599

Table 17: Predicted probabilities following ordered logit

			Year														
			1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1997	1999	2002	2003	2007	2009	2012
Fire gay teachers	Completely agree	Men	.334	.322	.311	.299	.288	.277	.266	.256	.227	.209	.183	.175	.147	.134	.116
		Women	.242	.232	.223	.214	.205	.196	.188	.180	.157	.144	.125	.119	.099	.089	.077
	Completely disagree	Men	.158	.165	.172	.180	.189	.196	.205	.214	.242	.262	.295	.306	.353	.378	.416
		Women	.227	.237	.247	.257	.267	.278	.289	.300	.334	.359	.396	.409	.462	.489	.529

Table 18: Predicted probabilities following ordered logit

		Year													

			1987	1988	1990	1994	1997	1999	2002	2003	2007
Nude mags are harmless	Completely agree	Men	.172	.171	.169	.164	.161	.159	.156	.155	.151
		Women	.103	.102	.101	.098	.096	.095	.093	.092	.089
	Completely disagree	Men	.203	.204	.206	.211	.215	.218	.222	.223	.229
		Women	.315	.317	.321	.327	.333	.336	.341	.343	.350




Figure 7a: "We should pay less attention to problems overseas and concentrate more on problems at home." CA = Completely agree, MA = Mostly agree. Source: Pew Research Center's *American Values Survey*, 1992-2012.




Figure 7b: "We should pay less attention to problems overseas and concentrate more on problems at home." CD = Completely disagree, MD = Mostly disagree. Source: Pew Research Center's *American Values Survey*, 1992-2012.




Figure 8a: "I have old fashioned views on family and marriage." CA = Completely agree, MA = Mostly agree. Source: Pew Research Center's *American Values Survey*, 1987-2012.




Figure 8b: "I have old fashioned views on family and marriage." CD = Completely disagree, MD = Mostly disagree. Source: Pew Research Center's *American Values Survey*, 1987-2012.




Figure 9a: "The best way to ensure peace is through military strength." CA = Completely agree, MA = Mostly agree.

Source: Pew Research Center's *American Values Survey*, 1987-2012.




Figure 9b: "The best way to ensure peace is through military strength." CD = Completely disagree, MD = Mostly disagree.

Source: Pew Research Center's *American Values Survey*, 1987-2012.




Figure 10a: "I'm pretty well satisfied with the way things are for me financially." CA = Completely agree, MA = Mostly agree. Source: Pew Research Center's *American Values Survey*, 1987-2012.




Figure 10b: "I'm pretty well satisfied with the way things are for me financially." CD = Completely disagree, MD = Mostly disagree. Source: Pew Research Center's *American Values Survey*, 1987-2012.




Figure 11a: "Business corporations make too much profit." CA = Completely agree, MA = Mostly agree. Source: Pew Research Center's *American Values Survey*, 1987-2012.




Figure 11b: "Business corporations make too much profit." CD = Completely disagree, MD = Mostly disagree. Source: Pew Research Center's *American Values Survey*, 1987-2012.




Figure 12a: "Women should return to their traditional roles in society." CA = Completely agree, MA = Mostly agree.

Source: Pew Research Center's American Values Survey, 1987-2012.




Figure 12b: "Women should return to their traditional roles in society." CD = Completely disagree, MD = Mostly disagree.

Source: Pew Research Center's American Values Survey, 1987-2012.




Figure 13a: "School boards ought to have the right to fire teachers who are known homosexuals." CA = Completely agree, MA = Mostly agree. Source: Pew Research Center's *American Values Survey*, 1987-2012.




Figure 13b: "School boards ought to have the right to fire teachers who are known homosexuals." CD = Completely disagree, MD = Mostly disagree. Source: Pew Research Center's *American Values Survey*, 1987-2012.




Figure 14a: "Nude magazines and X-rated movies provide harmless entertainment for those who enjoy it." CA = Completely agree, MA = Mostly agree. Source: Pew Research Center's *American Values Survey*, 1987-2007.




Figure 14b: "Nude magazines and X-rated movies provide harmless entertainment for those who enjoy it." CD = Completely disagree, MD = Mostly disagree. Source: Pew Research Center's *American Values Survey*, 1987-2007.

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