As Long as it Works: Violent and Nonviolent Rhetoric Among Opposition Group Leaders
A Study of Rhetoric in the US Civil Rights Movement and the Palestinian National Movement

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Acknowledgments

When I began the process of writing a Government and Politics Honors Thesis in January 2015, I had no idea how I’d be able to organize and write a 70+ page paper. Luckily, I’ve been surrounded by supportive peers and mentors who have helped me complete this project. I’d like to thank the staff of the GVPT Honors Program for giving me this opportunity and guiding me on how to manage my time, as well as Professors David Cunningham and Kanisha Bond for taking the time to serve on my thesis defense board. I also want to express my appreciation for Cameron Mackenzie, my supervisor at my summer internship at the Middle East Institute, who encouraged me to work on my paper when things were slow around the office and sent me any helpful resources he could find. I would also like to thank my friends and family for being a source of much-needed moral support throughout this process.

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Abstract

Research Question

Leaders of opposition movements around the world often change their rhetoric over time. For example, within the US Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s, Martin Luther King began his career by using nonviolent rhetoric, but used increasingly violent language toward the end of his career; similarly, Malcolm X initially used violent rhetoric but quickly moved toward more nonviolent language in the last two years of his life. This paper seeks to answer the question:

Why do opposition leaders change their rhetoric about the use of violence and nonviolence over the course of their careers?

This study demonstrates that opposition group leaders often begin their careers by using primarily violent or nonviolent rhetoric, however, most individuals in these leadership positions end up moderating their stances over time. By the end of their careers, most leaders use rhetoric that contains a mix of violent and nonviolent language. In this thesis, I will explore the factors that push leaders along this common trajectory.

Argument

In this thesis, I argue that leaders are initially drawn to primarily violent or nonviolent rhetoric through what I call “formative factors,” which are often related to the individuals’ personal lives rather than their political situations. The most common formative factors are stability in childhood and ideological influences. Later in life, once a leader has reached
prominence, they begin to be affected by “interactional factors,” which are more practical in nature. Common interactional factors include changing political landscapes and the desire for concessions from the state leaders they oppose.

Chapter 1 of this thesis gives important background information on the research surrounding the use of violence and nonviolence as well as the use of violent and nonviolent rhetoric, and Chapter 2 presents the main argument in detail. Chapter 3 gives information on the history of the Civil Rights movement in the US and serves as a background to Chapters 4 and 5, which focus on the rhetorical trajectories of Malcolm X and Martin Luther King, Jr. Similarly, Chapter 6 gives background information on the Palestinian resistance movement while Chapters 7 and 8 analyze the changing rhetoric of Yasser Arafat and the leadership of Hamas. Lastly, Chapter 9 briefly analyzes the rhetorical trajectories of Nelson Mandela and Jawaharlal Nehru to support the argument that similar factors affect leaders from all regions of the world, and Chapter 10 summarizes the paper’s findings.
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Chapter 1: Violence and Nonviolence

Introduction

In the October of 2014, I had the opportunity to spend five days traveling through Israel and the West Bank. Many stops on this trip raised questions for me about the conflict and how it related to other world issues, but none so much as my morning in Nabi Saleh, a small Palestinian village just north of Ramallah. My companions and I were traveling to the village to meet the leaders of a local protest movement there. Since 2009, the residents of Nabi Saleh have been holding weekly demonstrations to protest a nearby Israeli settlement, Halamish.

The protesters there pride themselves on being nonviolent in the face of repression. However, as I stood in the back of the protest along with international press, I witnessed multiple children hurling rocks toward the nearby Israeli soldiers; I even saw one young man bleeding from the head after being accidentally hit with a poorly aimed stone. This certainly did not meet my definition of nonviolence. Yet in the face of live gunfire from Israeli soldiers and arson attacks from Israeli settlers, these protesters did not see their actions as nonviolent in comparison.

What led the residents of Nabi Saleh to have such a different definition of nonviolence from mine? And how could anyone discuss the differences between violent and nonviolent protests when no one could agree on what those words meant? It was these questions that began to lead me toward the research topic of nonviolence and violence within the many elements of the Palestinian nationalist movement. This topic eventually led me to focus on violent and nonviolent rhetoric rather than the dense and often ill-defined topic of violence and nonviolence.
in general. But before the paper delves into the specific factors that influence violent, nonviolent, and mixed rhetoric, it is important to understand the different definitions of violence and nonviolence, and the ongoing debate over the efficacy of the two strategies.

**Difficulties in Definitions**

Studies of violence and nonviolence can be difficult because of differences in how those terms are defined. In one of his many works on nonviolence, *From Dictatorship to Democracy*, Gene Sharp defines violence as when “physical weapons are used to intimidate, injure, kill, and destroy,” whereas nonviolence occurs when “the struggle is fought by psychological, social, economic, and political weapons” (Sharp, 1994, p. 45). Both violent and nonviolent movements seek to gain power by force, but they use different methods in their attempts to achieve their goals (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 13). However, in the study *Does Civil Resistance Work?*, researchers Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan explain that “there are some difficulties with labeling one campaign as violent and another as nonviolent” (p. 12). These difficulties can occur when a movement utilizes both violence and nonviolence or when a means of protest straddles the line between violence and nonviolence.

One example of a means of protest that could be seen as either violent or nonviolent is the action of rock throwing among Palestinian protesters. Most Israeli citizens define rock throwing as violent, but many Palestinians do not (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 143). In Wendy Pearlman’s discussion of the First Intifada, a Palestinian protest movement that contained both violent and nonviolent means of protest, she explained the popular Palestinian opinion that their means of resistance were nonviolent:
Protesters confronted [Israeli] soldiers by throwing Molotov cocktails, and also burned tired and attacked accused [Palestinian] collaborators. For most Palestinians, however, these activities were not intended to harm or kill, as is basic to the definition of violence. Rather, they saw them as nearly symbolic forms of defiance against a well-equipped enemy (Pearlman, 2011, p. 105)

Discussions about nonviolence within a conflict can always be difficult, but they are particularly trying when the two sides cannot agree on what that term actually means.

Violent and Nonviolent Rhetoric

Violent and nonviolent rhetoric, while also difficult to define, can sometimes be easier to discuss, because leaders often explicitly speak about their views on the use of violence. Although each leader may be operating with his or her own definition of violence, their changing view of the concept, however it is defined, can often be easily understood because they explicitly state their changing views. In addition to statements concerning whether or not a leader supports violence, certain attributes can also identify rhetoric as either largely violent or largely nonviolent. Ellen Gorsevski defines nonviolent rhetoric as language that promotes peaceful action and focuses on “the discourse of love” and forgiveness, whereas violent rhetoric uses strategies such as dehumanizing the opposition, which “makes the universal norm against harming other human beings seem irrelevant” (Gorsevski, 1999, p. 450 – 456). Writer and activist Thomas Merton, on the other hand, has argued that articulate rhetoric is typically nonviolent, as “violence is essentially wordless, and it can begin only where thought and rational communication have broken down” (Merton, 1965, p. 13).

Why is violent and nonviolent rhetoric significant? Do certain types of rhetoric impact the actual use of violence within a movement? Do they predict whether a leader will be violent his or herself? It is clear that rhetoric and action do not always go hand in hand; Malcolm X
advocated violent resistance but never practiced violence on a personal level (Pachter, 2005), and Yasser Arafat was often accused of using nonviolent rhetoric to hide his violent actions (Ross, 2002, p. 18).

However, leaders’ rhetoric often has a considerable impact on their followers. Gorsevski argues that members of a movement can be convinced to use nonviolence through hearing nonviolent language and witnessing symbolic nonviolent acts (Gorsevski, 1999, p. 445). She also claims that nonviolent rhetoric is itself an important political act that can affect meaningful change without the need to resort to violence (p. 446). Meanwhile, studies have shown that violent rhetoric can make members of a movement more likely to commit, or at least support, violent actions. In a survey experiment conducted with Israeli and Indian citizens, Joshua Gubler and Nathan Kalmoe found that mildly violent language, such as the use of the words “battle” and “fight,” when combined with the mention of an outgroup (Palestinians in the case of Israeli participants and Muslims in the case of Indians) “provoke significantly greater support for policies that harm the outgroup,” particularly among those who were not previously inclined to support such policies (Gubler & Kalmoe, 2015, p. 2) An earlier study by Nathan Kalmoe focused on Americans and found that “violent political rhetoric increases support for violence against political leaders by priming aggression in trait-aggressive citizens” (Kalmoe, 2010). These theories and studies demonstrate that even if a leader’s rhetoric does not predict his or her own behavior, it can likely predict the overall behavior of that leader’s followers.

Quantifying Rhetoric

While types of rhetoric can often be understood through a qualitative study that primarily examines a few distinct examples, a quantitative study of violent and nonviolent rhetoric can be
more difficult. This paper provides a quantitative study of the rhetoric of Martin Luther King and Malcolm X over time; the appendix of the paper will go into more detail on how this study was carried out. However, studying rhetoric in a macro sense can be difficult, as it requires looking at examples devoid of their context. For example, in my study I counted a speech as more violent if it contained the word “violent” or “violence,” but that word may come up because a leader is mentioning violence in order to denounce it. However, despite these flaws, a quantitative study does illustrate each leader’s overall evolution over time:

The above figure illustrates Malcolm X’s use of nonviolent rhetoric over the last two years of his career. Before his break with the Nation of Islam, he used very few nonviolent terms; however, his use of nonviolent language skyrocketed after his break from the group in 1964.
The next figure demonstrates Martin Luther King’s use of violent rhetoric over the course of his career. For the majority of his career, King used relatively little violent language. However, beginning in the mid-1960s, his use of violent terms rose considerably.

Through these graphs, one can clearly see, despite some variations, that Martin Luther King and Malcolm X were both undergoing significant rhetorical shifts toward the end of their careers. Yasser Arafat and the Hamas leadership, on the other hand, were much more difficult to analyze quantitatively. Many of their speeches and statements have not been translated, making it more difficult to find a large enough number of examples to form meaningful data. Furthermore, even when a translation could be found, translation differences mean that one speech could get three different scores depending on the translator. Therefore, this paper’s analysis of Arafat’s and Hamas’s rhetorical changes over time will be purely qualitative.
Efficacy Debate

Before this paper begins explaining the main argument, it is important to keep in mind the ongoing debate between the efficacy of violence and nonviolence. Many factors can influence a leader’s decision to support violence or nonviolence, and one of the most important factors is that leader’s opinion on which method is most effective.

For certain leaders, violence can certainly appear to be the best method for them to achieve their goals. Violence may help either the movement as a whole or the leader who wants power within the movement. In a study of 323 violent and nonviolent movements between 1990 and 2006, Chenoweth and Stephan find that over 25% of violent campaigns achieved their goals, and that they were particularly likely to succeed when they had either external support or local popularity (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 11). The use of violence can help a movement gain visibility and attention from authorities (Kurz, 2005, p. 12), and it can be used to inflict such high costs on its opponent that the opponent has no choice but to make concessions (Pearlman, 2011, p. 4). Leaders may also use violence to gain popularity within their movement; as Wendy Pearlman explains, “research on ethnic politics has long upheld the argument that vying camps intensify their demands to ‘outbid’ each other for popular support. In the context of insurgencies, the same dynamic goads factions to escalate violence against the state” (p. 6). When a population is more inclined to support violence, leaders may choose to embrace a violent ideology to gain popularity.

On the other hand, there are also many reasons to believe that nonviolence is the most effective course of action. Chenoweth and Stephan’s study of campaigns in the 20th and early 21st centuries finds that nonviolent campaigns have become more common over time, and that the success rate of nonviolent movements has also increased (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 6).
Their study found that “nonviolent resistance campaigns were nearly twice as likely to achieve
full or partial success as their violent counterparts” (p. 7). They argue that:

Nonviolent campaigns have a participation advantage over violent insurgencies, which is
an important factor in determining campaign outcomes. The moral, physical,
informational, and commitment barriers to participation are much lower for nonviolent
resistance than for violent insurgency (p. 10)

Nonviolent resistance may be met with oppression by the state, but states find it harder to justify
such crackdowns to the international community when the resistance movement they are facing
is not violent (p. 51). Violent resistance makes violent state crackdowns more likely, and it often
gives the movement’s opposition a larger advantage. As nonviolence advocate Gene Sharp
explains, “by placing confidence in violent means, one has chosen the very type of struggle with
which the oppressors nearly always have superiority” (Sharp, 1994, p. 6). Therefore, a leader
may well conclude that nonviolence gives them a greater chance of success.

It is also important to consider the role of rhetoric in determining whether a movement
uses primarily violent or nonviolent means of protest. On one hand, nonviolent rhetoric can
coexist with violent action; in the early 2000s, many international scholars, including Israel
historian Efraim Karsh, argued that Yasser Arafat was using nonviolent rhetoric to mask his still-
violent actions (Karsh, 2004). However, other scholars believe that nonviolent rhetoric has a
significant impact on whether a movement can be nonviolent. Professor Gorsevski argues that
“nonviolent theory shows rhetoricians that language and culture – our ways of creating and
perpetuating our reality – can impose minimal aggression while maximizing the potential for
peacemaking” (Gorsevski, 1999, p. 445). In any case, nonviolent rhetoric does have a
relationship with nonviolent action, so it is important to consider the role of rhetoric in any
examination of violence and nonviolence.
Conclusion

Many debates surrounding violence and nonviolence make a discussion of the topic quite complicated. The line between violence and nonviolence can be murky and difficult to define, and both methods of protest have enjoyed a measure of success in the past. However, the case studies examined in this paper demonstrate that some leaders undergo shifts in their rhetoric that are so significant that they ultimately transcend the definition and efficacy debates.
Chapter 2: Main Argument

Introduction

Popular leaders of opposition movements are often remembered by history for their use of either violence or nonviolence. However, the level of violent or nonviolent language in the rhetoric of these leaders often shifts substantially over time.

In this paper, I argue that opposition movement leaders often shift their rhetoric from a pure strategy to a mixed strategy. In other words, leaders usually begin their careers by using rhetoric that is either largely violent or largely nonviolent. However, over time, situational factors push both of these types of leaders towards a mixed strategy in which the leader uses both violent and nonviolent rhetoric. Leaders who come to power using violent rhetoric end up using more nonviolent language over time, and leaders who come to power using nonviolent rhetoric use more violent language over time. Although this argument can be applied to many world leaders, this paper will focus primarily on the leadership of two movements: the US Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s and the ongoing Palestinian National Movement.

As the following charts will illustrate, individual leaders are influenced by two broad categories of influences: formative factors and interactional factors. Formative factors lead these individuals toward their initial choice of rhetoric, either violent or nonviolent. After a leader has gained prominence, interactional factors begin to be more influential, steering both types of individuals toward the use of mixed rhetoric. These interactional factors are varied, but most involve changes brought about by a leader’s analysis of the political climate in which their movement operates.
Once leaders have been influenced by both formative factors and interactional factors, they are likely to make use of a mix of violent and nonviolent rhetoric. This often takes the form of leaders publicly embracing nonviolence while on some level threatening violence if their nonviolent tactics fail to extract satisfactory concessions.

The next two images explain this argument further. Figure 1 identifies the possible paths for a leader’s rhetoric based on two formative factors, shown in gray on the chart (childhood experiences and sources of inspiration) and two interactional factors, shown in purple on the chart (actions of the opposition and actions of the leader’s followers). This simplified chart of possible rhetorical trajectories shows that leaders are most likely to end up with rhetoric that is mixed to a certain degree; there is only a 12.5% chance that a leader will retain a purely violent or nonviolent rhetoric, while there is a 37.5% chance that their final rhetoric will be equally mixed between violent and nonviolent language and a 50% chance that the rhetoric will be mixed, but leaning toward either violent or nonviolent language.

However, Figure 1 assumes that the likelihood of all factors occurring is equal. In this paper, I argue that two specific paths are most likely; Figure 2 illustrates those two common paths. Formative factors often push leaders in one direction or another; someone with a violent childhood is more likely to draw later inspiration from violent movements, whereas someone growing up in a stable household is more likely to be open to the idea of nonviolence being effective. A 30-year study of aggression found that children whose parents use violence are more likely to exhibit aggressive behavior and that individuals who exhibit aggression in childhood are more likely to use violence in adulthood (Temcheff, Serbin, Martin-Storey, Sack, Hodgins, Ledignham, & Schwartzman, 2008, p. 231). A second study on violence in childhood focused on support for violence rather than committing violence. This 2014 study examined violent
tendencies among men in Vietnam and found that men who were either victims of violence or witnesses to violence in childhood typically found more justifications for hitting women (Yount, Pham, Minh, Krause, Schuler, Anh, & Kramer, 2014, p. 333).

Figure 2 groups all formative factors, shown in gray, together as two common groups of factors, and it similarly groups together the interactional factors, shown in purple. Most leaders examined in this paper will fall into either Path A (moving from violent to mixed rhetoric) or Path B (moving from nonviolent to mixed rhetoric), and they will be labeled by their “Path” at the end of each chapter. These two common paths push most leaders toward rhetoric that is, to a certain extent, a mix of violent and nonviolent language.
Beginning of Life (Assume Blank Slate)

Violent Upbringing

Nonviolent Upbringing

Violent Predisposition

Nonviolent Predisposition

Violent Inspiration

Nonviolent Inspiration

Violent Rhetoric

Mixed Rhetoric

Mixed Rhetoric

Nonviolent Rhetoric

Opposition Incentivizes Violence

Opposition Incentivizes Violence

Opposition Incentivizes Nonviolence

Opposition Incentivizes Nonviolence

Opposition Incentivizes Nonviolence

Opposition Incentivizes Nonviolence

Violent Followers

Mixed Rhetoric (Leaning Violent)

Mixed Rhetoric (Leaning Nonviolent)

Mixed Rhetoric (Leaning Nonviolent)

Mixed Rhetoric (Leaning Nonviolent)

Mixed Rhetoric (Leaning Nonviolent)

Nonviolent Followers

Nonviolent Followers

Nonviolent Followers

Nonviolent Followers

Nonviolent Followers

Nonviolent Followers

Purely Violent Rhetoric

Mixed Rhetoric (Leaning Violent)

Equally Mixed Rhetoric

Mixed Rhetoric (Leaning Nonviolent)

Mixed Rhetoric (Leaning Nonviolent)

Equally Mixed Rhetoric

Mixed Rhetoric (Leaning Nonviolent)

Mixed Rhetoric (Leaning Nonviolent)

Mixed Rhetoric (Leaning Nonviolent)

Purely Nonviolent Rhetoric

End Result Likelihoods:
6.25% Purely Violent, 25% Somewhat Violent, 37.5% Equally Mixed, 25% Somewhat Nonviolent, 6.25% Purely Nonviolent
Figure 2

Assume that Leaders Begin Life with no Predisposition for Violent or Nonviolent Rhetoric

Formative Factors:
- Personal Experience with Violence
- Inspiration from International Violent Struggle

Formative Factors:
- Personal Experience with Nonviolence
- Inspiration from Nonviolent Resistance

VIOLENT RHETORIC

Path A:
- Malcolm X, Hamas, Yasser Arafat, Nelson Mandela (2)

Interactional Factors:
- Learn more about potential efficacy of/reasons for nonviolence, need nonviolence to get concessions from opposition

NONVIOLENT RHETORIC

Path B:
- MLK Jr., Nelson Mandela (1), Jawaharlal Nehru

Interactional Factors:
- Learn more about potential efficacy of/reasons for violence, followers lose faith in nonviolence and want to see strength from leaders

MIXED RHETORIC

Leaders end up publicly embracing nonviolence while holding on to threat of violence if nonviolent tactics fail
Formative Factors

Formative factors are the factors that influence a leader’s initial choice of rhetoric, whether it be violent, nonviolent, or a mix of the two. Two major formative factors that this paper will focus on are childhood circumstances and inspiration from international opposition movements.

Individuals who experience difficult childhoods, especially those framed by violence, are more likely to grow up to use violent actions as well as violent rhetoric. This draw to violence can come both from witnessing violence at a young age and from a high level of social and economic grievances (Pearlman, 2011, p. 167). Conversely, those who grow up in more stable homes can give individuals more hope for peace and stability as they mature, making them less likely to turn to violence and violent language.

Slightly later in life, inspiration from other opposition movements around the world can also have a significant impact on a leader’s initial style of rhetoric. Individuals who find inspiration from worldwide revolutions are more likely to support violence because they admire the success of violent movements that have come before them. On the other hand, leaders who learn more about nonviolent protest movements and their leaders are more likely to be inspired by those leaders and attempt to emulate them by using nonviolent language.

As Chart 2 suggests, these two factors often come together and lead individuals toward either violent or nonviolent rhetoric rather than a mixture of both types of rhetoric. Most leaders examined in this paper experience formative factors that only push them in one direction rather than pushing them toward the middle. There are multiple reasons that could explain this phenomenon. First, individuals are more likely to seek out inspiration that reflects their own experiences; therefore, someone who has had a violent or unstable childhood is more likely to be
drawn to violent movements for inspiration, whereas someone who has been brought up in a stable, nonviolent home is more likely to believe that nonviolence may work.

Furthermore, economic class may influence both factors, giving them a causative relationship even in the case where one factor does not influence the other. Individuals who grow up in poverty are more likely to witness violence at a young age, and, because of their lack of wealth, they are also more likely to be drawn to communist revolutionaries, who often use violence, as a source of inspiration. Furthermore, poor individuals often attain low levels of education, which can also lead to a greater predisposition toward violence (Temcheff et al., 2008, p. 231). Meanwhile, those who grow up in more economically stable households are more likely to have more stable, nonviolent childhoods in general, and because more economically privileged individuals have access to better education, these individuals are more likely to think about the long term consequences of their choices between violence and nonviolence. Those with more education are more likely to hear the common wisdom that while violence can work for a movement in the short term, it rarely works from a long term perspective. Therefore, childhood experiences and international inspiration often converge, pushing leaders toward one extreme or the other.

**Interactional Factors**

Many different interactional factors can drive leaders to diversify their message, switching from a purely violent or nonviolent strategy to one that mixes the two. This willingness to change among opposition leaders makes sense; as Anat Kurz explains in *Fatah and the Politics of Violence*, continuity of strategy “will last only as long as there is no external inducement to change” (Kurz, 2005, p. 13). This flexibility among opposition movements can be
seen at least as far back as the 19th century, in the internal struggle between different abolitionist movements in the US. The abolitionist movement in the mid-19th century found itself divided over methods of resistance; as African American Studies professor Julius Lester explains, “the Garrisonians were committed to a method; blacks [under Douglass] were committed to the destruction of slavery. It was inevitable that Douglass and Garrison would conflict” (Lester 1968, p. 42). While William Lloyd Garrison’s white abolitionists were distant enough from the issue of slavery to be able to focus on (nonviolent) methods rather than the goals themselves, Frederick Douglass’s black abolitionists did not see anything as more important than their ultimate goal of abolishing slavery; therefore, they were flexible on strategy. Many movements reflect the black abolitionist movement in this way; leaders care most about the goals of their movement, so they tend to be flexible on the methods used to achieve those goals.

Certain interactional factors primarily affect leaders who initially use violent rhetoric, pushing them to embrace more nonviolent language over time. The interactional factor that arises the most often in this situation is the leader’s relationship with their opposition. Leaders may first use violent language to garner support from the population they wish to lead, but this language often makes it difficult for the leader to extract meaningful concessions from their opposition. Therefore, once they realize that they need these concessions, they switch to more nonviolent rhetoric in order to appease their opposition.

Other interactional factors primarily push leaders who initially use nonviolent rhetoric toward more violent language. While leaders can have an individual commitment to nonviolence, they may need to embrace violence in order to win the support of those who they wish to lead. Aggressive language is often used to achieve social goals; in inner-city America, teenagers use violent language and actions to gain respect and acceptance from their communities (Anderson,
A 2013 study of police officers in South Africa found that many state officials believed that respect is “earned by force” (Faull, 2013, p. 6). For leaders specifically, violence and violent language “is useful for winning public support and securing a reputation for superior . . . commitment” to the leader’s cause (Pearlman, 2011, p. 14).

Meanwhile, some factors can push leaders in either direction. For example, both types of leaders may change their positions over time due to a broadening worldview or increased understanding of their political climate. Leaders may become more open to using the type of language that they initially shied away from simply due to having broader life experiences. For individuals on Path A (from violent to mixed rhetoric), this often includes more diverse experiences with those whom they have initially labeled as the “outgroup,” such as Malcolm X meeting non-racist white people during his pilgrimage to Mecca. New experiences with an outgroup can help humanize that group, which is often considered an important “first step toward reconciliation” (Gubler, Halperin, & Hirschberger, 2015, p. 36). For individuals on Path B (from nonviolent to mixed rhetoric), change often comes from a looking internally within their movement, such as Martin Luther King speaking with angry, violent-supporting youth in the Watts ghetto of LA.

Changes in political climate can also contribute to changes in rhetoric. When Yasser Arafat lost international standing after his backing of Saddam Hussein in the First Gulf War, negotiations with Israel, and the use of nonviolent rhetoric to get there, began to seem more politically appealing. Leaders may also learn more about the other type of protest and begin recognizing its advantages. When a leader sees a strategy opposite from theirs working, like Malcolm X noticing the political gains of Martin Luther King, they often decide that broadening their language could make them more successful.
Introduction to Case Studies

This paper will primarily focus on three leaders who have made substantial rhetorical shifts over the course of their careers: Martin Luther King, Jr., Malcolm X, and Yasser Arafat. Martin Luther King began his career as a champion of nonviolence, and while he consistently held that nonviolence was the best method of action, toward the end of his life he became more understanding of those who chose violence, and he increasingly used violent language himself. Conversely, both Malcolm X and Yasser Arafat initially advocated for violence, but both used increasingly nonviolent rhetoric over time.

Below are brief examples of the rhetorical shift that each leader undertook over the course of their careers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initial Rhetoric</th>
<th>Later Rhetoric</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Martin Luther King:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“He who lives by the sword will perish by the sword. And history is replete with the bleached bones of nations that failed to follow this command. We must follow nonviolence and love.” -May 1957</td>
<td>“I knew that I could never again raise my voice against the violence of the oppressed in the ghettos without having first spoken clearly to the greatest purveyor of violence in the world today - my own government” -April 1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malcolm X:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| “You don't have a peaceful revolution. You don't have a turn-the-other-cheek revolution. There's no such thing as a nonviolent revolution. . . Revolution is bloody, revolution is hostile, revolution knows no compromise, revolution overturns and destroys everything that gets in its way. And you, sitting | “America today is at a time or in a day or at an hour where she is the first country on this earth who can have a bloodless revolution. . . Why is America in a position to bring about a bloodless revolution? Because the Negro in this country holds the balance of power, and if [he] were given what the constitution says he is
around here like a knot on the wall, saying, "I'm going to love these folks no matter how much they hate me." No, you need a revolution.”  
-November 1963

supposed to have, the added power of the Negro in this country would sweep all of the racists and the segregationists out of office”  
- April 1964

Yasser Arafat:  
“We shall never stop until we can go back home and Israel is destroyed . . . The goal of our struggle is the end of Israel, and there can be no compromises or mediations . . . the goal of this violence is the elimination of Zionism from Palestine in all its political, economic, and military aspects . . . We don’t want peace, we want victory. Peace for us means Israel’s destruction and nothing else”  
-March 1970

“I come to you in the name of my People, offering my hands that we can make true peace, peace based on justice. I ask the leaders of Israel to come here, under the sponsorship of the United Nations, so that, together, we can forge that peace. . . . And here, I would address myself specifically to the Israeli people . . . I say to them: Come, let us make peace.”  
-December 1988

After focusing on these three leaders, the paper will also explore the evolution of Hamas over time, arguing that the militant organization is also moving toward increased nonviolence and nonviolent rhetoric. Lastly, it will briefly examine two other world leaders who have undergone rhetorical shifts: Nelson Mandela and Jawaharlal Nehru.

Advantages of Mixed Rhetoric

One issue that this paper will not examine in detail is the efficacy of mixed rhetoric. Leaders are most likely to end up using mixed rhetoric because they are influenced by factors that push them toward both types of language, but it is also possible that they are likely to use mixed rhetoric because it is effective in achieving their goals.
A common example of mixed rhetoric is a leader advocating nonviolence but also threatening use of violence if nonviolent methods do not lead to concessions. One approach to threatening violence is making use of the radical flank effect. As Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan explain:

The concept [of the positive radical flank effect] posits that violence may sometimes increase the leverage of challengers, which occurs when states offer selective rewards and opportunities to moderate competitor groups to isolate or thwart the more radical organizations. In other words, the presence of a radical element may make the moderate oppositionists in the nonviolent campaign seem more palatable to the regime (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 43)

If the radical flank effect does in fact help moderate leaders extract concessions from their opposition, those moderate leaders could use that effect to gain more leverage in any negotiations with their opponents. Therefore, at least in this one case, mixed rhetoric can be the most effective strategy in addition to being the most likely one.

Conclusion

This paper has put forth the argument that two types of factors, formative and interactional, influence leaders of opposition movements over the course of their lives, making them most likely to eventually embrace a strategy that mixes violent and nonviolent rhetoric. A breakdown of this argument is below:

- Leaders of opposition movements are influenced by two main groups of factors: formative and interactional
  - Formative factors tend to push leaders toward one extreme or the other, likely due to economic circumstances
  - Later on, interactional factors tend to pull leaders toward the middle
Regardless of the efficacy of a mixed strategy, rhetoric that is a mix of violent and nonviolent rhetoric is the most likely final position.

In the following case studies, this paper will illustrate how each formative and interactional factor led all leaders examined in this paper to an initially extreme position and, later, to a more moderate position that combines both types of rhetoric.
Chapter 3: Background on Civil Rights Movement

“Physical combat is merely one aspect of resistance. In the context of America, it is an act of resistance for a poor man to buy a Cadillac. To resist is to do whatever is necessary to maintain self-dignity. For one it may be killing a white man . . . for another it may be taking his own time about coming when called. For another it might be the overingratiating smile, the too humble bow, the too servile 'yassuh’.”

-Julius Lester, 1968

Introduction

Before considering case studies of Civil Rights leaders Malcolm X and Martin Luther King, it is important to understand the historical context in which both leaders came into prominence. By the time that Malcolm X and Martin Luther King debated about the use of violence to grant black Americans equal rights, this debate had been ongoing since at least the abolitionist movement of the 19th century.

Abolitionist Movement: First Divisions Emerge

Disputes within movements for black rights within America date back at least to the mid-19th century, when white abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison and black abolitionist Frederick Douglass disagreed on the morality of using violence in order to end slavery. Whereas William Lloyd Garrison believed in demonstrating the brotherhood of the entire human race and did not condone violence, Frederick Douglass did at times support the potential for violent action. In a 1849 speech in Boston, he said: “I should welcome the intelligence tomorrow, should it come, that slaves had risen in the South, and that the sable arms which had been engaged in beautifying and adorning the South were engaged in spreading death and devastation” (Lester, 1968, p. 45).
Douglass was considered a moderate within the abolitionist movement, as he never fully decided whether violence or nonviolence would be a more effective tactic in the fight against slavery. He declined to participate in violence, refusing to help John Brown in his violent raid at Harpers Ferry, West Virginia in 1859 (Lester, 1968, p. 47). However, in that same year, Douglass acknowledged that the prominent nonviolent method of ‘moral suasion’ may not be effective in ending slavery; he argued that “Moral considerations have long since been exhausted upon slaveholders. It is in vain to reason with them . . . slavery is a system of brute force. It shields itself behind might, rather than right. It must be met with its own weapons” (p. 47).

As Julius Lester explains, “the Garrisonians were committed to a method; blacks were committed to the destruction of slavery. It was inevitable that Douglass and Garrison would conflict” (Lester, 1968, p. 42). For activists who have a personal stake in the issue at hand, staying true to a particular method of resistance, such as pure nonviolence, is rarely as important as the goals of the resistance.

Regardless of their personal stances on the use of violence, some abolitionists believed that violence was an inevitable response to the injustice of slavery. Angelina Grimke, an abolitionist born to a slave-owning family, came to believe that “slavery by its very nature, by the false order it imposed and its mimicry of familial and social relationships, could not but result in violence in one form or another” (Browne, 1999, p. 38).

Divisions Continue into a New Century

By the beginning of the 20th century, the abolition of slavery had been achieved in the United States, but full equal rights were yet to be realized. As black Americans examined how to
achieve these rights, new divisions occurred. Three prominent black leaders rose to prominence during this time: accommodationist Booker T. Washington, uncompromising W.E.B. DuBois, and separatist Marcus Garvey.

Booker T. Washington, born in 1856 in Virginia, spent the first nine years of his life in slavery (Moore, 2003, p. 15). Later in life, he became well-known as an activist who did not push for integration with whites. He suggested that black Americans focus on raising their economic standards of living before pursuing civil rights. To white Americans, he asked that blacks be allowed to pursue economic advancement as long as they agreed “not to push for social and political rights” (p. 32 – 33).

Washington’s main political rival, William Edward Burghardt DuBois, was born free, in 1868 Massachusetts (Moore, 2003, p. 37). Unlike Washington, DuBois “had little regard for white people or America and refused to compromise the fight for equality” (Lester, 1968, p. 74). Marcus Garvey, born in Jamaica in 1887, took DuBois’s disregard for white America to a new level and pushed for complete separation of the races. He suggested that this separation could only be achieved by returning to the African continent (p. 76). To different degrees, these three men influenced a generation that would soon lead an even larger struggle for equal rights in America.

Beginning of the Civil Rights Movement

As African Americans led a major movement for equal civil rights in the 1950s and 1960s, members of the movement remained divided over violent versus nonviolent action. Two men personified this divide: pacifist reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. and militant Muslim activist Malcolm X. While King focused on ending de jure segregation in the South, Malcolm X
spoke more on de facto segregation in the urban ghettos of the North (Howard-Pitney, 2004, p. vii). Where King stressed integration, Malcolm pushed for separation; where King preached for nonviolence as a means to end racial oppression, Malcolm spoke of the right to self-defense and advocated for blacks to use any means necessary to secure their rights (p. 17).

At the beginning of the Civil Rights Movement, King’s message of nonviolence resonated with many southern blacks. Many agreed with his interpretation that segregation and racism were moral problems, and therefore nonviolence and love could bring morality back to America and solve the problem of racism (Lester, 1968, p. 4). His preaching of love did have a positive impact, both on a local and national level. When King led demonstrations in a town or city, the crime rate among blacks in that area would drop significantly as local people began to involve themselves more in the nonviolent movement (p. 25). Meanwhile, the juxtaposition of nonviolent protesters with brutality from police hurt America’s international image and eventually pushed the Kennedy and Johnson administrations to support the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (p. 11).

At the same time, many African Americans in the North were drawn to the leadership of Malcolm X, who spoke of the importance of pride and self-respect in black communities (Lester, 1968, p. 91). While King pushed for integration with whites, Malcolm X spoke of separation from the ‘white devils,’ claiming that African Americans who advocated separation “were ashamed of their race and wished they were white” (Howard-Pitney, 2004, p. 2). Those who did not buy into King’s rhetoric of loving the enemy often gravitated toward the more uncompromising rhetoric of Malcolm X and the Nation of Islam.
Shifts in the Civil Rights Movement

While at the beginning of the Civil Rights Movement most black Americans followed the nonviolent methods of Martin Luther King, the popular support for this means of protest did not last through the end of the 1960s. While the legal victories of the southern civil rights movement raised the expectations of African Americans throughout the country, true change did not always follow; this was particularly true in the North, where segregation was often de facto rather than de jure (Howard-Pitney, 2004, p. 3). Violent revolts among Northern black ghettos became more and more common between 1964 and 1968 (p. 3). In a 1968 book, Afro-American Studies professor Julius Lester explained blacks’ growing dissatisfaction with the nonviolent movement:

We’ve had enough of this kind of sentimentality, this kind of sympathy. How inspirational it all was, but it didn’t solve the problem. . . .We know [that ‘love’ as a tactic is ineffective], because we still get headaches from the beatings we took while love, love, loving. We know, because we died on those highways and in those jail cells, died from trying to change the hearts of men who had none. We know, those of us who’re twenty-three and have bleeding ulcers. We know, those of us who’ll never be quite right again. We know that nothing kills a nigger like too much love (Lester, 1968, p. 104 – 107)

It was in this context that once-rivals Martin Luther King and Malcolm X began to agree on more and more issues, as both leaders struggled to contend with the changing landscape of the Civil Rights Movement.

In order to cope with the changing perspectives of their followers, both King and Malcolm X became more understanding of the other toward the end of their lives and began to compromise on some of their earlier positions. The slow convergence of the two leaders in the mid-1960s led many to hope for an even stronger movement, as Malcolm X’s reputation in the northern ghettos could help King gain more influence there (Howard-Pitney, 2004, p. 14). In fact, in early 1965, both leaders were speaking about setting up a meeting to discuss working together on Civil Rights issues across the country. However, two days before they were
scheduled to meet, Malcolm X was assassinated by a member of the Nation of Islam, the group that he had left behind a year earlier (p. 16). This dream of black America’s two greatest leaders working together to achieve justice was, sadly, not to be realized.
Chapter 4: Malcolm X

“\textit{I learned early that crying out in protest could accomplish things. My older brothers and sister had started school when, sometimes, they would come in and ask for a buttered biscuit or something and my mother, impatiently, would tell them no. But I would cry out and make a fuss until I got what I wanted. I remember well how my mother asked me why I couldn’t be a nice boy like [my brother] Wilfred; but I would think to myself that Wilfred, for being so nice and quiet, often stayed hungry. So early in life, I had learned that if you want something, you had better make some noise}”

-Malcolm X, 1965

Introduction

In the early 1960s, a Nation of Islam minister known as Malcolm X became famous for his harsh words against white America. Unlike Martin Luther King, who spoke about the importance of loving your oppressors, Malcolm argued that no good would come of being nonviolent with those who refused to be nonviolent themselves. In 1968, Julius Lester explained the huge impact that Malcolm had on African Americans:

He said aloud those things which backs had been saying among themselves. He even said those things we had been afraid to say to each other. His clear, uncomplicated words cut through the chains on black minds like a giant blowtorch. His words were not spoken for the benefit of the press. He was not concerned with stirring the moral conscious of America because he knew – America has no moral conscious. He spoke directly and eloquently to black men (Lester, 1968, p. 91).

Although his views on violence and race relations changed throughout his career, he was most well known for his scathing vilification of white America.

Malcolm X was born as Malcolm Little in 1925 Nebraska. His father was a Baptist preacher and an organizer for Marcus Garvey’s Universal Negro Improvement Association, a nationalist group that advocated complete separation between blacks and whites and pushed for a
Pan-African identity for all blacks (Howard-Pitney, 2004, p. 6). After Malcolm’s father was killed and his mother suffered from a serious mental illness, he was placed into foster care and soon turned to crime. While in prison, Malcolm discovered the Nation of Islam (NOI), an organization of black Muslims that stressed the superiority of blacks to the ‘white devils.’ He soon dropped the name ‘Little,’ as that last name originated in slavery, and took on the new name Malcolm X. In 1959, a documentary about the Nation of Islam, called “The Hate That Hate Produced,” brought NOI leader Elijah Muhammad and spokesperson Malcolm X into national prominence (X & Haley, 1965, p. 242).

Although Malcolm was initially known for his violent words and his unconditional denouncement of whites, this position changed significantly throughout the course of his short career. By 1965, he accepted the idea that not all whites were inherently evil, and he speculated that racial equality could be reached in the US through nonviolent means. Much of this shift coincided with Malcolm’s break from the Nation of Islam and his conversion to traditional Sunni Islam after undertaking the Hajj (the Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca) in 1964. However, there were in fact many interactional factors that contributed to Malcolm’s many ideological transformations toward the end of his life.

Formative Factors

Both main formative factors, childhood experience and outside inspiration, played a large role in forming Malcolm X’s initial rhetoric when he began speaking on behalf of the Nation of Islam. Malcolm grew up surrounded by poverty and violence, leading him to believe that violence may be inevitable. At the same time, he drew much of his inspiration from the violent
rhetoric of Elijah Muhammad, the NOI leader that influenced Malcolm X significantly at the beginning of his career.

Malcolm spent most of his formative years in East Lansing, Michigan, where his family was often under attack by their white neighbors. The family’s home was burned to the ground when Malcolm was just four years old, and just two years later, his father Earl was killed by white supremacists (Howard-Pitney, 2004, p. 6). In fact, of Earl’s six brothers, only one died of natural causes; witnessing three of his brothers die at the hands of white men pushed him to become a fervent supporter of the black separatist movement (p. 8). His family managed to scrape by on the food that they grew until the beginning of the great depression, when they would often survive on boiled dandelions (X & Haley, 1965, p. 14).

Malcolm’s formal education ended after the 8th grade, when he moved to Boston to live with his sister Ella and became involved in the crime scene there (Howard-Pitney, 2004, p. 8). However, as his daughter Atallah Shabazz pointed out in her introduction to his autobiography, the emphasis on education in his early childhood did eventually lead him to spend most of his time in prison in the library (X & Haley, 1965, p. xv). It was in this environment that Malcolm discovered the Nation of Islam, a movement whose followers were mainly composed of lower-class African Americans from America’s northern ghettos (p. 8).

When Malcolm was assassinated in February 1965, Martin Luther King spoke on his death, focusing on the impact of his childhood on his often-violent speech:

Malcolm X was clearly a product of the hate and violence invested in the Negro’s blighted existence in this nation. He, like so many of our number, was a victim of the despair that inevitably derives from the conditions of oppression, poverty, and injustice which engulf the masses of our race. But in his youth, there was no hope, no preaching, teaching or movements of non-violence (p. 125).
King recognized that much of Malcolm’s hateful and violent rhetoric was the result of witnessing so much violence and poverty and so little hope in his formative years.

These childhood experiences made Malcolm particularly susceptible to the influence of the Nation of Islam’s violent, extremist language. As he explains in his autobiography, the rhetoric of black sanctity and white devilry helped him make sense of the traumatic events of his childhood (X & Haley, 1965, p. 386). The NOI’s narrative also helped him make sense of his current predicament of being imprisoned; Elijah Muhammad wrote to Malcolm in prison and told him that “the black prisoner . . . symbolized white society’s crime of keeping black men oppressed and deprived and ignorant, and unable to get decent jobs, turning them into criminals” (p. 172). The Nation of Islam further appealed to him by revealing the accomplishments of blacks that had been erased from white history books, thereby helping Malcolm regain a sense of pride in his identity as a black man (p. 177).

All of these factors came together in making Malcolm an unquestioning follower of Elijah Muhammad during the beginning of his career as a minister. In his 1965 autobiography, Malcolm divulged that he “believed so strongly in Mr. Muhammad that [he] would have hurled [himself] between him and an assassin” (X & Haley, 1965, p. 293). Because of this devotion, many of Malcolm’s early speeches focused on parroting the Nation of Islam’s ideas about the coming destruction of the white race. In his 1963 speech “God’s Judgment of White America,” Malcolm explained his new views:

The Honorable Elijah Muhammad teaches us that as it was the divine will in the case of the destruction of the slave empires of the ancient and modern past, America’s judgment and destruction will also be brought about by divine will and divine power. . . White America must now pay for her sins. . . . God himself must first destroy this evil Western world, the white world (Howard-Pitney, 2004, p. 113-114)
Many of Malcolm X’s early speeches were also impacted by his international influences, the violent revolutions that were changing the political landscapes of nations like Kenya and Algeria (X & Breitman, 1965, p. 8). He came out of his studies of these movements with the lesson that “there’s no such thing as a nonviolent revolution . . . and you [African Americans], sitting around here . . . you need a revolution” (Howard-Pitney, 2004, p. 100). Both local and international inspiration came together and pushed Malcolm X toward largely violent rhetoric when he first rose to prominence.

Beginning Rhetoric

In one of Malcolm X’s early speeches, “The Black Revolution” in June 1963, his rhetoric closely matched that of the Nation of Islam. His speech referenced one of the Nation’s principle reasons for advocating separation: God was going to destroy the white race, so it was in the best interest of black Americans to leave the country before God’s wrath would begin. In the speech, Malcolm explains his reasons for separatism:

Just as God destroyed the enslavers in the past, God is going to destroy this wicked white enslaver of our people here in America. . . . We want no part of integration with this wicked race that enslaved us. We want complete separation from this wicked race of devils” (Howard-Pitney, 2005, p. 69 –70).

Malcolm’s blanket condemnations of white Americans and his advocacy for violent revolt and separating from whites defined his early career. Later in 1963, he connected his religious beliefs to his rejection of Martin Luther King’s nonviolent ideology:

There is nothing in our book, the Koran, that teaches us to suffer peacefully. Our religion teaches us to be intelligent. Be peaceful, be courteous, obey the law, respect everyone; but if someone puts his hand on you, send him to the cemetery. That’s a good religion (X & Breitman, 1965, p. 12).
He advocated nonviolence only when the opponents of the Civil Rights Movement were nonviolent themselves, and white opponents of integration were rarely nonviolent.

Malcolm often responded directly to King’s messages of nonviolence and love. In response to King’s focus on the power of love, Malcolm asked, “Does the lamb love the world devouring it? . . . Does a person being raped love the rapist?” (Howard-Pitney, 2004, p. 10). In addition to criticizing King’s message on ideological grounds, he also spoke on why this method of resistance, specifically the idea of appealing to the morals of white Americans, would not be effective. He claimed that “tactics based solely on morality can only succeed when you are dealing with people who are moral or a system that is moral. A man or system which oppresses a man because of his color is not moral” (p. 98). He also argued that King’s method did not work in reality:

What the March on Washington [in August 1963] did do was lull Negroes for a while. But inevitably, the black masses started realizing they had been smoothly hoaxed again by the white man. And, inevitably, the black man’s anger rekindled, deeper than ever, and there began bursting out in different cities, in the ‘long, hot summer’ of 1964, unprecedented racial crises (X & Haley, 1965, p. 287).

While King’s nonviolent movement did achieve significant political gains, many grievances still remained. Malcolm saw the remaining anger in black communities and became even more convinced that nonviolent protest could not solve his people’s problems.

**Later Rhetoric**

As the following graphs illustrate, Malcolm X’s rhetoric changed substantially throughout the course of his career. Figure 3 demonstrates the number of times that Malcolm used “violent” terms and “nonviolent” terms in each major speech and public statement that he
made throughout the 1960s\textsuperscript{1}. One can see that early in his public career, he used violent rhetoric significantly more than he did nonviolent rhetoric. However, in the middle of 1963, just months before his break with the Nation of Islam, his use of nonviolent terms began to parallel his use of violent language.

\textbf{Figure 3}

Figure 4 isolates Malcolm’s use of increasingly nonviolent language over the last five years of his life. During the majority of his tenure in the Nation of Islam, Malcolm used fewer than 10 nonviolent terms, such as “peace,” “vote,” or “love,” per speech. However, his use of nonviolent rhetoric increased exponentially after his break with the NOI and his trip across the Middle East and Africa.

\textsuperscript{1} A list of these terms can be found in the appendix on page 122
This drastic change coincided with Malcolm’s separation from the Nation of Islam, which came soon after the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. The day of the shooting, Elijah Muhammad instructed all NOI ministers not to comment on the issue. However, less than one month after the assassination, Malcolm X was asked his opinion after his speech “God’s Judgment of White America,” and he responded that America’s “chickens [were] coming home to roost,” explaining that the rampant hate in America had “spread unchecked, finally [striking] down this country’s Chief of State” (X & Haley, 1965, p. 307). Shortly after this statement, Elijah Muhammad told Malcolm that he would have to silence him for 3 months in order to distance the Nation of Islam from his comment; three days later, Malcolm heard that NOI ministers were starting to threaten his life, and he knew that these threats could only be made with Elijah Muhammad’s approval (p. 309).

After traveling to Mecca to complete the Hajj, Malcolm converted to Sunni Islam and made his official break with the Nation of Islam. His conversion played a large role in a newfound desire to collaborate with Martin Luther King rather than denouncing him as
ineffective (Howard-Pitney, 2004, p. 13). He soon began to reject the NOI concept of separation, instead seeing “Negroes as an integral part of the American community” (X & Haley, 1965, p. xxx), and he recognized that his anger toward white Americans had been obscuring his understanding of racial issues in the US (p. 160).

One major aspect of Malcolm’s evolution was his more nuanced view of white Americans. While he still condemned white racists, he no longer saw whites as inherently and “unchangeably evil” (Howard-Pitney, 2004, p. 18). Malcolm’s 1965 reflections of an incident two years earlier illustrate his new view of whites. In 1963, a white university student came up to Malcolm and asked if there was role that she could play in ending racism; Malcolm told her that there was nothing that she could do, and the girl ran out crying (p. 112). In his 1965 autobiography, Malcolm reflected on that incident, as he had started to realize that there was a significant role that whites could play in ending racism.

I wish that now I knew her name, or where I could telephone her, or write to her, and tell her what I tell white people now when they present themselves as being sincere, and ask me, one way or another, the same thing that she asked. The first thing I tell them is that at least where my own particular Black Nationalist organization . . . is concerned, they can’t join us . . . America’s racism is among their own fellow whites. That’s where the sincere whites who really mean to accomplish something have got to work (X & Haley 383-384).

By this time, while Malcolm was still wary of white supporters, he accepted their help and had thought through an important role for them in the movement for civil rights: working to eradicate racism among their fellow whites.

In addition to his evolving view of white Americans, Malcolm’s understanding of other civil rights leaders also changed toward the end of his life. In late 1964 and early 1965, Malcolm “ceased his former ferocious verbal assaults on the leaders of the national civil rights organizations,” and he endorsed Martin Luther King’s goal of obtaining voting rights (Howard-Pitney, 2004, p. 13). While he never renounced his conditional support for violence, he began to
soften his views on those who did denounce violence. In a January 1965 speech, he admitted “I have great respect and admiration for one who has the nerve to tie his own hands and then walk out and let a brute brutalize him. I have to respect him because he’s doing something that I don’t understand” (X & Breitman, 1965, p. 208). Major differences remained between Malcolm and those who took a purely nonviolent approach, but he had come to respect other leaders despite their differing views.

In perhaps Malcolm’s most significant progression over the last two years of his life, he began to see hope that a nonviolent approach might actually be effecting in improving the lives of black Americans. In his April 1964 speech “The Ballot or the Bullet,” Malcolm began advocating for the nonviolent action of taking civil rights issues to the United Nations and focusing on voting rights within the United States (Howard-Pitney, 2004, p. 173). In that same month, he demonstrated a complete reversal from earlier statements when he stated:

America today is at a time . . . where she is the first country on this earth that can actually have a bloodless revolution. . . . Why is America in a position to bring about a bloodless revolution? Because the Negro in this country holds the balance of power, and if the Negro in this country were given what the Constitution says he is supposed to have, the added power of the Negro in this country would sweep all of the racists and the segregationists out of office (p. 164).

This new message came in direct contrast to his November 1963 statement that “there’s no such thing as a nonviolent revolution” (p. 100). In fewer than 18 months, Malcolm had completely reversed his position on the hope for a peaceful solution to racism.

**Interactional Factors**

These shifts in Malcolm X’s rhetoric over time came as a result of three main interactional factors: changing influences, a broader understanding of the world, and a desire for
concessions. These factors became significant in Malcolm’s life when he broke of ties with the Nation of Islam, broadened his worldview by traveling to Mecca and across the Middle East and Africa, and began to witness the results of both violence and nonviolence firsthand.

Malcolm’s break with Elijah Muhammad contributed greatly to his new rhetorical flexibility and his broadening understanding of the world. According to Michael S. Handler, one of the few reporters that Malcolm trusted during his life, Malcolm’s separation from the Nation of Islam coincided with his changing views towards whites (X & Haley, 1965, p. xxix). In his autobiography, Malcolm explained that during his twelve years as an NOI member, he rarely thought for himself (p. 313). In February 1965, he explained:

I feel like a man who’s been asleep somewhat and under someone else’s control. I feel what I’m thinking and saying now is for myself. Before, it was for and by the guidance of Elijah Muhammad. Now I think with my own mind (X & Breitman, 1965, p. 226).

His new independence of thought allowed him to move away from the NOI’s messages of hate and violence and toward a more moderate stance.

Just a month after splitting with the Nation of Islam, Malcolm X undertook the Hajj, the Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca in Saudi Arabia, and he traveled through other countries across the Middle East and Africa. His experiences abroad had a profound impact on his views of the world, and his broader understanding of world issues led him to a more moderate position on many social issues, but particularly on his previous condemnations of white people. When Malcolm traveled to Mecca, he met pilgrims who were white and nevertheless treated him and other black pilgrims simply as other Muslims, acting “in true brotherhood” (Howard-Pitney, 2003, p. 158). When he returned from Mecca in May 1964, he reflected on his experience and admitted:

In the past, I have permitted myself to be used to make sweeping indictments of all white people, and these generalizations have caused injuries to some white people who did not
deserve them. Because of the spiritual rebirth which I was blessed to undergo as a result of my pilgrimage to the Holy City of Mecca, I no longer subscribe to sweeping indictments of one race (X & Breitman, 1965, p. 58).

Malcolm’s realization that some white people did not deserve his condemnation represented yet another complete reversal from his previous positions. Furthermore, it contributed greatly to his growing disposition toward nonviolence, as one of the principle strategies of violent rhetoric is dehumanizing the opposing group (Gorsevski, 1999, p. 450 – 456). By accepting white people as fellow humans who were sometimes kind and sometimes cruel, Malcolm abandoned one previous method of violent rhetoric.

Malcolm’s independence from the Nation of Islam and his international travel were instrumental in two of the main interactional factors that caused his shifts in rhetoric: the changes in his influences and his broader understanding of the world. However, the last interactional factor affecting him came simply from witnessing the results of both violence and nonviolence within the civil rights movement and thinking about which action was more likely to force the US government to give concessions to the movement. When Malcolm witnessed actual violence from the black community in 1964, it did not give him hope that the government would see these actions and be forced to treat the black community better; instead, it made him fearful. He confessed in his autobiography that:

It scared me the first time I really saw the danger of these ghetto teen-agers if they are ever sparked to violence. One sweltering summer afternoon, I attended a Harlem street rally [and incited the crowd] . . . The first thing you know [the crowd’s] mood grew so ugly that I really got apprehensive. I got up on top of a car and began waving my arms and yelling at them to quiet down (X & Haley, 1965, p. 318).

Personally witnessing a crowd revolting made Malcolm start to rethink the model that he had been following. He began to realize for the first time that he had the power to start riots, and he began questioning if that was truly what he wanted (p. 318).
Meanwhile, Malcolm saw the results of the nonviolent movement and began to realize that this method of protest was helping the movement gain concessions from the government. By 1965, he saw that King’s nonviolent movement in the south had created significant legal change in the country (Howard-Pitney, 2004, p. 14). He said in February 1965 that he’s “for anything . . . that gets meaningful results” (X & Breitman, 1965, p. 222), and by the time of his assassination he was realizing that the nonviolent movement was in fact achieving meaningful results.

Conclusion

Malcolm X underwent major ideological and rhetorical shifts in the last two years of his life. These shifts can be understood in terms of formative and interactional factors.

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<th>Trajectory:</th>
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<th>Formative Factors:</th>
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<td>2) <strong>Early Influences</strong>: The Nation of Islam and inspiration from world revolutions led him to believe that violent rhetoric would be most effective</td>
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<td>2) <strong>Broader World Understanding</strong>: Traveling outside the US made him more welcoming of white allies and less likely to dehumanize his white adversaries</td>
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<td>3) <strong>Desire for Concessions</strong>: Witnessing the gains made by nonviolent activists led him to reconsider nonviolence as a viable option</td>
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Malcolm X died shortly after beginning this new trajectory; it is impossible to predict with certainty whether or not he would have continued on this path, but the existence of multiple interactional factors pushing him toward moderation suggests that he would have.

Ultimately, the rhetoric and actions of Malcolm X at both the beginning and end of his career had a significant impact on the movement for civil rights in America. His legacy today reflects the hope that he expressed at the end of his autobiography:

Yes, I have cherished my ‘demagogue’ role. I know that societies often have killed the people who have helped to change those societies. And if I can die having brought any light, having exposed any meaningful truth that will help to destroy the racist cancer that is malignant in the body of America - then, all of the credit is due to Allah. Only the mistakes have been mine.\(^2\)

\(^2\) X & Haley, 1965, p. 389
"Revolutionary prophets, like Malcolm and Martin, often do not live to become old men. They are usually killed by the forces they are seeking to change. Malcolm X was killed by the blacks he loved and was seeking to liberate from self-hate. Martin King was killed by the whites he loved and was seeking to set free of racism”

- James H. Cone, 1992

Chapter 5: Martin Luther King, Jr.

Introduction

In the mid 1950s, a Baptist preacher named Martin Luther King, Jr. gained recognition for his leadership of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, one of the earliest campaigns in the modern Civil Rights Movement. In contrast to Malcolm X, who would emerge as King’s main rival in the movement only a few years later, Martin Luther King focused on a message of nonviolence and love for the people who were oppressing black Americans. Although he wavered in his opinion that love for his enemies could work miracles toward the end of his life, he is principally remembered for his pacifist message.

Martin Luther King was born in Atlanta, Georgia to a middle-class family in 1929. His father and maternal grandmother were both prominent Baptist preachers, and at age 18 King decided to enter the ministry himself (Cone, 1994, p. 20 – 27). Fewer than 10 years later, King rose to national prominence when he became president of the Montgomery Improvement Association, the organization leading the 1955-1956 Montgomery Bus Boycott, and “swiftly emerged as the movement’s most compelling and articulate figure” (Howard-Pitney, 2004, p. 4).

Although King began his career with messages of nonviolence and love for one’s enemy, his position on violence and nonviolence was rapidly evolving in the last few years of his life.
From 1966 to his death in 1968, King’s rhetoric became more and more inflammatory; he separated himself from white leaders in Washington, spoke more about world revolutions, and began using language similar to that of Malcolm X. A broader understanding of both his followers and of the overall situation of blacks in America contributed greatly to these changes.

Formative Factors

Childhood experiences and outside inspiration both played a significant role in forming King’s rhetoric at the beginning of his career. Through living in a stable home that emphasized the importance of education, King internalized messages of love and forgiveness that helped shape his early speeches. In his later adolescence and early adulthood, the inspiration that King received from the Baptist church and from the life of Mahatma Gandhi further pushed him toward the use of nonviolent language.

Unlike Malcolm X, whose childhood was defined by violence, poverty, and instability, King grew up comfortably and had a more positive outlook on the world and its future. This optimism allowed him to be more open to believing that a nonviolent approach was the most appropriate response to oppression. In a 1950 essay, King described the affect of his childhood on his worldview:

It is quite easy for me to think of the universe as basically friendly mainly because of my uplifting hereditary and environmental circumstances. It is quite easy for me to lean more toward optimism than pessimism about human nature mainly because of my childhood experiences (Howard-Pitney, 2004, p. 37)

This belief in the goodness of human nature was instrumental in forming King’s view that whites could be allies in the civil rights movement if they could only be made to understand the evils of racism. In the same essay, King points out that his parents also directly influenced his views on
whites by telling him that it was his “duty as a Christian” to love even those who mistreated him (p. 39). He fully internalized this message when he joined interracial organizations in college, where he worked with white students and came to further improve his views of whites (p. 39).

King’s middle-class childhood also played a large role in his education. As theologian James Cone explains, “among blacks during the 1940s and early 1950s, only the [black] middle class valued education enough to accept the social isolation and mental discipline required to succeed academically and professionally in white northern universities and seminaries” (Cone, 1992, p. 27). King’s advanced education allowed him to form nuanced views on race relations and religion and to find inspiration from nonviolent international figures like Gandhi.

King’s religious beliefs were instrumental in his view that whites could be trusted to join the fight against racism. As Cone explains:

In contrast to Malcolm [X]’s views, Martin believed in whites because he believed in the goodness of humanity. He believed in humanity because he believed in God, the One who created male and female in the image and likeness of the divine. Therefore, all people, white and Negro alike, have the moral capacity to do the good and to fight against evil (Cone, 1992, p. 220)

The Baptist church and King’s interpretation of church views helped develop his confidence that appealing to the morals of white America could be an effective tactic for the civil rights movement.

Also impacting King’s beliefs was inspiration from Gandhi’s leadership of the Indian movement for independence. When King read about Gandhi’s life and work, he found parallels between Gandhi’s philosophy of nonviolence and King’s own religious beliefs. In a 1960 essay, King explain the profound influence that Gandhi had on him:

As I read [Gandhi’s] works I became deeply fascinated by his campaigns of nonviolent resistance. . . . as I delved deeper into the philosophy of Gandhi my skepticism concerning the power of love gradually diminished, and I came to see for the first time
that the Christian doctrine of love operating through the Gandhian method of nonviolence was one of the most potent weapons available to oppressed people in their struggle for freedom” (Howard-Pitney, 2004, p. 43).

Gandhi’s belief that “if you want something really important to be done you must not merely satisfy the reason, you must move the heart also” had a particularly significant impact on King (Gorsevski, 1999, p. 454). In late 1959, King’s visit to India further convinced him that nonviolence could be effective. He noted that although violent campaigns also sometimes succeeded in winning struggles, “the aftermath of hatred and bitterness that usually follows a violent campaign is found nowhere in India” because of the nonviolent nature of its revolution (Howard-Pitney, 2004, p. 44). King continued to draw inspiration from Gandhi throughout his career, and in 1965 he “compared the Selma March to ‘Gandhi’s march to the sea’” (Cone, 1992, p. 219).

**Beginning Rhetoric**

Martin Luther King’s initial rhetoric was defined by his rejection of violence and his acceptance of whites as part of an integrated society, in direct contrast to Malcolm X’s support for separatism. He embraced nonviolence on a personal level, explaining that the philosophy of nonviolence had “helped [him] to diminish long-repressed feelings of anger and frustration” (Howard-Pitney, 2004, p. 67). He also believed in nonviolence on a moral level; in 1963, he explained that he “tried to stand between . . . two forces, saying that we need to emulate neither the ‘do-nothingism’ of the complacent nor the hatred and despair of the black nationalist. For there is the more excellent way of love and nonviolent protest” (p. 83).

In addition to his view that nonviolence was morally superior to violence, King also believed that nonviolence led to better long-term solutions. In his 1959 trip to India, King noted
that because Indians won independence without the use of violence, the country was more stable than it would have been after a violent revolution; this realization “left [King] even more convinced of the power of nonviolence” (Howard-Pitney, 2004, p. 44). He put his belief in nonviolence and nonviolent rhetoric into practice with his seminal 1963 work “Letter from a Birmingham Jail.” In this essay, he ties in his religious beliefs to his practical view on the superiority of nonviolent action:

I am grateful to God that, through the influence of the Negro church, the way of nonviolence became an integral part of our struggle. If this philosophy had not emerged, by now many streets of the South would, I am convinced, be flowing with blood. [If whites don’t support nonviolent black protesters,] millions of Negroes will, out of frustration and despair, seek solace and security in [militant] black nationalist ideologies—a development that would inevitably lead to a frightening racial nightmare (p. 83–84).

Along with his nuanced justifications of nonviolent but active protest, in this essay King weaves examples of nonviolent action with condemnations of injustice to create “a rhetorical lesson in nonviolence” (Gorsevski, 1999, p. 449). King further demonstrated his belief in nonviolence in his famous “I Have a Dream Speech” of the same year:

In the process of gaining our rightful place, we must not be guilty of wrongful deeds. Let us not seek to satisfy our thirst for freedom by drinking from the cup of bitterness and hatred. We must forever conduct our struggle on the high plane of dignity and discipline. We must not allow our creative protest to degenerate into physical violence. Again and again, we must rise to the majestic heights of meeting physical force with soul force (King, 1963)

In this speech, King supplemented his inspiring words about a better future with a reminder that his followers must not let themselves fall into hatred of their oppressors.

In addition to his rejection of violence, King also became known for his message of love for his white oppressors. While Malcolm X spent much of his early career condemning all whites as “devils,” King served as the civil rights movement’s “chief interpreter to white Americans” (Howard-Pitney, 2004, p. 6). In 1966, King rejected the term “Black Power” because taking
power and not sharing it with whites would be “exchanging one form of tyranny for another” (Lester, 1968, p. 99). In his “I Have a Dream” speech, he further explained his trust of white allies:

The marvelous new militancy which has engulfed the Negro community must not lead us to a distrust of all white people, for many of our white brothers, as evidenced by their presence here today, have come to realize that their destiny is tied up with our destiny. And they have come to realize that their freedom is inextricably bound to our freedom (King, 1963).

Martin Luther King believed in white Americans not only because he thought of all humans as inherently good, but also because he knew that some whites recognized that racism was hurting them as well; therefore, supporting the civil rights movement was the only practical option.

Later Rhetoric

As demonstrated in the following graphs, Martin Luther King’s rhetoric went through a significant evolution over the course of his career. Figure 5 illustrates the use of “violent” (red) and “nonviolent” (blue) terms that King used in his sermons and speeches throughout the 1950s and 1960s. One can see that until the middle of the 1960s, King’s use of nonviolent rhetoric vastly overshadowed his use of violent language. However, the number of violent and nonviolent terms began growing closer in 1964, and by the last two years of his life, the violent terms in King’s speeches often outnumbered the nonviolent terms.

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3 A list of these terms can be found in the appendix on page 122
Figure 5

Figure 6 isolates King’s increasing use of violent rhetoric over time. His use of violent language remained consistently low until the mid-1960s. After 1965, the use of terms such as “fight,” “destroy,” and “war” became more and more common in his public sermons and speeches.
Beginning in the mid-1960s, King’s rhetoric started to become more radical and militant. He became more confrontational with the US government, spent more time condemning white Americans, and grew more open to revolutionary thought. These changes culminated in a greater understanding of why some African Americans resorted to violence moved him toward rhetoric that had once been associated more closely with Malcolm X.

According to Professor David Howard-Pitney, by 1965 King realized that racism was harder to eradicate than he had originally thought, and he began to focus on more systematic changes (Howard-Pitney, 2004, p. 18). As he began criticizing US policies at home and abroad, he lost popularity among whites, who now saw him as unpatriotic (p. 18) By the final year of King’s life, 1968, he and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference planned to march on Washington yet again “and, if necessary, immobilize the U.S. government until it took meaningful action to improve the conditions of America’s poor” (p. 137). As he began to focus on systematic issues besides racism, such as poverty, King distanced himself more and more from the US government and from whites.

Toward the end of his life, King’s views on white Americans also changed. He began criticizing white leaders more often, stating in 1965 that he “wonder[ed] at [persons] who fare to feel that they have some paternalistic right to set the timetable for another [person]’s liberation” (Cone, 1992, p. 232). As summer riots became increasingly common in the late 1960s, King spoke out against whites who used the riots as an excuse to stop supporting the civil rights movement (p. 232). During this time, “King . . . revised his own views on such things as the nature and tenacity of white racism, which was far deeper and harder to remove than he had earlier imagined” (Howard-Pitney, 2004, p. 18). Meanwhile, he began to focus on black role
models in his speeches rather than naming conventional white historical figures as role models for civil rights activists (Cone, 1992, p. 230).

Also significant was King’s growing openness to revolutionary thought. In 1966, King rejected Malcolm X’s idea of a world revolution:

Arguments that the American Negro is a part of a world which is two-thirds colored and that there will come a day when the oppressed people of color will rise together to throw off the yoke of white oppression are at least fifty years away from being relevant. There is no colored nation, including China, which now shows even the potential of leading a revolution of color in any international proportion (Howard-Pitney, 2004, p. 92).

However, only a year later, King completely reversed this view and began to speak of world revolutions:

These are revolutionary times. All over the globe men are revolting against old systems of exploitation and oppression. . . . The shirtless and barefoot people of the land are rising up as never before. . . . We in the West must support these revolutions. It is a sad fact that . . . the Western nations that initiated so much of the revolutionary spirit of the modern world have now become the arch antirevolutionaries (p. 146).

In the last two years of his life, King’s views were rapidly evolving, sometimes into views that directly opposed those that he expressed early in his career.

Additionally, toward the end of his career King became more understanding of why some rejected his ideas of nonviolence. By 1966, King “did not questions every individual’s right to defend himself against assault; rather, he asked people voluntarily to set aside that right . . . for the purpose of publicizing and eradicating a social evil” (Howard-Pitney, 2004, p. 91). He began speaking of blacks “fighting aggressively,” even though his idea of an aggressive fight still included the principle of nonviolence (p. 93). In his 1967 speech “Beyond Vietnam,” he warned of violence to come if nonviolence did not lead to tangible gains for blacks in the near future:

The words of the late John F. Kennedy come back to haunt us. Five years ago he said, ‘Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable.’ Increasingly, by choice or by accident, this is the role our nation has taken,
the role of those who make peaceful revolution impossible by refusing to give up the privileges and the pleasures that come from the immense profits of overseas investments (p. 145)

Although King defended nonviolence until his death, his rejection of violence did seem to be waveriing in the last few years of his career.

One of the most surprising shifts of King’s later career was his use of rhetoric once associated with Malcolm X. In 1965, King still believed that Malcolm’s language was irresponsible and would not let Malcolm join him in the Selma march (Howard-Pitney, 2004, p. 14). However, just a year later, King borrowed from Malcolm’s antagonistic vocabulary when he proclaimed that “Mayor Daley’s response [to the movement] was to play tricks with us – to say he’s going to end slums but not doing any concrete thing” (Cone, 1992, p. 233). In perhaps the most apparent example of his usage of Malcolm X’s early rhetoric, King began to parallel Malcolm’s ideas of God’s judgment of whites from his days with the Nation of Islam.

Theologian and activist James Cone paints a picture of this new Martin Luther King:

He began to speak like a prophet, standing before the day of judgment, proclaiming God’s wrath and indignation upon a rich and powerful nation that was blind to injustice at home and indifferent to world peace. Instead of speaking of the American dream, as he had done so eloquently before, he began to speak like Malcolm, over and over again, of an American nightmare, especially in Vietnam (p. 237)

Particularly in his 1967 speech “Beyond Vietnam,” King aligned himself more closely with Malcolm X by speaking about the possibility of a violent revolution; he expressed hope for nonviolent change, but at the same time he increasingly referenced the idea of a world revolution, an idea which had once been advocated for by Malcolm X (Howard-Pitney, 2004, p. 145). King’s opposition to the Vietnam War demonstrated his continuing commitment to nonviolence, but it also led him to take on Malcolm X’s antagonistic rhetoric.
Interactional Factors

The ideological and rhetorical shifts that Martin Luther King exhibited toward the end of his career can be primarily attributed to two interactional factors: losing influence among African Americans who wanted faster results of their protest actions and a broader understanding of his political situation.

In the early 1960s, King’s messages of hope and love resonated with much of black America. However, when that hope failed to turn into many tangible concessions, especially for northern blacks who were less affected by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, many of his followers began to lose faith in his nonviolent message. As nonviolent workers in the south were faced with violence by whites, King’s ideas about nonviolence were increasingly questioned by other activists (Howard-Pitney, 2004, p. 90). In 1968, Julius Lester explained blacks’ exasperation with King’s idea of moral persuasion, as they began thinking “that white folks had plenty more bullets than they did conscience” (Lester, 1968, p. 10). Because of this, many of King’s followers began to think of nonviolence as something to be used only as long as it was effective (Howard-Pitney, 2004, p. 90).

King began to recognize this divide between himself and his followers after the Watts ghetto rebellion of August 1965. When he traveled to Watts, he found that many of the youth of the Watts ghetto in Los Angeles did not believe in nonviolence, and many had never heard of him (Cone, 1992, p. 221). During this time,

Black Power was on the lips of many young blacks, as they read Franz Fanon’s *Wretched of the Earth* and Malcolm [X]’s *Autobiography*. Nonviolence began to lose prestige as the most appropriate weapon for social change, especially among the younger generation of civil rights activists and in the northern ghettos (p. 225)

This changing view of black youth pushed King toward taking on more aggressive rhetoric in an effort to avoid the movement spiraling out of control.
King was further pushed toward violent rhetoric by a broadening understanding of the political situation in America. When King thought over the negative reaction that youth in Watts had to his nonviolent messages, “he began to realize that the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts did not significantly reduce the problems of racism and poverty, especially in the North” (Cone, 1992, p. 222). Recognizing that his nonviolent movement had not been as successful as he had originally thought led King to begin experimenting with new types of rhetoric.

While King was in the process of rethinking the effectiveness of nonviolence, he began broadening his approach to focus on issues of poverty and war in addition to legal racism. As he talked more about this broad spectrum of issues impacting race relations in America, he began to lose white supporters because of his growing radicalism (Howard-Pitney, 2004, p. 138). Meanwhile, the militant black camp “increasingly dismissed him (echoing Malcolm’s old sentiments) as an unreliable ‘Uncle Tom,’ too prone to compromise” (p. 138). His broadening worldview as well as the criticism he faced from both extreme sides of the movement also led to King exploring different kinds of rhetoric.

Conclusion

Martin Luther King’s ideology and rhetoric evolved quickly during the last two years of his career. These changes can be understood through formative and interactional factors.

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<th>Trajectory:</th>
<th><strong>Path B</strong></th>
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<td><em>Leaders on Path B begin their careers with mostly nonviolent rhetoric, which becomes more violent over time.</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>Formative Factors:</td>
<td><em>Martin Luther King’s formative factors led him to use nonviolent rhetoric as he first rose to prominence.</em></td>
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<td></td>
<td>1) <strong>Childhood Experience</strong>: Growing up in a stable, middle class home gave</td>
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him an optimistic worldview that could focus on nonviolence

2) **Early Influences**: The Christian church and inspiration from Gandhi led him to believe that nonviolent rhetoric would be most effective

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<th>Interactional Factors:</th>
<th>Martin Luther King’s interactional factors led him to take on more radical and violent rhetoric later in life.</th>
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<tr>
<td>1) <strong>Losing Influence</strong>: As African Americans became more disillusioned with nonviolence, he needed to take on more violent rhetoric for his message to resonate with black youth</td>
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<tr>
<td>2) <strong>Broader Situational Understanding</strong>: Recognizing that his nonviolent campaigns had not been as successful as he had predicted made him more understanding of those who rejected nonviolence</td>
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Ultimately, throughout his constantly evolving views on race relations and methods of protest, King inspired the world through his combined messages of change, love, hope, and self-worth. His optimism about the future of black Americans is perfectly exemplified by one of his final speeches, 1967’s “Where Do We Go from Here?”

Where do we go from here? First, we must massively assert our dignity and worth, We must stand up amidst a system that still oppresses us and develop an unassailable and majestic sense of values. We must no longer be ashamed of being black. . . Let us realize that the arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice. . . This is our hope for the future, and with this faith we will be able to sing in some not too distant tomorrow, with a cosmic past tense: ‘We have overcome!’

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4 Howard-Pitney, 2004, p. 149 - 156
Chapter 6: Background on Palestinian Resistance

“If there ever was a contemporary conflict that deserved to be included in a series of historical works entitled ‘Contesting the Past,’ it is surely the Arab-Israeli or Israeli-Palestinian conflict. . . . Any attempt to simply recount its main events in chronological order is bound to be contested by someone – even if that account is deliberately neutral in intent, purged of any overt editorializing, and without passing judgment on motives, causes, or effects”

-Neil Caplan, 2010

Introduction

Similarly to Malcolm X and Martin Luther King, Jr., Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat went through significant rhetorical shifts over the course of his career. He moved from violent rhetoric to language that was primarily nonviolent, and the Hamas leadership, including Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh and Political Chief Khaled Mashal, might be moving along a similar trajectory. However, before this paper examines the factors at play in Arafat’s language, it is important to understand a basic history of the conflict in which he played a central role.

Beginning of the Conflict: 1881 - 1948

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict dates back to the founding of Zionism, the movement to create a Jewish state, in the early 1880s. When Jewish immigration to Palestine began in the end of the 19th century, Jews and Arabs lived together with little violence despite the fact that both groups were seeking self-determination in the same land; however, clashes between the two groups intensified after the beginning of the British Mandate in 1917.

The conflict intensified largely due to the conflicting promises made by British leaders in World War I. In the span of less than a decade, Britain promised the land of Palestine to Jews in
the Balfour Declaration, to Arabs in the Hussayn-MacMahon correspondences, and to
themselves in the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Because of these conflicting promises, the British
Mandate of 1917 to 1948 largely consisted of the British trying (and failing) to satisfy the
demands of Arab and Jewish residents of Palestine while also trying to promote their own
regional interests (Caplan, 2010, p. 59).

Palestinian leadership during the British Mandate was largely divided between two
prominent Palestinian families: the Nashibis and the Husaynis. This division came to a head
during the Arab Revolt of 1936 – 1939. During the revolt, the Husaynis took on a militant
leadership role while the Nashibis took on a more moderate approach and called for a ceasefire
(Pearlman, 2011, p. 46). Foreshadowing issues of Palestinian disunity that continue to this day,
this split in leadership contributed to the failure of the Arab Revolt to end the British Mandate, as
it largely devolved into intra-Palestinian violence in its final year (p. 54). This dissolution of
Palestinian leadership also played a major role in the Palestinian reaction to UN Resolution 181
in 1947, which suggested the partition of Palestine, and their major defeat in the war of 1948.
Wendy Pearlman explains:

Stronger leadership, institutions, and collective purpose might have given Palestinians
greater resilience with which to preserve their collective existence in the face of war and
uncertainty. [However,] Palestinian Arabs . . . remained torn along familial, provincial,
and other social lines (p. 56-57)

Partly due to a lack of cohesive leadership, Palestinians rejected Resolution 181 and were
defeated in the ensuing war of 1948, called the War of Independence by Israelis and the Nakba,
or “catastrophe,” by Palestinians. Over 700,000 Palestinians were displaced in the 1948 war;
many of these refugees and their descendants remain in refugee camps in Syria, Lebanon, and
Jordan to this day. Because of the devastating defeat of Palestinians and their Arab allies in this
war, with the Palestinian people scattered across the new state of Israel and refugee camps across
the region, no serious Palestinian leadership emerged until the founding of Fatah in 1959 and the
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964.


Throughout the 1950s, the Arab states of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria took the lead
in opposing the new state of Israel. However, after the Arab defeat in the Six Day War of 1967, a
The PLO and other Palestinian groups, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(the PFLP), used primarily violent tactics like airplane hijackings to bring international attention
to the Palestinian issue (p. 163). The PLO’s use of violence was successful in bringing awareness
to their conflict with Israel, but it did prevent them from extracting concessions through
negotiation. As historian Neil Caplan explains:

In the decades following the 1967 war, the Americans generally supported Israel’s
position that the PLO should be excluded from the diplomatic process until it signed on
to Resolution 242, recognized Israel’s right to exist, and explicitly renounced terrorism. .
. . For the next decade and a half, the PLO stood firm in officially rejecting Security
Council Resolution 242 . . . almost as stubbornly as the Israelis and Americans kept it
excluded from the diplomatic game (p. 165 – 166)

The PLO’s potential achievements at this time were therefore limited, as they had no opportunity
to gain power through talks with Israel. Meanwhile, the shock value of international terrorism
slowly declined with time, and Palestinian groups found that they were getting diminishing
returns from violent actions (Hirst, 1977, p. 447). The use of violence was successful in putting
Palestinian issues on the international agenda, but because of Israel’s refusal to negotiate with
those who did not renounce violence, this tactic could not lead to the achievement of any other
goals, such as the creation of a Palestinian state or the return of Palestinian refugees to their
homeland.
The First Intifada and Hope for Peace: 1987 – 1993

One of the largest shifts in the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts came in December 1987, when riots in Gaza became a nationalist revolt called the Intifada, or “uprising.” The Intifada, which consisted of mostly nonviolent action, was meant “‘to create a daily series of acts of defiance’ that would assert their nationalist will, demonstrate the unsustainability of military rule [of Palestinian territories by Israel], and compel Israel to reach an agreement with the PLO” (Pearlman, 2011, p. 102). Now, it was nonviolent protest instead of violent action that was successfully bringing international attention to the Palestinian cause:

Within the first eighteen months of the uprising, Israeli troops and settlers killed about six hundred fifty Palestinians. On December 22, 1987, the UN Security Council passed a resolution denouncing Israel’s disproportionate use of force against Palestinian civilians (The United States did not exercise its veto). . . . [Israel] was simply incapable of making a case for its position while its army was shooting down unarmed women and children’ (Chenoweth & Stephen, 2011, p. 129)

The Intifada went beyond simply bringing attention to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; Palestinian nonviolent action combined with violent Israeli responses brought increased international sympathy to the Palestinian cause. The Intifada was also an important turning point in the conflict because it was primarily led by Palestinians within the occupied territories rather than by the exiled PLO leadership.

The late 1980s were also a noteworthy era for the conflict due to the creation of Hamas, a radical Islamist Palestinian movement. Hamas began as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, which provided social services for Palestinians, primarily in the Gaza Strip. Ahmed Yassin, the founder of Hamas, began his career by creating the Islamic Center, which “served as a political and cultural center for most Brotherhood activities in the Gaza Strip” (Schanzer, 2008, p. 20). At the beginning of the Intifada, Yassin’s faction of the Muslim Brotherhood combined force with
other militant groups to form an umbrella resistance movement: *Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya*, or the “Islamic Resistance Movement,” which was shortened to the acronym HAMAS (p. 24).

However, the most significant moment of the decade came in December 1988, when PLO chairman Yasser Arafat spoke before the UN General Assembly. He accepted Resolution 242 and the two-state solution, recognized Israel’s right to exist, and formally renounced the use of terrorism (Chenoweth & Stephen, 2011, p. 132). By meeting the long-held American and Israeli demands that Palestinians renounce violence and accept the state of Israel, Arafat had finally opened the door to international negotiations.

The Oslo Era and Beyond: 1993 – Present

In 1993, secret negotiations between Israeli officials and PLO representatives began in Oslo, Norway. These talks “culminated in the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) by Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat in September 1993 on the White House lawn” (Chenoweth & Stephen, 2011, p. 136). Spoilers from both sides responded with violence; non-PLO Palestinian militants committed suicide bombings inside Israel throughout the mid-1990s, and in 1995 Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated by an Orthodox Israeli who opposed the accords (Dudley, 2004, p. 143). However, a hope for peace remained throughout the 1990s. A 1994 poll of Palestinians found that only 33% supported armed attacks against Israel (Chenoweth & Stephen, 2011, p. 136), and some commentators compared the Oslo process to other peace negotiations and expressed hope that peace was becoming more likely around the world. Ellen Gorsevski expressed this hope in 1999:

> The nonviolent rhetoric surrounding these events [the Oslo Accords and the Northern Ireland peace process] confirms that human beings . . . *will not* always be at war. At the
forefront of all such talks is a propaganda of peace; the media receive hopeful statements and pronouncements from the participants of the negotiations; nonviolent rhetoric abounds (Gorsevski, 1999, p. 452)

However, less than a year after this article was published, unprecedented violence broke out across Israel and Palestine with the beginning of the Second Intifada, which lasted from 2000 to 2005.

Defining the beginning of the 21st century was the breakdown of the Oslo Process and the many failed attempts to form a unified Palestinian government that incorporated both Fatah and Hamas. A 2002 attempt to form a unified leadership broke down after two and a half years of dialogue, and after Hamas won a majority of Parliament seats in the elections of 2006, a civil war between the two factions led to the current arrangement of Hamas running the Gaza Strip while Fatah runs the West Bank (Pearlman, 2011, p. 177 – 181). Further attempts to create a unity government were made in 2007, 2011, and 2014, but none have created a lasting peace between the two parties.

Conclusion

Some of the rhetorical choices made by Palestinian leaders over the past few decades can be attributed to personal experiences and their initial orientation towards violence and nonviolence. However, as the next two chapters will demonstrate, overall shifts in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict played a major role in influencing rhetorical choices as well. While conditions in the middle of the 20th century led to the use of violent actions and violent rhetoric, the next two chapters will argue that conditions between the late 20th century and the present favor a more nonviolent approach.
Chapter 7: Yasser Arafat

“For most Palestinians today, Mr. Arafat’s era in the PLO has been the decisive political and psychological fact of their national identity. Between 1948 and 1968, when Mr. Arafat emerged as a major leader, Palestinians were a forgotten people – refugees, displaced persons, a nation dispossessed and unrecognized. Mr. Arafat and his al-Fatah loyalists set out to shape them as a national community: He built institutions, dispensed arms, and instilled a sense of hope and pride.”

-Edward Said, 1983

Introduction

PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat defined the Palestinian national movement from his founding of the Fatah party in 1959 to his death in 2004. His name often inspires either pride or revulsion, depending on the audience. Although a controversial figure, Arafat’s ever-changing methods of resistance to Israeli rule of the Palestinian territories were ultimately successful in reshaping the Palestinian national identity after the Palestinian nation fell apart during the 1948 war (Said, 1994, p. 78).

Muhammad Yasser Abdel Rahman Abdel Raouf Arafat was born to Palestinian parents in Cairo, Egypt in 1929, and after his mother died when he was five years old, he lived in Jerusalem for four years (“Yasser Arafat – Biographical,” 1994). When Egypt, Jordan, and Syria invaded the new Israeli state in May 1948, Arafat attempted to join the invasion but was turned away by the Arab armies (Schanzer, 2008, p. 16). This experience likely “served as an awakening for Arafat, who came to believe that the Arab regimes would never beat Israel. He believed that only a Palestinian revolutionary movement could achieve that goal” (p. 16). In the 1950s, Yasser Arafat and Salah Khalaf became involved with the Muslim Brotherhood but “became frustrated
with the Brothers’ aversion to armed activity” (Pearlman, 2011, p. 64). Arafat went on to found the Fatah party in 1959, and in 1967 he became chairman of the recently-formed Palestinian Liberation Organization (p. 70).

Arafat began his career committed to violent resistance, and he used his chairmanship of the PLO to support violent actions against Israel. However, by the mid-1970s Arafat was contemplating the use of nonviolence and negotiations with Israel, and in 1988 he formally renounced violence and the use of terrorism; this shift opened the doors to the negotiations that led to the Oslo Accords of 1993. Although some argue that Arafat continued to support violence after 1988, his public rhetoric remained significantly more nonviolent than it had been at the beginning of his career.

**Formative Factors**

Yasser Arafat’s early career as PLO chairman was marked by his fervent support for violent resistance against the state of Israel. Three primary formative factors contributed to his original violent stance: violence and extremism in his childhood, inspiration from violent revolutions in other countries, and his initial analysis of his political environment.

Incidents in Arafat’s childhood exposed him to both violence and radicalism at an early age. Between the ages of five and nine, he lived in Jerusalem during the British Mandate of Palestine, and “one of his earliest memories [was] of British soldiers breaking into his uncle’s house after midnight, beating members of the family and smashing furniture” (“Yasser Arafat – Biographical,” 1994). When he moved back to Cairo, he continued his education among other Palestinians, many of whom were refugees from the 1948 war. Some of this education was
provided by teachers from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), many of whom were volunteers who adhered to radical political theories and inculcated elaborate conceptualizations of social injustice and revolutionary change among their pupils. Palestinian students attended universities in Arab capitals, mainly in Beirut and in Cairo, where they were exposed not only to theories of political change, but to models of revolutionary struggle as well (Kurz, 2005, p. 25).

Arafat’s schooling in Cairo, combined with the violence he experienced at the hands of the British in Jerusalem, made him more predisposed toward violent political action. Furthermore, much like Malcolm X, Arafat found political inspiration in other revolutionary, often violent, struggles around the world. Arafat modeled Fatah’s strategy after the resistance movements in Algeria and Vietnam (Kurz, 2005, p. 45-46). Algeria was particularly inspirational; here was an Arab nation “that had succeeded in the space of a few years in defeating a colonial power” (Karsh, 2004). Arafat spoke of this type of inspiration in his 1974 speech at the United Nations, when he likened the plight of Palestinians to oppression in Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa (Arafat, 2004). It is not surprising that he found inspiration in other violent movements, as violent resistance is particularly common in movements that seek self-determination. As Anat Kurz explains in *Fatah and the Politics of Violence*:

Fatah’s violent strategy reflected its strategic affiliation with the general sphere of popular insurgency. Indeed, the strategic emphasis placed on the armed struggle is a common denominator of insurgent organizations, and particularly of organizations that strive to promote goals of national self-determination (Kurz, 2005, p. 32).

Because the movement for Palestinian statehood is most commonly described as a self-determination struggle, it was understandable for Arafat to find inspiration in other self-determination movements, many of which used violent tactics.
The formative factors of childhood experience and international inspiration have both been analyzed before in the cases of Malcolm X and Martin Luther King; however, Yasser Arafat differs from them in that his initial decision to support violence also came as a result of his initial analysis of his political surroundings. When Arafat first came to prominence, there were few reasons for him to pursue nonviolent action. He began his political involvement in Cairo, where nonviolent tactics like civil disobedience could not have a large impact on Israel because he was not living under Israeli control (Pearlman, 2011, p. 74). Furthermore, many Palestinians saw the cost of negotiating with Israel as being prohibitively high. Palestinian philosopher Edward Said explained this way of thinking in a 1985 essay:

We [Palestinians] have, in effect, been told that if we concede our national claims to any part of Palestine, if we accept Jordanian tutelage, if we recognize Israel, if we forget our history and our identity, if we say and do all that is required of us, in the interest of peace, we might qualify for a stool near the bargaining table (Said, 1994, p. 82).

Because the cost of exploring negotiations was high, it made sense for Arafat to explore other means of resistance that might be less costly. Because nonviolent action was unlikely to be either effective at pressuring the Israeli state or to be supported by the Palestinian people, Arafat chose to support violence in the beginning of his career.

**Beginning Rhetoric**

Yasser Arafat’s initial rhetoric was defined by his calls for the destruction of the Israeli state and his rejection of peace with Israelis. His rhetoric became more mixed in the mid-1970s, when he began to explore the possibility of peace talks with Israel. However, Fatah continued to use violence throughout the 1970s, and although Arafat began to express hopes for peace during this period, he still refused to renounce the use of violence.
In 1968, Arafat explained that Palestinians had gotten very little respect from the international community when they were purely seen as needy refugees, but that “now that Palestinians carry rifles, the situation has changed” (“Quotes: Yasser Arafat,” 2004). Because he saw his violent tactics as being successful in bringing Palestinians respect, he spoke in that same year about using the strategy of attrition. In Arafat’s own words, he sought to achieve Palestinian national aims by preventing immigration and encouraging emigration . . . weakening the Israeli economy and diverting the greater part of it to security requirements . . . [and] creating and maintaining an atmosphere or strain and anxiety that will force the Zionists to realize that it is impossible for them to live in Israel (Karsh, 2004).

He continued to use this type of radical rhetoric throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. In 1972, he clearly articulated his stance on violence by stating that he and his followers “don’t want peace. We want war. Victory” (“Arafat: Notable Quotes,” 2004).

However, Arafat’s uncompromising position began to shift in the middle of the 1970s, as Fatah began to worry about the possibility of the Palestinian territories returning to non-Palestinian Arab control (Kurz, 2005, p. 79). Because their nationalist aims were being threatened, Fatah was forced to consider reorganizing their movement. Therefore, “mobilization mechanisms other than violence were sanctioned” (p. 80). Arafat’s rhetoric reflected this minor shift in his 1974 speech to the UN General Assembly in Geneva, Switzerland. His speech did justify the use of violence in the Palestinian territories; he argued that areas of the world [like Palestine] are gripped by armed struggles provoked by imperialism and racial discrimination, both merely forms of aggression and terror. Those are instances of oppressed peoples compelled by intolerable circumstances into a confrontation with such oppression. But wherever that confrontation occurs it is legitimate and just (Arafat, 1974).
However, he also famously spoke of an “olive branch,” which symbolized the hope of eventual peace talks with Israel. The last line of his speech, where he proclaimed “I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom fighter’s gun. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand” (Hirst, 1977, p. 464), indicated his new position on resistance to Israeli rule; he was becoming increasingly open to the use of nonviolent tactics, but he was not yet willing to give up violence completely.

Later Rhetoric

Although Arafat and the PLO began exploring the use of nonviolent tactics in the mid-1970s, his ultimate shift came in 1988, when he formally renounced the use of terrorism. This absolute reversal made his rhetorical shift perhaps the most radical of any other leader studied in this thesis. As the Palestinian national movement grew stronger from the Intifada that had begun the year prior, Arafat issued the Palestinian Declaration of Independence in November 1988, which endorsed the UN Partition Plan of 1947, thereby “effectively recognize[ing] Israel” (Pearlman, 2011, p. 113). With the Intifada bringing new international attention to the conflict, Arafat had the tools to support a two-state solution and announce that “Palestinians would confine their struggle to the establishment, by peaceful means, of a state on that 22 per cent of historic Palestine constituted by the occupied territories” (Hirst, 1977, p. 20).

In December 1988, in the wake of the declaration of a Palestinian state, Arafat spoke before the UN General Assembly in Geneva once more. He declared that this new state was “a peace-loving state” and that he “condemn[ed] terrorism in all its forms” (Arafat, 1988). After decades of refusal to recognize Israel, he formally recognized Israel’s right to exist by accepting UN Resolutions 242, which introduced the idea of “land for peace” (the idea that Israel could
create peace with its neighbors if it withdrew from the occupied territories), and 338, which called for a ceasefire after the War of 1973 (Arafat, 1988). Toward the end of his speech, Arafat spoke directly to the people of Israel:

I say to them: Come, let us make peace. Cast away fear and intimidation. Leave behind the specter of the wars that have raged continuously in the furnace of this conflict for the past forty years. Set aside all threats of wars to come, whose fuel could only be the bodies of our children and yours. Come, let us make peace (Arafat, 1988)

With his UN speech, Arafat made possible the historic peace deal that he would make with Israel five years later: the Oslo Accords.

In September 1993, after months of secret negotiations in Oslo, Norway, Arafat stood on the White House lawn and shook hands with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin as they signed the Oslo I Accord. As David Hirst explains, this peace deal was the culmination of a long-term movement toward moderation:

When, in the early sixties, [Arafat] first emerged on the public stage it was as the leader of the guerilla movement Fatah, and, as with all such resistance movements, his goal was absolute and uncompromising ... But ever since the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the peace process that then began in earnest, he had – in accordance with a ‘doctrine of stages’ – been staking out ever more moderate positions, implying that Israel, in some form or another, was there to stay, and resorting to diplomacy as well as violence to achieve his aims (Hirst, 1977, p. 18)

The making of peace with Israel and the acceptance of an eventual state on only 22 percent of historic Palestine, represented a 180 degree shift from Arafat’s original goal of destroying the state of Israel.

Arafat remained a controversial figure until his 2004 death, particularly because many accused him of supporting terrorist acts while hiding behind nonviolent rhetoric. When the Second Intifada broke out in the Palestinian territories in 2000, Fatah began leading the movement in order to recover its legitimacy with the Palestinian public; however, Fatah’s return
to support for violence made peace with Israel even less likely than it had been before (Kurz, 2005, p. 22). However, despite Arafat’s possible private support for violence, his public rhetoric remained nonviolent throughout the last few years of his life. In a 2002 speech, he claimed that Palestinian groups who were carrying out terrorist attacks against Israel did “not represent the Palestinian people or their legitimate aspirations for freedom,” and he once again stated that

Palestinians are ready to end the conflict. We are ready to sit down now with any Israeli leader, regardless of his history, to negotiate freedom for the Palestinians, a complete end of the occupation, security for Israel and creative solutions to the plight of the refugees while respecting Israel’s demographic concerns. But we will only sit down as equals (Dudley, 2004, p. 149)

In this speech and others during the beginning of the 21st century, Arafat once again affirmed his commitment to nonviolence, although his stance continued to be questioned by international observers.

Interactional Factors

Despite claims of hypocrisy, it is clear that Arafat’s public stance on violence shifted drastically between the beginning of his career as a guerilla leader and his later position as a state leader and diplomat. Arafat’s reversal of his position on nonviolence can be attributed to three main interactional factors: increasing support for nonviolence from the Palestinian public, a need for international legitimacy, and the desire for concessions from Israelis. However, a fourth interactional factor explains these charges of hypocrisy: his relationship with Hamas.

When Arafat and the PLO first rose into prominence as leaders of the Palestinian people, they were supported because of their uncompromising stances on defeating Israel and returning Palestinian refugees to their homes. However, the beginning of the Intifada in 1987 demonstrated that the Palestinian public was beginning to lean more toward nonviolent action. The Intifada
showed the Palestinian leadership that civil disobedience could be successful in bringing attention to the Israeli occupation; the success of the mostly-nonviolent Intifada “necessitated a definitive statement by the PNC [the Palestinian National Council, led by Arafat] of support for the Intifada as an end-to-occupation and relatively nonviolent movement” (Said, 1995, p. 145).

The Intifada also pushed Arafat toward a more substantial shift in rhetoric because it was led by Palestinians in the occupied territories rather than by exiled Fatah leaders such as himself. Kurz points out that shifts toward nonviolence from once-terrorists “may well constitute responses to developments that . . . threaten to undermine [a leader or organization’s] institutional position and render its . . . legitimacy and modes of action effectively irrelevant” (Kurz, 2005, p. 14). This theory explains why a threat to Arafat’s legitimacy may have pushed him to embrace nonviolence as he hadn’t before.

While Arafat’s legitimacy among Palestinians was being threatened by the leadership of the Intifada in the late 1980s and early 1990s, his international legitimacy was also threatened when he sided with the Saddam Hussein regime during the First Gulf War of 1990-1991. The subsequent “decline in the PLO’s political status ultimately left Fatah with no choice but to approve participation of a delegation from the territories in negotiations with Israel” (Kurz, 2005, p. 21). The international legitimacy that Arafat had gained by his renouncement of violence in 1988 quickly diminished after the Gulf War; therefore, it was not surprising that he sought to regain this legitimacy by taking part in negotiations with Israel in the early 1990s.

Furthermore, it was in Arafat’s interest to take on a more nonviolent stance in order to gain concessions from America and Israel. He moved toward nonviolence both because of opportunities offered through a commitment to nonviolence and because of a lack of
opportunities to gain concessions through violence. As Brookings Fellow Daniel Byman explains, militant leaders

are more likely to engage in talks without preconditions if they believe a victory through arms is unreachable. The PLO’s expulsion from Lebanon and repeated defeats by Israel led its leaders [like Arafat] to recognize they would not gain a Palestinian homeland solely by the gun (Byman, 2005, p. 409)

Fatah’s expulsion from Lebanon showed Arafat that violence may not be successful in achieving the group’s goals; furthermore, after the expulsion Fatah’s “military capabilities and its ability to engage in violent struggle was badly impaired” (Kurz, 2005, p. 104).

While violence was beginning to look less appealing to the PLO, Arafat also recognized the opportunities presented by taking a more nonviolent stance. By the late 1980s, “Fatah seemed to have progressed as far as it could without American and Israeli recognition” (Kurz, 2005, p. 20). Meanwhile, US President George H.W. Bush presented an opportunity for Arafat to gain international legitimacy because the US “desperately sought a government that could control the Palestinians and perhaps even attempt to tend to their needs” (Schanzer, 2008, p. 26). Arafat quickly stepped into that role by renouncing the use of violence and recognizing Israel. This new stance quickly led to success for the PLO as Israel in turn became more flexible on its policies (Kurz, 2005, p. 3). With this new position on nonviolence, Arafat extracted major concessions from Israelis, such as partial Palestinian self-rule in the occupied territories, in the 1993 Oslo Accords.

However, Arafat did not embrace a purely nonviolent strategy; his rhetoric remained largely nonviolent but he was often accused of supporting violence. The fact that Arafat’s commitment to nonviolence was often called into question can be understood through his relationship with Hamas, Fatah’s political rival. When the Second Intifada broke out in 2000, Arafat tried to prevent protesters’ use of guns, but they allowed protesters to throw rocks in an
attempt to prevent the Palestinian public from turning to Hamas over Fatah (Pearlman, 2011, p. 144). In contrast to the First Intifada, when many Palestinian protesters supported nonviolent action, protesters in the Second Intifada were much more likely to support the use of violence, and to expect their leadership to do the same.

Palestinians turned to arms after the fall of 2000 because they judged it to be the best way to obtain concessions from Israel. Many Israeli commentators warned that Palestinians looked to the lessons of the first Intifada, as well as those of Hezbollah in Lebanon, and concluded that Israel surrenders only under force. Indeed, in 14 polls from 2001 to 2005, a consistent majority of Palestinian respondents would say that they believed that armed confrontations achieved national rights in a way that negotiations could not. (p. 152)

The use of violence in the Palestinian territories and the growing Palestinian support for Hamas put Arafat in a difficult position where he would lose international legitimacy by refusing to confront Hamas’s violent actions but any attempts to confront Hamas would weaken his domestic popularity (Schanzer, 2008, p. 42). Because of these conflicting forces, Arafat found himself facing charges of hypocrisy because he would crack down on Hamas when asked to by the international community, but because he would lose domestic legitimacy for these crackdowns, he would also try to hold talks with the rival party whenever holding those talks was politically convenient (p. 67 – 73).

Conclusion

Yasser Arafat attracted controversy throughout his life, in part because of his ever-shifting stance on violence and nonviolence. He was known in the beginning of his career as an international terrorist, but by the end of his life as a peacemaker and diplomat. His later rhetoric was not purely nonviolent; at times, he supported the use of rock throwing in Palestinian protests, but it was significantly less violent than his early speeches, which called for the destruction of Israel. His speeches in the 1990s and 2000s mixed violent and nonviolent rhetoric.
The immense changes in his rhetoric over the course of his life can be understood in terms of formative and interactional factors.

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Because Yasser Arafat lived longer than both Malcolm X and Martin Luther King, his rhetorical shifts were even more significant than theirs. His constantly evolving ideas about resistance have made him both loved and reviled around the world. However, regardless of whether one sees him as a positive or negative influence on the Palestinian movement, it is undeniable that he played a central role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the peace process for most of the past fifty years.
Chapter 8: Hamas

Introduction

Hamas, led by its Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh and Political Chief Khaled Mashal, is a militant and political group in Palestine that has been designated as a terrorist organization by many countries, including the US and Israel. Hamas has enjoyed a large degree of popular support among Palestinians, mostly owing “to the foil it plays to Fatah, which many see as having grown corrupted by power while delivering little through its peaceful negotiations with Israel” (Laub, 2014). As a result of the 2007 war with Fatah and Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from the territory in 2005, Hamas currently rules the Gaza Strip.

Like its rival Fatah, Hamas began as a militant movement that supported violence against Israel. However, unlike Fatah, Hamas has not fully renounced violence; in this way, Hamas is similar to its rival on the other side of the political spectrum, Islamic Jihad, a group that shares many goals with Hamas (most importantly, the creation of an Islamist state in historic Palestine) but employs more radical methods. However, in the past five years, Hamas has begun stating increasing support for nonviolent action. An analysis of the interactional factors that are currently impacting Hamas explain this slight shift and supports a prediction that the Hamas leadership will continue to use increasingly nonviolent rhetoric.

It is important to note that this chapter deviates from previous case studies in that it contains significantly more speculation about the future. Hamas’s shift toward nonviolence has
been minimal so far; however, the factors that pushed Malcolm X, Martin Luther King, and Yasser Arafat to change their rhetoric can also be observed in the cases of Hamas leaders Haniyeh and Mashal. Therefore, this chapter will argue that interactional factors will continue to push Hamas toward a more major rhetorical shift in the future.

Formative Factors

When Hamas was founded in 1987, the vast majority of its statements that were issued employed violent rhetoric. This initial decision to support violence can be traced to two main formative factors: the desire for public support and competition with Fatah.

Hamas was founded at the beginning of the First Intifada, a mostly nonviolent movement against the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories. However, the Intifada still led to increased anger, frustration, and violence from Palestinian youth (Schanzer, 2008, p. 35). The leaders of Hamas, including founder Ahmed Yassin, “understood that their campaign of violence and their ardent rejection of Israel was the best path to winning the support of the Palestinian people” (p. 35), especially because it allowed them to fill the role of militant leadership that Fatah left when Arafat embraced nonviolence (p. 28). Their decision to embraced armed resistance to the Israeli occupation bought them popular support from the Palestinian public, but it also served to protect them from the risk of violent splinter groups forming, since “if they did not embrace militancy, more Brotherhood members might defect to Islamic Jihad” (Pearlman, 2011, p. 101). Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh plainly expressed this reasoning when he stated that “‘The scale of . . . attacks will be determined by the level of popular support for such a strategy’” (p. 137).
Furthermore, embracing violence helped the Hamas leadership gain power by hurting their main rival Fatah. Using and supporting violence helped to undermine Fatah’s leadership by demonstrating that they could not enforce a promise of nonviolence (Kurz, 2005, p. 81). When Palestinian violence broke out, Israel would retaliate against the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority, meaning that Hamas could use violence against its external enemy, Israel, to hurt its internal enemy, Fatah, at the same time (Pearlman, 2011, p. 171). Middle East scholar Jonathan Schanzer explains this incentive to support and even carry out violence:

Hamas realized that it could kill two birds with one stone. By attacking Israel, it boosted its popularity on the Palestinian street, and it elicited an Israeli military retaliation that, in most instances, damaged the infrastructure of the PA, paved the way for Fatah’s disintegration, sparked more anti-Israeli anger among the Palestinians, and drove new recruits to the Hamas fold. Given these tangible rewards for terror, Hamas had absolutely no reason to desist (Schanzer, 2008, p. 72).

Because these incentives existed for Hamas to use violence to gain political power, it is not surprising that the Hamas leadership embraced this strategy when the group was founded.

**Beginning Rhetoric**

In the first few years of Hamas’s existence, the group’s official statements were characterized by rhetoric that was almost exclusively violent. Their official covenant, released in August 1988, condemns peace talks and advocates for the destruction of Israel:

> Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it. . . . Initiatives, and so-called peaceful solutions and international conferences, are in contradiction to the principles of the Islamist Resistance Movement. . . . In the face of the Jews’ usurpation of Palestine, it is compulsory that the banner of Jihad be raised (“Hamas Covenant 1988,” 2008)

Furthermore, Hamas often sent out communiqués with violent language. A September 1988 press release stated that readers should “lend punches to the Jews wherever possible,” and a
March 1989 statement included phrases such as “come to jihad, come to martyrdom” (“Hamas in Their Own Words,” 2011).

In fact, Hamas quickly moved beyond violent rhetoric and took violent actions. Throughout 1989, the group’s “use of violence was increasing in intensity and audacity;” Hamas moved from a kidnapping in February 1989 to a stabbing in May and a bus hijacking in July (Schanzer, 2008, p. 32). Hamas increased its violent attacks fourfold from 1991 to 1993, reflecting “not only the increasing militancy of the Islamist movement, but also the end of the previously unifying optimism regarding nonviolent protest and diplomacy” (Pearlman, 2011, p. 118). Throughout the end of the 20th century, Hamas continued to act as a violent spoil to Fatah and a spoiler to the peace process between Israel and Palestine.

More Recent Rhetoric

Beginning in the mid-2000s, Hamas began to experiment with nonviolent action and rhetoric in addition to their use of violence. In 2006, the group participated in nonviolent parliamentary elections. Instead of using violence to intimidate voters, Hamas encouraged voters to not reveal their choices to pollsters, therefore lulling Fatah into a false sense of confidence and leading Fatah leaders to put less energy into campaigning than they might have otherwise (Schanzer, 2008, p. 93). This tactic paid off, as Hamas won the majority of the seats in the new Palestinian parliament. Just as violent actions had once increased Hamas’s domestic political power, this use of a nonviolent political tactic brought the group unprecedented political legitimacy.
This turn to nonviolent actions came along with increasingly nonviolent public statements. In 2008, Hamas leader Ahmed Yousef, an advisor to Prime Minister Haniyeh, wrote in a letter to US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice:

Many people make the mistake of presuming that we have some ideological aversion to making peace. Quite the opposite; we have consistently offered dialogue with the U.S. and the E.U. to try and resolve the very issues that you are trying to deal with in Annapolis. . . . We are not anti-American, anti-European, or anti-anyone (Schanzer, 2008, p. 160)

Although many were skeptical of the veracity of Hamas’s claim to be considering peace, the fact that the group’s leadership was no longer unconditionally calling for violent resistance was in itself significant. More recently, in 2011, after a prisoner exchange was conducted between Hamas and the Israeli government, a spokesman for Haniyeh said that Hamas was shifting from an emphasis on armed resistance to nonviolent tactics (Greenwood, 2011). The statement did “not qualify as a full repudiation of violence, but mark[ed] a step away from violent extremism by the Hamas leadership towards the more moderate Islamism espoused by groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo” (Greenwood, 2011).

However, Hamas is still making use of violent rhetoric as a complement to its nonviolent statements. In December 2008, Hamas spokesman Fawzi Barhoum claimed that “Hamas will continue the resistance until the last drop of blood,” and Khaled Mashaal proclaimed from his exile in Syria that “resistance will continue through suicide missions” (“Hamas in Their Own Words,” 2011). More recently, in January 2014, Prime Minister Haniyeh declared that “thousands of fighters . . . have been preparing in silence for the campaign to liberate Palestine” (“8 Years, 8 Quotes,” 2014). These aggressive statements demonstrate the fact that Hamas is still making significant use of violent language in addition to their more nonviolent statements.
However, the interactional factors currently affecting the group are likely to continue pushing them toward moderation and increasingly nonviolent rhetoric in the future.

**Interactional Factors**

Hamas’s shift toward nonviolence has been slow and unsteady so far. However, the interactional factors driving this shift continue to affect the group, meaning that Hamas is likely to continue moving toward nonviolent rhetoric in the coming years. Three main interactional factors are playing a role in this shift: changes in Palestinian support for violence, changes in Hamas’s international political position, and the group’s desire for concessions.

Hamas first began supporting violence in part because this brought them political support from Palestinians. However, the Palestinian public’s support for violence has changed significantly since Hamas’s founding in 1987. A 1994 poll found that only 33% of Palestinians supported violent action against Israel, and a 2002 study found that 72% of Palestinians supported the cessation of violence in return for a Palestinian state based on 1967 borders (Chenoweth & Stephen, 2011, p. 138). If Hamas continues to oppose a peace based on 1967 borders, it will find itself at odds with more than two thirds of the population it wishes to lead. Hamas has already lost popularity after its seizure of the Gaza Strip, as they were increasingly seen as aggressive and divisive; they cannot afford to lose more political support through maintaining an unpopular position on negotiations (Schanzer, 2008, p. 182).

Therefore, in theory, Hamas will begin to support a nonviolent resolution to the conflict based on 1967 borders or risk losing domestic legitimacy. There is a precedent for Hamas refraining from violence when Palestinians voice their disapproval; when Palestinians supported nonviolent resistance in the First Intifada, Hamas recognized this preference and refrained from
violence for the entire first year of the Intifada (Pearlman, 2011, p. 112). Consequently, it is likely that Hamas will once again respect the popular will and turn to a more nonviolent approach.

Hamas has also begun moving toward nonviolent rhetoric due to recent changes in international politics. The historically close relationship between Hamas and Iran and Syria has long been a major roadblock to Hamas joining peace talks with Israel or the PLO/Fatah (Pearlman, 2011, p. 179). However, this roadblock may be disappearing:

Hamas believes the events of the Arab Spring, in which uprisings have . . . ushered in democratic, moderate Islamist governments in Tunisia and Egypt, have changed the landscape of the Middle East and is repositioning itself accordingly away from the Syria-Iran axis that has sustained it for decades (Greenwood, 2011)

If Hamas’s relationship with Iran and Syria continues to decline, the PLO and Israel may be more open to negotiations with the group. Furthermore, the loss of major regional allies is likely to push Hamas to find new allies in the region; this loss may be significant enough to make Hamas consider finding allies in its former enemies, Israel and the PLO.

Lastly, the desire for concessions has begun pushing Hamas to consider negotiations with Israel, and it will likely continue to do so. Despite its many declarations that the group will never abandon armed resistance, Hamas has made ceasefires with Israel on multiple occasions. Longer-term negotiations offer many potential benefits to Hamas. Successful negotiations with Israel will end the disastrous sanctions that have been applied to the Gaza Strip as a result of Hamas’s refusal to renounce violence (Schanzer, 2008, p. 164). Talks with the US could also improve Hamas’s political position, as negotiations with Washington “would give Hamas leaders additional political clout and the legitimacy it now seeks. Such recognition might also open the spigots of aid that the United States and Europe have for now turned off” (Byman, 2005, p. 411). Hamas leaders have everything to gain from negotiations with Israel and the US: international
legitimacy, popular support from Palestinians who support nonviolence, and relief from the sanctions that have been devastating the Gaza Strip for years.

Conclusion

Hamas is constantly denounced as a fanatical, violent terrorist organization. However, while Hamas still supports violence to a certain degree, the organization’s level of support for violence has been declining over the past ten years. Hamas’s slow shift toward more moderate, nonviolent rhetoric can be explained in terms of formative and interactional factors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trajectory:</th>
<th><strong>Path A</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Leaders on Path A begin their careers with mostly violent rhetoric, which becomes more nonviolent over time.</em></td>
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<th>Formative Factors:</th>
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<tr>
<td><em>The following formative factors led Hamas leaders to choose violent rhetoric and action after the organization’s founding.</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>1) <strong>Desire for Political Support</strong>: A high degree of support for violent resistance at the time of Hamas’s founding made its leaders support violence in order to gain popularity</td>
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<tr>
<td>2) <strong>Competition with Fatah</strong>: The fact that violence from Hamas often resulted in punishment for its rival Fatah gave Hamas additional incentives to support violent action</td>
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<th>Interactional Factors:</th>
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<tr>
<td><em>The interactional factors currently facing Hamas have begun to push them toward a more nonviolent stance, and will likely continue to do so into the future.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) <strong>Changing Palestinian Public</strong>: The growing Palestinian support for nonviolence has made Hamas rethink its support for violence, which is steadily growing more unpopular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) <strong>Changing International Arena</strong>: The breakdown of Hamas’s relationship with Iran and Syria makes negotiations seem more appealing to both Hamas’s rivals and Hamas itself</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) <strong>Desire for Concessions</strong>: The potential for Hamas to gain international</td>
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legitimacy and relief from economic sanctions may push the group toward negotiations

Hamas’s shift toward nonviolence has not been particularly significant yet. Leaders of the group have begun making statements supporting nonviolent resistance to the Israeli occupation, but they have not gone as far as Yasser Arafat; they have so far refused to renounce violence and terrorism. Nonetheless, the presence of multiple interactional factors pushing Hamas toward nonviolence makes it likely that Hamas will take this step in the future rather than remaining stagnant or becoming more radical.

However, a potential Hamas shift to nonviolence unfortunately does not guarantee a seamless transition to nonviolence in Israel and Palestine. As Jonathan Schanzer explains:

The notion that Hamas would not necessarily remain the most radical faction in Gaza was of course a worry to Israel and America, but it was an even greater threat to the Palestinians of Gaza. Such a scenario would begin anew the cycle that had sparked the Fatah-Hamas rivalry two decades earlier (Schanzer, 2008, p. 188)

If Hamas moves toward a position more associated with Fatah, there is a high probability that another militant splinter group will move in to take the place of Hamas. Nevertheless, an embrace of nonviolence by Hamas would be a major achievement, and it would be a significant step in the process of peace.
Chapter 9: Other Case Studies

Introduction

So far, this thesis has demonstrated that leaders of opposition movements in both the US and the Palestinian Territories have made substantial shifts in their use of violent and nonviolent rhetoric. While Martin Luther King moved from pure nonviolence to a stance more accepting of violence, Malcolm X and Yasser Arafat became more accepting of nonviolence toward the end of their careers, and Hamas may be moving along the same trajectory. This chapter will illustrate that these rhetorical shifts are also found in leaders of other regions of the world.

Nelson Mandela, the first democratically elected president of South Africa, and Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India, both made significant ideological and rhetorical shifts over the course of their long leadership careers. Nehru followed a trajectory similar to that of Martin Luther King; he began his career as a follower of nonviolence, but became more open to the use of violence later in his life. Mandela presents an even more interesting case; rather than moving along the two paths (violent rhetoric to mixed rhetoric and nonviolent rhetoric to mixed rhetoric) that have already been established, his rhetoric changed in a more unique way. He began his career devoted to nonviolence, but he soon began supporting violence and using violent rhetoric. After more than 20 years in prison, he emerged with a rhetoric that had changed once more – his final rhetoric was mixed, but leaning toward nonviolence. This chapter will first examine Mandela’s journey along this unique rhetorical path.
Nelson Mandela

In 1918, Rolihlahla “Nelson” Mandela was born “into a high-ranking family of the Xhosa-speaking Thembu chieftancy” (Boehmer, 2008, p. 21). Early in his life, he was singled out as a particularly bright child, and he attended his village school and in 1939 received a scholarship to study at the University of Fort Hare (p. 29). After moving to Johannesburg, Mandela joined the African National Congress (ANC), and in 1950 he was elected the president of the new ANC Youth League (p. 37). The ANC, while initially committed to nonviolence, later came to the conclusion that violent action was necessary to end the racist system of apartheid in South Africa, and in June 1964 Mandela was sentenced to life in prison for his involvement with the ANC (p. 50). A campaign to “Free Mandela” began in 1978, and in 1990 Mandela was released from prison amid negotiations with the South African government. In May 1994, he was elected as South Africa’s first democratic president.

Mandela’s path to rhetoric of nonviolence and forgiveness was far from linear. As Elleke Boehmer explains in *Nelson Mandela: A Very Short Introduction*:

Taking a chronological view of his career across five decades, 1950 to 2000, we see Mandela tracing an ideological parabola away from his early Gandhist phase, towards a support for armed resistance, and then, at the last, turning back to non-violent ideas of political negotiation and compromise (Boehmer, 2008, p. 107).

This non-linear rhetorical trajectory can be explained by the fact that Mandela’s ideology was actually fairly consistent: he believed in doing whatever it took to help free his country from apartheid. What changed throughout the course of his career, and what therefore influenced his rhetoric, was the ever-changing political situation in South Africa. He explains in his autobiography that for him, “nonviolence was not a moral principle but a strategy” (Mandela, 1994, p. 137). Although other formative and interactional factors had a certain degree of influence over Mandela’s trajectory, the main factor that constantly influenced his rhetorical
decisions was his analyses of the political landscapes in South Africa over the course of his career.

Formative Factors

Three formative factors played a large role in forming Nelson Mandela’s initial support for nonviolent resistance: his upper class upbringing, early ideological influences, and, perhaps most significantly, Mandela’s analysis of the political effectiveness of nonviolence as a tactic.

Because Mandela was raised as part of a social elite in an all-black neighborhood, he did not have to deal with as much first-hand discrimination and racial violence in his childhood as leaders like Malcolm X and Yasser Arafat, whose violent and unstable childhoods led them to choose initially violent rhetoric. During his early years, he “would only rarely have been the target of derogatory white eyes” (Boehmer, 2008, p. 33). Furthermore, as part of an economically privileged family, Mandela had access to higher education, which exposed him to a variety of nonviolent ideologies.

In Mandela’s university years, he was strongly influenced by Booker T. Washington, the moderate African American leader who emphasized self-improvement within the black community of America above asking whites for equal political rights (Boehmer, 2008, p. 29). He was further influenced by the legacy of Mahatma Gandhi and by the work of Indians in South Africa. In Nelson Mandela’s 1994 autobiography, he writes about his early campaigns in the ANC and explains that “the 1913 passive resistance campaign in which Mahatma Gandhi led a tumultuous procession of Indians crossing illegally from Natal to the Transvaal” became a model for ANC protests (Mandela, 1994, p. 91). Meanwhile, Mandela was also influenced by the positive experiences he had with white students at his school. He worked with white students
against racism and was surprised that privileged white students “were willing to align themselves with the oppressed majority and make sacrifices they did not need to” (Hain, 2010, p. 41).

However, the most significant factor pushing Mandela towards an initially nonviolent stance was his belief that nonviolence was useful for the movement when he first began his involvement. After taking part in the 1943 bus boycott in Alexandra, Mandela was “impressed by the boycott’s effectiveness” (Hain, 2010, p. 41). In 1952, the ANC launched the nonviolent Defiance Campaign, which garnered much popular support (p. 67). However, Mandela was always clear that his commitment to violence was tactical, not moral. He explained in his autobiography that he “saw nonviolence in the Gandhian model not as an inviolable principle but as a tactic to be used as the situation demanded” (Mandela, 1994, p. 111).

**Early Rhetoric**

Although Mandela did not focus on a moral argument for nonviolence, his initial rhetoric praised nonviolence as a necessary tactic in the fight against apartheid. In response to the victory of the racist Afrikaner National Party in the 1948 elections, Mandela wrote in the *African Lodestar* magazine that the ANC was launching a “Programme of Action” that would use Gandhian protest tools (Boehmer, 2008, p. 37).

Mandela’s speeches from this time praise moderation and nonviolence, as during this point he believed this to be the most effective tactic. In a 1952 speech during the Defiance Campaign, he announced that “We have . . . called upon our people to identify themselves unreservedly with the cause of world peace” (Mandela, 1986, p. 42). 8 years later, in his August 1960 trial, Mandela “preached moderation and reaffirmed the ANC’s commitment to nonviolent struggle” (Mandela, 1994, p. 218). However, this commitment would not last much longer.
Mandela’s decision to begin pushing for violent action can be partially explained through two interactional factors: popular support for violence and new ideological influences. However, the most significant factor leading Mandela to support violence was his changing analysis of the political problems that his movement faced.

The ANC’s move toward violence began in part because the masses of oppressed South Africans had begun ignoring the organization’s calls for nonviolence, turning instead to violent means of resistance. In 1994, Mandela explained, “People on their own had taken up arms. Violence would begin whether we initiated it or not. Would it not be better to guide this violence ourselves, according to principles where we save lives by attaching symbols of oppression, and not people?” (Mandela, 1994, p. 237)

Meanwhile, on a more personal level, Mandela was encountering new, more militant, political influences. He and his ANC comrades began to move away from the ideology of Gandhi and more toward that of Frantz Fanon, whose “approach to the overthrow of imperial power . . . was bracingly combative: the colonized, he believed, should resist the colonizer to the death, with violence” (Boehmer, 2008, p. 104). Mandela heard many views such as this when he traveled to Algeria in 1962. At this time, he met Houari Boumedienne, a representative for the Algerian Front, who told him that liberation movements had to do whatever they could to push their opposition towards negotiations (p. 46-47). However, these new influences were not the primary reason for Mandela’s shift to violence; by this point, “he was already convinced that the only remaining recourse for South Africa’s marginalized majority was violent retaliation” (p. 105).
The primary force pushing Mandela toward violence was his interactions with the leading Afrikaner National Party and his resulting political analysis that nonviolent protest was futile. Mandela’s constant arrests and bannings and his treatment as an “unconvicted criminal” led Mandela to the “grim realization that peaceful protests would, tragically, not succeed in beating the government” (Boehmer, 2008, p. 40). Soon after his first government banning expired, Mandela “conceded, to the crowd’s delight, that non-violence could not overturn a ‘white minority regime bent on retaining power at any cost’” (p. 40). The government had responded to the ANC’s nonviolent Defiance Campaign with raids and arrests, and the ANC leadership soon saw that “the state was engaged in systematically closing down virtually every available avenue of non-violent activism” (p. 45).

Mandela soon realized that Gandhian resistance could no longer serve as a model for the ANC. He explained in his autobiography, “Nonviolent passive resistance is effective as long as your opposition adheres to the same rules as you do. But if peaceful protest is met with violence, its efficacy is at an end” (Mandela, 1994, p. 137). While peaceful protest was unsuccessful, Mandela believed that armed resistance could be a path to negotiations with the South African government (Boehmer, 2008, p. 108). Due to this political analysis, the ANC’s new armed group, Spear of Nation, launched its first violent attack with a series of bombings in December 1961 (p. 46). Although Mandela eventually moved back toward support for nonviolence, he still defended this line of thinking once he was released from prison. During a tour of America in 1990, “Mandela was anxious to mark his distance even from Martin Luther King’s ideal of non-violence as having been untenable for South Africa in the 1960s” (p. 90). The fact that nonviolence made sense for Mandela in 1990 did not make him regret his choice to support
violence in the 1960s, because his decisions were consistently influenced by the changing political scene in South Africa.

Later Rhetoric

Mandela’s rhetoric in the 1960s, before his imprisonment in 1964, became significantly more militant. In 1961, he explained his choice to turn to violence by using a South African proverb: “the attacks of the wild beast cannot be averted with only bare hands” (Mandela, 1994, p. 236). Through this metaphor, his followers came to understand that the “beasts” in the South African government could only be fought through violent action. In that same year, he assumed the position of commander-in-chief to the armed group Spear of the Nation, which explained the ANC’s turn to violence in their manifesto:

The people prefer peaceful methods of change to achieve their aspirations without the suffering and bitterness of civil war. But the people’s patience is not endless. The time comes in the life of any nation when there remain only two choices: submit or fight. That time has now come to South Africa. We shall not submit and we have no choice but to hit back by all means within our power in defence of our people, our future and our freedom (Mandela, 1986, p. 122)

Although the manifesto expressed the ANC’s initial hope that nonviolence would prevail, it also demonstrated that the movement was frustrated that nonviolent tactics did not appear to be successful in achieving political aims.

Later, in his 1962 speech, “Land Ruled by the Gun,” Mandela declared that “hard and swift blows should be delivered with the full weight of the masses of the people” (Boehmer, 2008, p. 87). He used imagery of “freedom flames” that would “never be extinguished” in order to rally the masses to resisting apartheid (p. 87). His speeches continued to make use of violent rhetoric until his imprisonment in 1964.
Interactional Factors: Part 2

During his time as a political prisoner, Mandela began the slow journey back to nonviolent rhetoric and negotiations with the government that he opposed. His decision to enter negotiations in the late 1980s can be explained by two additional interactional factors: a better understanding of his enemies and broadened political horizons because of his time in prison.

Mandela’s relationship with his white prison wardens was instrumental to his decision to once again embrace nonviolence and negotiations. Over the course of his long imprisonment, Mandela developed close relationships with many of his guards, and he came to believe that “when an Afrikaner changes [his racist ways] he changes completely and becomes a real friend” (Hain, 2010, p. 157). He began looking at his prison “as a microcosm of a future South Africa, where reconciliation would be essential to survival and progress” (p. 161). This understanding led him to begin studying the Afrikaans language and Afrikaner history in order to better relate to those he would one day negotiate with for the future of his country (p. 143).

While Mandela’s growing understanding of Afrikaners helped him when he began negotiations with the South African government, the factor that was the most significant in pushing him toward the peace table was his broadened understanding of his political surroundings. The decades that Mandela spent in prison turned into an opportunity for him to refine his political philosophy. As South African scholar Elleke Boehmer explains:

> As many of the prisoners found, it was within this formidably abstracted yet also disciplined environment . . . that ideas might be held up for sustained inspection and thoroughly analyzed, explored through discussion and in the round. . . . As Mandela himself wrote in a key essay, ‘National Liberation’: [Here] [o]ne is able to stand back and look at the entire movement from a distance’ (Boehmer, 2008, p. 157)

By the end of the 1970s, Mandela spent most of his days in reading and group political and philosophical discussions with his fellow inmates (p. 58). Their long years in prison allowed
Mandela and his ANC comrades “to ponder political problems and processes (resistance, negotiation) in detail and from every available angle, literally for years” (p. 159). One of the many intellectual breakthroughs that Mandela experienced during his time on Robben Island Prison was that political dialogue between black Africans and white Afrikaners was necessary for national reconstruction (p. 54). Archbishop Desmond Tutu explained the enormous change that Mandela underwent during his time in prison: “While in prison Mandela grew in moral stature. The 27 years were a crucible that helped to remove the dross, turning a young angry activist into the magnanimous icon who amazed the world with his generosity of spirit, free from bitterness” (Hain, 2010, p. 13)

Final Rhetoric

Although the content of Mandela’s speeches changed over time, his shift to nonviolent rhetoric can be more easily understood by his use of symbolically nonviolent actions. In her essay “Nonviolent Theory on Communication,” Ellen Gorsevski argues that “symbolic public acts,” in addition to formal statements, are an important type of nonviolent rhetoric (Gorsevski, 1999, p. 451).

In the mid 1980s, Mandela made his second rhetorical shift by entering into negotiations with the South African government, closely paralleling Arafat’s entering into negotiations with Israel less than a decade later. He believed “that if he now stepped forward, he might author a fundamental turn in his country’s fortunes” (Boehmer, 2008, p. 67). He maintained that the ANC would not renounce violence until the group was given political rights (p. 68). After years of negotiation, Mandela was released from prison in February 1990, and in August he “announced the unilateral suspension of the ANC’s armed struggle” (Hain, 2010, p. 255).
Mandela used symbols of nonviolence and forgiveness in order to push his country toward peace. As Archbishop Desmond Tutu explains:

To his presidential inauguration he invited his former white jailer to attend as a VIP; he hosted a lunch for Dr. Percy Yutar, the prosecutor in the Rivonia trial who had wanted the accused to be sentenced to death; and he flew to have tea with the widow of Dr. Verwoerd, the high priest of apartheid. It was gestures such as these that turned the former terrorist into a president much loved by all (Hain, 2010, p. 13)

Furthermore, he helped create an environment of forgiveness and peace within South Africa through the 1996 Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In this commission, both victims and perpetrators of wrongdoings under the apartheid government came forward to “obtain moral and psychological release” from the country’s violent past (Boehmer, 2008, p. 78-79). Those who admitted their misconduct usually did not face judicial punishment; rather, under Mandela’s leadership, his nation decided to leave the past behind and move on.

Mandela: Conclusion

Nelson Mandela traveled along an interesting rhetorical path over the course of his long career. He began his involvement with the ANC committed to nonviolence, but he soon shifted to a violent rhetorical stance. However, by the time he was released from prison, he had embraced a mixed rhetoric; he did not renounce his use of violence in the 1960s, but he committed himself to nonviolence into the future. His path can be explained in terms of formative factors and two groups of interactional factors:

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<tr>
<th>Trajectory:</th>
<th><strong>Path B, then Path A</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leaders on Path B move from nonviolent rhetoric to more violent rhetoric, and leaders on Path A move from violent rhetoric to increasingly nonviolent rhetoric over time.</td>
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Formative Factors:

Nelson Mandela’s formative factors led him to use nonviolent rhetoric as he first rose to prominence.

1) **Childhood Experience**: Upper Class Upbringing
2) **Early Influences**: Booker T. Washington and Mahatma Gandhi
3) **Political Analysis**: Belief that Nonviolence was Effective

Interactional Factors, Part 1:

Nelson Mandela’s first set of interactional factors led him to embrace a more violent rhetoric in the 1960s.

1) **Popular Support**: South African Masses Supportive of Violence
2) **Political Analysis**: Belief that Nonviolence Had Become Obsolete

Interactional Factors, Part 2:

Nelson Mandela’s second set of interactional factors led him to embrace a mixed, mostly nonviolent, rhetoric after his release from prison in 1990.

1) **Understanding of Enemy**: Growing Relationship with Afrikaners
2) **Political Analysis**: Hope for Peace and Nonviolence Due to Political Education in Prison

Because of his commitment to nonviolence after his release from prison, Mandela has often been compared to one of his early political influences, Mahatma Gandhi. However, Mandela’s commitment to nonviolence was not morally based and uncompromising like Gandhi’s commitment was (Boehmer, 2008, p. 91). In fact, he was much more similar to another disciple of Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru. Nelson Mandela turned to Nehru as well as Gandhi [for inspiration], finding in him a political pragmatism and strong personal discipline that corresponded with his own. . . . Nehru’s acceptance of the principle of justified retaliation, and the frustration he experienced with respect to Gandhi’s determined pacifism, resonated with Mandela’s always-tactical, qualified adoption of a passive resistance stance (p. 93-94)

As the next section of this chapter will demonstrate, Jawaharlal Nehru had a similar approach to nonviolence as Mandela; he embraced nonviolence as long as he saw it as effective.
Jawaharlal Nehru

Jawaharlal Nehru was born in 1889 in Allahabad in British-controlled India. He grew up with his father Motilal, a prominent lawyer and politician, and studied at Cambridge University in England. He soon became involved in politics like his father, and he became a disciple of the nonviolent revolutionary Mohandas “Mahatma” Gandhi. After India achieved independence in 1947, Nehru was elected the nation’s first Prime Minister, and he played an important role in defining the new nation’s secular identity. Throughout his 17-year tenure as Prime Minister, Nehru “was forced to grapple with these central questions of Indian nationalist debate in an attempt to find a legitimate idiom of nationalism that, though fitting the criteria of being authentically Indian, was not narrow or sectarian” (Zachariah, 2004, p. 10). In general, he succeeded in creating this new national identity and in winning the love of his people (p. xxi).

In terms of rhetoric, Nehru followed a similar path to Martin Luther King; he began his career as a supporter of nonviolent resistance to British control of India, but later in his career he became more accepting of the idea of using violence to achieve national aims: the ending of segregation for King and Indian independence for Nehru. However, the reasoning behind this shift had more in common with Nelson Mandela; like Mandela, Nehru was always motivated by his thoughts on what means of resistance would be most effective for his country. He found inspiration in Gandhi’s message of nonviolence, but unlike Gandhi, he never committed himself to nonviolence unconditionally.

Formative Factors

Three formative factors played significant roles in forming Nehru’s initial support for nonviolence. His stable childhood and his early ideological influences made it likely that he
would embrace nonviolent rhetoric. However, the most important factor driving Nehru toward nonviolence was his initial analysis of nonviolence’s effectiveness as a tactic.

Much like Mandela and King, Nehru experienced a stable childhood where he did not experience violence on a personal level. He was born into “a well-connected, affluent and important political family, high in the ranks of the emerging Indian middle class” (Zachariah, 2004, p. 3), and he was very well educated, speaking 6 languages to varying degrees (p. 13-17). His high degree of education, from tutors both in India and abroad, could explain the nuanced understanding of nonviolence that he embraced early in his career.

Also important to Nehru’s initial choice to use nonviolent rhetoric was the strong ideological influence that Gandhi held over Nehru’s early career. Nehru first came into contact with Gandhi at the Lucknow Congress in 1916, but Nehru, an elite, western-educated lawyer, found it difficult to relate to Gandhi’s spiritual, ascetic style (Zachariah, 2004, p. 33). However, he soon came to take Gandhi seriously because he recognized the effectiveness of Gandhi’s campaigns in both India and South Africa (p. 33). Over time, Gandhi became a political mentor and “alternative father figure” for Nehru, who often disagreed with the moderate political views of his father, Motilal Nehru (p. 3). Gandhi focused on the power of Satyagraha, or “truth force,” and ahimsa, or “non-violence.” In his 1927 autobiography, Gandhi explained his moral and spiritual commitment to nonviolence:

This ahimsa [non-violence] is the basis of the search for truth. I am realizing every day that the search is in vain unless it is founded on ahimsa as the basis. It is quite proper to resist and attack a system, but to resist and attack its author is tantamount to attacking oneself . . . To slight a single human being is to slight those divine powers, and thus to harm not only that being but with him the whole world (Rathore, 2014, p. 8193)
Nehru admired the moral side of nonviolence, but he never thought of *Satyagraha* as a tactic that should be followed unconditionally (Coward, 2003, p. 26). His main motivation for accepting this tactic was his belief in its effectiveness.

When considering violent and nonviolent tactics, Nehru’s focus was the effectiveness of these tactics in achieving political aims; he was not drawn to *Satyagraha* as a search for truth as Gandhi was, and in fact Nehru did not believe that any truths were absolute (Coward, 2003, p. 26). However, he became a devoted follower of Gandhi’s nonviolent movement because he believed that it would be an effective tool in ending British control of India. Nehru believed that *Satyagraha* “was a program that enabled the weak and the poor to resist the strong” (p. 27). Meanwhile, while he did not have a moral objection to violence, he understood that armed resistance was unlikely to be effective against an enemy that was better armed; meanwhile, “satyagraha filled the masses with [the] confidence and strength” necessary to end British rule (p. 25).

**Early Rhetoric**

Much like Mandela, Nehru spoke often in his early career in favor of nonviolence, but he was always open about the fact that his devotion to the practice of *Satyagraha* was practical, not moral or religious. In his 1936 autobiography, he explained: “I did not give an absolute allegiance to the doctrine of nonviolence or accept it forever, but it attracted me more and more, and the belief grew upon me that, situated as we were in India and with our background and traditions, it was the right policy for us” (Nehru, 1936). This reasoning for supporting nonviolence explains his 1920 writings that praised the effectiveness of nonviolence. He wrote that “in spite of its negative name it was a dynamic method, the very opposite of a meek
submission to a tyrant’s will. It was not a coward’s refuge from action, but the brave man’s
defiance of evil and national subjection” (Rathore, 2014, p. 8193). At this time, Nehru’s public
rhetoric never supported the use of violence, but he nonetheless kept himself open to the
possibility that nonviolence might not work forever.

**Interactional Factors**

During his tenure as Prime Minister of India, Nehru’s rhetoric began to shift toward
language that was more accepting of the use of violence. This shift to a more mixed rhetoric can
be explained by two interactional factors: new political influences and his new political analysis
as a state leader.

One major factor in Nehru’s shift toward a more violent rhetorical stance was his
growing distance from Gandhi and his increasing commitment to a socialist ideology. When the
Non-Cooperation Movement was called off by Gandhi and failed to expel the British from India,
Nehru began looking for new political ideologies that might be more effective (Zachariah, 2004,
p. 57). He soon turned to socialism and communism “to better understand his political situation”
(p. 58). His new influences from communist regimes, such as China and the USSR, which had
come to power through violence, made him more accepting of the tactic. In a 1941 speech,
Nehru condemned the use of violence in the Russian Revolution but he justified this use of
violence to a certain degree, claiming that:

> Violence of the capitalist order seemed inherent in it; while the violence of Russia, bad
> though it was, [was] aimed at a new order based on peace and cooperation and real
> freedom for the masses. . . In balance, therefore, I was all in favor of Russia, and the
> presence and example of the Soviets was a bright and heartening phenomenon in a dark
> and dismal world (Nehru, 1941)
This move away from the non-violent Gandhi and toward more violent communist revolutionaries clearly played a significant role in Nehru’s political development later in his career.

Nehru’s position on violence shifted even further when he became Prime Minister of India and therefore had to think through political decisions as a state leader rather than an opposition leader. As a state leader, he had to consider the importance of defense for his country; he could no longer simply advocate for peace without pursuing other safeguards as well. Therefore, he established a large Indian army and began pursuing nuclear weapons (Mathal, 2013, p. 75). He came to admit that “the national State itself exists because of offensive and defensive violence” (Rathore, 2014, p. 8194). He explained that “under present conditions where nations are pitched against nations, violence seems almost inevitable” (p. 8194). While opposition movements could achieve certain successes while renouncing violence, running a state required a new way of thinking. Therefore, as Nehru’s thinking on running a country broadened, his political thinking began to expand and he began making use of both violent and nonviolent rhetoric.

Later Rhetoric

One of the clearest examples of Nehru’s rhetorical shift came in his 1949 speech at the founding of the National Defense Academy. While explaining the reasoning behind his support for strong armed forces in India, Nehru claimed:

We, who for generations had talked about and attempted in everything a peaceful way and practiced non-violence, should now be, in a sense, glorifying our army, navy and air force. . . . There was no greater prince of peace and apostle of non-violence than Mahatma Gandhi, the Father of the Nation, whom we have lost, but yet, he said it was better to take the sword than to surrender, fail or run away. We cannot live carefree
assuming that we are safe. Human nature is such. We cannot take the risks and risk our hard-won freedom (Pekarcsik, 2013)

In that same year, Nehru spoke of the possibility of a third world war. He expressed hope for avoiding such a war, but admitted, “Of course, no country dares take things for granted and not prepare for possible contingencies. We, in India, must be prepared for all possible danger to our freedom and our existence. That is so” (Shah, 1967, p. 95).

Many of Nehru’s speeches from the late 1940s followed a similar line of thinking: ideally, India will not use any violence, but the nation must be prepared to defend itself if necessary. As he was pushing for the acquisition of nuclear weapons in 1946, Nehru advocated for nuclear disarmament but at the same time pointed out that “if India is threatened she will inevitable try to defend herself” (Mathal, 2013, p. 75).

**Nehru: Conclusion**

Jawaharlal Nehru experienced his rhetorical shift for similar reasons to Nelson Mandela. Although other formative and interactional factors played a role in the rhetoric he chose, the most impactful influences over his rhetorical choices were his thoughts on which tactic would be most effective in achieving his political goals. Therefore, he supported Gandhian nonviolence when that nonviolence was effective, and once he came into power as India’s Prime Minister, he began exploring the option of violent rhetoric because that rhetoric was more effective for a state leader. His choices can be understood through the formative and interactional factors that impacted Nehru throughout his career:

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<th>Trajectory: Path B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leaders on Path B begin their careers with mostly nonviolent rhetoric, which becomes more violent over time.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Jawaharlal Nehru’s formative factors led him to use nonviolent rhetoric as he first rose to prominence as a follower of Gandhi.

1) **Childhood Experience**: Stable, Upper Class Upbringing
2) **Early Influences**: Mahatma Gandhi’s *Satyagraha*
3) **Political Analysis**: Belief that Gandhian Nonviolence was Effective

Nehru’s interactional factors led him to embrace a more violent rhetoric once he became Prime Minister of India.

1) **New Influences**: Socialism, Violent Communist Regimes
2) **Political Analysis**: Belief that States Must Be Prepared to Use Violence

Political influences, such as that of Gandhi and of communist revolutionaries, played a significant role in forming Nehru’s rhetoric over time and bringing him to a final type of rhetoric that used a mix of violent and nonviolent language. However, like Mandela, Nehru was motivated primarily by political efficacy, and he chose his tactics accordingly.

**Conclusion**

Mandela and Nehru both follow the model that this paper has previously established: leaders of opposition movements are most likely to begin their careers with rhetoric that is purely violent or purely nonviolent, and move toward a mixed rhetoric over time. Both leaders began their careers committed to nonviolence, and both became more open to other options later in their lives. They are unique from previously discussed leaders in that political analysis seemed to play an even more significant role for them than it did for Malcolm X, Martin Luther King, or Yasser Arafat; however, despite the varying factors that influenced them, all leaders walked similar paths to eventually mixed rhetoric.
Chapter 10: Conclusion

Introduction

This thesis has argued that leaders of opposition movements are most likely to begin their careers using either violent or nonviolent rhetoric almost exclusively, and that they will move toward a more mixed rhetoric later in their careers. To varying degrees, Malcolm X, Martin Luther King, Yasser Arafat, the leadership of Hamas, Nelson Mandela, and Jawaharlal Nehru have followed this path from purely violent or nonviolent rhetoric to a mixed rhetoric where they acknowledge the merits of both types of strategy.

Now that each leader has been examined in depth, this conclusion will review the paper’s arguments about the similarities between the formative and interactional factors that have occurred the most often in the lives of these leaders and influenced their rhetoric about strategy. Most leaders are initially influenced by formative factors that are related to their personal lives, whereas the interactional factors that they experience later in their careers are more likely to be related to their political analyses.

Formative Factors

Although some leaders take their initial positions on violence and nonviolence because of their views on the political efficacy of these tactics, they are more likely to pick their initial opinion because of influences from their personal lives. Of the three most common formative factors that influenced these leaders, only one was the leaders’ initial political analyses. The
other two most common formative factors were the leaders’ childhood experience and their early ideological influences.

Leaders on both of the paths to mixed rhetoric (from violence or nonviolence) picked their initial rhetoric in part because of their thoughts on which tactic would be the most effective for achieving their political goals. Both Yasser Arafat and Hamas initially chose violence in order to attract a political following and to garner international attention for their cause. On the other side, both Nelson Mandela and Jawaharlal Nehru were initially drawn to nonviolent rhetoric because they believed that nonviolence would be useful in reaching the political goals of their movements. Both initially looked to Gandhi’s successes and believed that they could use his methods to achieve their goals.

However, leader’s childhood experiences appear to be just as important as political analyses. Both Malcolm X and Yasser Arafat experienced loss and violence early in their lives; these negative childhood experiences made them predisposed to think of violence as a norm and therefore more likely to accept it as a tactic. Meanwhile, Martin Luther King, Nelson Mandela, and Jawaharlal Nehru grew up in comfortable, stable, upper class homes. None of these leaders experienced violence early in their lives, so they were less likely to turn to it as a tactic to achieve their goals. Furthermore, all three of these leaders were well educated, making them more likely to find inspiration in political thinkers such as Mahatma Gandhi rather than looking to wars as inspiration.

Early ideological influences also played a significant role in many of these leaders’ initial rhetorical choices. King, Mandela, and Nehru were all influenced by the work of Mahatma Gandhi and his philosophy of nonviolence; this made them more likely to give his model of nonviolence a try in their respective movements. Meanwhile, Malcolm X and Yasser Arafat
largely looked to international wars and revolutions for inspiration. In addition to the Nation of Islam, Malcolm X looked to revolutions in countries such as Kenya and Algeria as inspiration for his tirades against white America. Yasser Arafat also looked to Algeria for inspiration, seeing a country that had freed itself of the government that it rejected through the use of violence. Their study of violent action being used for political means made them more willing to support the use of violence in their own rhetoric.

**Interactional Factors**

While the formative factors influencing these leaders are often related to the leaders’ personal lives, interactional factors are much more likely to involve political analyses. Personal experiences also impacted the rhetoric of these leaders. For example, Mandela’s positive relationship with his white prison wardens made him more open to compromising with the Afrikaner government of South Africa, and Malcolm X’s experiences with non-racist white people on his Hajj to Mecca made him reconsider allowing white allies into his movement. However, in general, the main factors driving these leaders toward more mixed rhetoric were changes in their political surroundings. Three main interactional factors were common among these leaders: the desire for concessions from their opposition, the behavior of their followers, and new political analyses.

The desire for concessions only impacted leaders who initially chose violent rhetoric; this is to be expected, since a desire for concessions is most likely to push leaders toward negotiation with their opponents, which is a common way to extract political concessions. Because states prefer to work with actors that show moderation and a willingness to stop violence, a desire to improve relations with the state is likely to make radical leaders consider moderating their
rhetoric. While this factor only influenced leaders along Path A (moving from violent rhetoric to mixed rhetoric), it impacted all three leaders that were primarily on this path: Malcolm X, Yasser Arafat, and the Hamas leadership. Malcolm X was inspired by the successes of Martin Luther King’s nonviolent movement and began to consider employing similar tactics to achieve further successes. A few decades later, Yasser Arafat came to recognize that negotiations with Israel could give him international legitimacy as well as more concrete political concessions from Israel. Now, Hamas faces similar incentives to gain concessions through embracing nonviolent rhetoric and entering into negotiations with the Israeli government. Through such negotiations, Hamas could gain international legitimacy as Arafat did, and they could gain relief from the current economic sanctions on the Gaza Strip.

Changing behavior from followers of these leaders’ movements, however, affected leaders on both paths. Growing Palestinian support for nonviolence helped push Arafat to embrace the tactic, and this still-growing support is likely to push Hamas leaders in the same direction. Conversely, Martin Luther King’s rhetoric became more accepting of violence when his followers, particularly those in the northern United States, began using violence after losing faith that nonviolent resistance would improve their lives. Similarly, followers of Nelson Mandela’s African National Congress began turning to violence in the late 1950s, and Mandela decided to channel their energy into something productive by switching to violent rhetoric himself.

Additionally, changes in the political surroundings of these leaders and their movements have often impacted the rhetorical decisions made by these individuals. Yasser Arafat’s drive for international legitimacy was stronger after he lost legitimacy for backing Saddam Hussein in the
First Gulf War. He moved to the negotiation table to regain his lost legitimacy, and Hamas may soon make a similar move to make up for their currently strained relations with Syria and Iran.

These types of changes in political landscapes have also affected leaders who were initially nonviolent. When Jawaharlal Nehru became the Prime Minister of India, he realized that while opposition movements could be successful without using violence, states had to be willing to use violence for their own protection. Therefore, once he was a state leader, he switched to a more mixed rhetoric. Meanwhile, changes in political landscapes affected Nelson Mandela on two separate occasions. First, when the South African government began cracking down on nonviolent protests, Mandela came to the conclusion that nonviolent resistance could not be successful in defeating the apartheid regime, and he therefore switched to a more violent rhetoric. Years later, after spending decades refining his political philosophy while in prison, when the South African government approached him to discuss negotiations, Mandela once again embraced nonviolence and moved to a mixed rhetoric.

Through the impact of these interactional factors on leaders from many different regions of the world, one can see that changes in leader’s political environments are instrumental in pushing them to embrace a rhetoric that mixes violent and nonviolent language rather than one or the other.

**Competing Theories**

Other research has examined the choices that leaders and their organizations make concerning violence and nonviolence, though relatively few focus on shifts between the two. A 2014 study from Peace Research Institute Oslo argued that individual and group characteristics determine whether a movement will choose violent or nonviolent tactics but did not address
potential shifts between the two tactics (Dahl, Gates, Gleditsch, & González, 2014, p. 1). The researchers claim that

Non-violent tactics are likely to be attractive for large groups with a mobilization advantage and these have little to gain from shifting to violence. By contrast small groups can have feasible prospects for guerilla warfare in the periphery, and are unlikely to improve their position by shifting to nonviolence. Organizations rarely substitute between tactics, since actor profiles in practice change little over time and actors rarely have incentives to unilaterally change the tactics they chose at the outset of a conflict (p. 1)

This study gives important insight into some factors that push groups toward their initial choice of tactics. However, Marianne Dahl and her fellow researchers contend that shifts between violent and nonviolent tactics are rare, and they therefore do not address the causes of such shifts (p. 4). Consequently, this theory is not adequate to explain the phenomenon of opposition group leaders changing their support for violence or nonviolence over time, a phenomenon that can be seen not only in the six cases examined by this thesis but also in the case of the Irish Republican Army, which ceased most of its violent activities after a 1972 ceasefire as well as in the cases of the Italian Red Brigades, the West German Red Army Faction, and the Weather Underground, all of which increased their use of violence over time (Kurz, 2005, p. 15).

Some researchers have analyzed certain shifts between violence and nonviolence, although this research tends to be limited in scope. In 1983, Todd Sandler suggested that terrorist groups may switch to nonviolent tactics when facing the possibility of negotiations with the government that they oppose (Sandler, T., Tschirhart, J., & Cauley, J., 1983, p. 36). He uses the Rational Actor Theory, assuming that leaders will only consider what tactic is most likely to be effective (p. 36). The fact that the potential for negotiations can push leaders toward nonviolence is also supported by this thesis; a desire for concessions through negotiations was instrumental in the shifts of Yasser Arafat and Nelson Mandela toward nonviolent rhetoric. However, changes
on a more personal level can also affect rhetoric, as seen in the cases of Malcolm X (through his experiences in Mecca) and Nelson Mandela (through his improved understanding of Afrikaner culture), and these more personal factors go beyond the scope of Sandler’s research.

Mark Irving Lichbach also examined shifts between the use of violence and nonviolence; while Sandler and his fellow researchers focused on how violent movements might become more nonviolent, Lichbach examines circumstances in which nonviolent movements might turn to violent tactics. He argues that “an increase in a government’s repression of nonviolence will reduce the nonviolent activities of an opposition group but increase its violent activities” (Lichbach, 1987, p. 266). This argument certainly holds in the case of Nelson Mandela, where state repression of nonviolent protest motivated him to lead the ANC’s switch to violent resistance. However, this study illustrates a very specific condition under which groups will move from nonviolent to violent tactics. The broader model of interactional factors illustrates a greater diversity of motivations for a switch to support for violence, including the behavior of a leader’s supporters in the cases of Martin Luther King and Nelson Mandela.

The model of formative and interactional factors presented by this thesis is meant to be more inclusive than the theories that came before it; because of the range of factors that can affect each leader, it can be used to help predict the future rhetorical behavior of all opposition leaders rather than only leaders that fit a certain criteria.

**Predicting Future Behaviors**

Through the six leaders examined in this thesis, one can see the trend of leaders from both sides of the violence vs. nonviolence debate move toward a mix of the two sides over time.
Recognition of this trend may be helpful in predicting the future behavior of opposition group leaders from around the world.

Because formative factors tend to be based on personal experiences early in life, we can use the precedents set by the examples in this paper to predict what rhetoric a leader will embrace at the beginning of his career. If the leader grew up in poverty and therefore turned to violent communist revolutions for inspiration, he will likely use violent rhetoric early in his life. If he grew up in a comfortable, stable home and studied pacifist philosophers like Gandhi, he can be expected to embrace more nonviolent language.

However, depending on the political situations that these individuals find themselves in, both types of leaders may find themselves using similar rhetoric toward the end of their careers. As they move beyond their childhood influences, interactional factors such as popular support, relationships with their opposition, and their changing political understanding of the world will begin to play a role in forming their rhetorical choices. Most interactional factors can push leaders toward either violence or nonviolence, so it is most likely that the combination of all these formative and interactional factors will lead these individuals to eventually embrace a mixed rhetoric in order to satisfy their many and often conflicting goals.

Ultimately, by understanding the different factors that influence the rhetoric of opposition group leaders, political scholars can better understand the complex rhetorical trajectories that leaders have followed in the past. Furthermore, they can use this understanding to analyze the factors facing current opposition group leaders; they can better predict changes in these leaders’ rhetoric and therefore better predict the futures of many conflicts around the globe.

Finally, a clear policy implication of this work is that it can be useful to try to create incentives for leaders to move towards nonviolent contention. Although leaders that advocate
for violence may seem intractable, this thesis shows that their positions can and do change. Talks with leaders who have once utilized violent rhetoric have often led to moderation in rhetoric and a subsequent decrease in the use of violence within a movement (for example, in the cases of Yasser Arafat and Nelson Mandela). Therefore, discussions with such leaders should not be condemned, for they can be instrumental in finding nonviolent solutions to a once-violent conflict.
Works Cited


Appendix

Introduction

When I decided to make the focus of this thesis violent and nonviolent rhetoric, I realized that there was no simple way to illustrate rhetorical shifts over time. Because rhetoric can be difficult to quantify, the majority of my analysis came from a qualitative rather than quantitative analysis of each leader’s changes in rhetoric. However, I realized that unless I analyzed every major speech made by each leader, it would be difficult to show that the statements I analyzed were parts of larger trends in their rhetoric. For this reason, I attempted to illustrate the rhetorical trajectories of two of the leaders that this thesis focuses on: Malcolm X and Martin Luther King, Jr. I quantified these trajectories by counting the number of times that “violent” terms and “nonviolent” terms showed up in each speech.

Method

In order to keep this process somewhat simple, I identified 14 terms that are largely considered violent and 14 terms considered to be more nonviolent. These terms are listed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Violent Terms</th>
<th>Nonviolent Terms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fight</td>
<td>Boycott</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack</td>
<td>Rally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bomb</td>
<td>March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kill</td>
<td>Protest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Demonstrate/Demonstration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death/Dead</td>
<td>Sit-In</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invade/Invasion</td>
<td>Elect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destory/Destruction</td>
<td>Candidate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War</td>
<td>Withdraw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force</td>
<td>Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bullet</td>
<td>Vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun</td>
<td>Ballot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blood</td>
<td>Love</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent/Violence</td>
<td>Nonviolent/Nonviolence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I then analyzed 18 speeches by Malcolm X and 16 speeches and sermons by Martin Luther King by searching for each violent and nonviolent term and recording the total of “violent” and “nonviolent” language used in each speech. Through graphing the number of “violent” and “nonviolent” terms found in each speech, I was able to illustrate how each leader’s use of violent and nonviolent language changed over the course of their careers.

Data

Through searching for violent and nonviolent terms in each speech from Malcolm X and Martin Luther King, I was able to create the following graphs:

![Malcolm X Violent and Nonviolent Rhetoric](image)

**Figure 7**

Figure 7 was created using the following data:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speech and Date</th>
<th># Nonviolent Terms</th>
<th># Violent Terms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Queen’s College Speech – 5/5/60</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Man’s History – 12/1/62</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Black Revolution – 6/1/63</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Message to the Grassroots – 11/10/63</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speech and Date</td>
<td># Nonviolent Terms</td>
<td># Violent Terms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rediscovering Lost Values – 2/28/54</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA Mass Meeting at Holt Street Baptist Church – 2/5/55</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birth of a New Nation – 4/7/57</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Realistic Look at the Question of Progress in the Area of Race Relations – 4/10/57</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8, showing Martin Luther King’s rhetorical trajectory, was created using a similar set of data:

![Figure 8: King Violent and Nonviolent Rhetoric](image)
These data sets should be understood with the important caveat that these terms have been taken out of their original context. The leaders’ changing use of these terms over time can give us insight into overall trends in their rhetoric, but it is important to keep in mind that not all violent terms were always used in a violent way, and vice versa. For example, Martin Luther King condemned violence in many of his early speeches, but his use of the word “violent” made his rhetoric appear more violent on these graphs when he was in fact spreading the opposite message. However, when combined with a quantitative analysis of important speeches in these leaders’ lives, these data sets can paint an overall picture of the rhetorical shifts that Malcolm X and Martin Luther King experienced over the course of their careers.